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From 1945 to 1947, the US Army prosecuted over 200 individuals from the Japanese military 
who were accused of committing war crimes against US and Philippine military and civilian 
personnel during the period of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. At these trials, war 
crimes trials from WWI and earlier conflicts provided useful guidance for some points of law 
upon which the trials could rely. Legal edicts (usually from General Douglas MacArthur’s 
office) provided further rules that the trials were obliged to follow. However, the trials also 
developed the law as they went and provide valuable jurisprudence that is, as yet, relatively 
undiscovered. 
The US Army trials in Manila were among the first of the Allied trials conducted after the 
Pacific War and represent law-making at a critical juncture at a time when war crimes 
jurisprudence was in its formative stages. These trials represent more than just the machinations 
of a hastily thrown-together judicial body in the aftermath of war—these trials represent an 
epoch in law making where complex legal issues of criminal responsibility for war crimes were 
considered and crafted. The Manila trials provide a significant body of jurisprudence to add to 
the existing body of laws in regard to establishing the legal standards and relevant law for 
command responsibility, superior orders and military necessity. 
The central question posed in this thesis is how did the jurisprudential approaches to criminal 
responsibility at Manila contribute to, or provide guidance for other war crimes trials? This 
question relates to the normative aspects associated with how the law ought to be as far as 
command responsibility, superior orders and military necessity are concerned. 
This thesis posits that the Manila trials provide clarity of law in relation to the doctrine of 
command responsibility, superior orders and military necessity. The trials indicate that there 
are at least eight instances where commanders could be convicted for the unlawful acts of 
subordinates. In relation to the defence of superior orders, in most cases, the trials favoured the 
‘intermediate’ test to determine the liability of subordinates for carrying out unlawful orders. 
In relation to attempts by defendants to use military necessity as a defence to war crimes, the 
Manila trials held firmly to the stance of not allowing the doctrine of military necessity to be a 
defence to war crimes. 
As such, the law espoused from the Manila trials represents a form of justice that is consistent 
with the principles of ‘just war’ theory, specifically, jus in bello and jus post bellum. This is 
because the rationale underlying the judgments appears to align with the core principles of the 







I. Prelude to the Allied War Crimes Trials in the Asia–Pacific 
On 26 July 1945, with only weeks to the end of the Pacific War, the United States of America, 
Great Britain, and the Republic of China declared in the Potsdam Declaration, ‘stern justice 
shall be meted out to all war criminals including those who have visited cruelties upon our 
prisoners’.1 
True to their word, at the conclusion of the war in the Pacific, the Allied Powers2 established 
military tribunals to prosecute thousands of Japanese military personnel accused of committing 
war crimes against the Allies and the civilian populations of Asia and the Pacific.3 These trials 
were conducted throughout the Asia–Pacific region on a scale yet unmatched. The outcomes 
of these trials resulted in the conviction of thousands of Japanese military personnel for war 
crimes such as murder, torture, and other atrocities committed against Allied prisoners of war 
(‘POW’) and non-combatants.4 Those convicted of war crimes received either prison sentences 
or, in many cases, the death penalty. 
As was the case with the European trials, the Asia–Pacific war crimes trials frequently 
encountered complex ethical and legal questions in relation to the criminal responsibility of 
 
 
1 ‘Potsdam Declaration’ (26 July 1945): Annex A-1, Judgment International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East. 
2 The United States, Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, France, China, the Soviet Union, and 
the Philippines. 
3 See appendix of this dissertation, ‘Other Notable Allied Trials of the Asia-Pacific War’ for a brief 
overview of the British and Australian war crimes trials. 
4 At the time of the Pacific and European trials, there was no fixed definition of a ‘war crime’. Rather, 
war crimes were captured in a series of treaties and conventions from as early as the 19th century such 
as the various incarnations of the Hague Conventions of 1899, 1907 and 1929 involving the 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, and 
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War that outlawed certain conduct during time of 
war. In 1949, the Geneva Conventions and the subsequent protocols provided additional codification 
of the laws of war and war crimes. Customary international law for centuries prior had banned 
conduct such as murder and the mistreatment of captured military personnel. Examples of the types of 
crimes with which the accused were charged during the US Army trials in the Philippines—and will 
therefore form the basis of investigation for this thesis—include crimes such as the mistreatment and 
abuse of Allied personnel and non-combatants such as beating, extra judicial murder, placing in 
solitary confinement, superiors permitting atrocities to be committed by subordinates, and the wilful 
and unlawful failure to discharge duties of commanders to prevent the commission of atrocities by 




those accused of war crimes. Three issues that often arose were known as the doctrine of 
‘command responsibility’, the defence of ‘superior orders’ and the defence of ‘military 
necessity’. 
Command responsibility relates to whether criminal liability would apply to superiors for the 
alleged criminal actions of subordinates, particularly where there existed little or no evidence 
that the superior participated in, gave direct orders for, or even knew about, the alleged 
wrongdoing.5 Commonly referred to as the doctrine of command responsibility, this form of 
criminal attribution was, and remains, problematic on various levels, particularly due to the 
ethical questions associated with convicting a person for a crime where their involvement is 
uncertain or indeterminate. The enduring nature of the ethical validity of convicting superiors 
for a crime they did not commit is as relevant now as it was throughout history. 
Defendants frequently raised obedience to superior orders and military necessity to justify their 
conduct. The defence of superior orders, though rarely accepted as a full defence to a charge 
of war crimes, relies on the assumption that the accused acted only out of their duty to obey 
orders.6 Also less likely to be accepted at the tribunal level was the so called plea of military 
necessity which is predicated on the notion that certain actions should be excluded from 
criminal liability on the basis that the conduct was necessary to achieve certain military 
objectives. 
Particularly in the early stages of the Allied war crimes trials in the Asia–Pacific, military 
commissions, tribunals and courts struggled with delineating extant international law and 
adapting that law to the legal questions that confronted them. Part of the problem was due to 
the lack of clear and comprehensive legal direction at the outset of the trials in regard to these 
legal questions. The absence of a clear understanding of how to deal with these difficult legal 
questions ensured there was a corresponding gap in creating a just and equitable legal 
framework and, often, military commissions throughout the Allied war crimes trials struggled 
to produce a coherent legal justification for their decisions.7 
 
 
5 Mirjan Damaska, ‘The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility’ (2001) 49(3) The American 
Journal of Comparative Law 455, 455–6. See also Alexandre Skander Galand, Emile Hunter and Ilia 
Utmelidze, ‘International Criminal Law Guidelines: Command Responsibility’ (Case Matrix 
Network, Centre for International Law Research and Policy, 2016) 5 <https://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/7441a2/pdf/>. 
6 United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC) ‘Chapter X: Developments in the Doctrine of 
Individual Responsibility of Members of Governments and Administrators of Acts of State, of 
Immunity of Heads of State, and by Superior Orders’ in Complete History of the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War (HMSO, London 1948) 274. See also 
Koji Kudo, ‘Command Responsibility and the Defence of Superior Orders’ (Doctor of Philosophy 
Thesis, University of Leicester, 2007) 7. 





One group of trials where these problems were frequently encountered were the trials 
conducted by the US Army in Manila from 1945 to 1947 which prosecuted approximately 200 
Japanese individuals accused of war crimes. The Manila trials, while not unique in terms of the 
volume of prosecutions or the legal issues raised, are nonetheless important to the contribution 
to and development of international law, given the important questions of criminal 
responsibility that were raised during those trials. 
The Manila trials provide an opportunity for international law to draw on a range of decisions 
that focussed on the ethical and legal boundaries of criminal responsibility. They are an 
exposition of ideas and theories regarding the nature of criminal responsibility in relation to, 
inter alia, such issues as the duties and liabilities of superiors in time of war, the role of 
subordinates regarding unlawful orders and the nature of what can be deemed acceptable 
conduct during war to achieve military objectives. 
The issues raised during the trials are as relevant today as they were over 70 years ago when 
the prosecution, at times, struggled to justify why Japanese superiors should be prosecuted for 
war crimes committed by their subordinates when there was little to no direct evidence linking 
them to the actual crimes for which they were charged, other than superiority in rank. 8 
Similarly, historical trials such as the Manila trials also shed light on the problems that can 




War: Essays in Political Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 43–46. Rengger asserts that 
the laws of war are in a constant state of ‘catchup’ and this is reflected in the ‘juridicalization’ of law 
once something new develops. The same can be said about the Allies regarding the formulation of 
new laws to deal with criminal responsibility. 
8 The doctrine of command responsibility raises the prospect of a dilemma due to the fact that another 
person (a superior) may face liability which is attributed to the unlawful conduct of their subordinates. 
This notion of criminal responsibility does not sit well with preconceived notions of fairness and 
justice, as in law, it should be the perpetrator who faces criminal sanction. For instance, where a 
subordinate commits a criminal offence, under the doctrine of command responsibility, the superior 
may face criminal sanction for failing in their duty as a superior to prevent or punish the offending 




II. Thesis Overview 
A. Thesis Question 
 
The central question posed in this thesis is how the jurisprudential approaches to criminal 
responsibility at Manila contribute to, or provide guidance for other war crimes trials. This 
question relates to the normative aspects associated with how the law ought to be as far as 
command responsibility, superior orders and military necessity are concerned. 
B. Thesis Arguments 
This thesis posits that the Manila trials contributed to the development of the law in relation to 
command responsibility, superior orders and military necessity in the following ways: 
1. Command responsibility: The Manila trials identified at least eight instances where 
commanders can be convicted for the unlawful acts of subordinates pursuant to the 
command responsibility doctrine; 
 
2. Superior orders: The Manila trials developed and applied an ‘intermediate’ test as the 
most appropriate test to determine liability for subordinates carrying out unlawful 
orders; and  
 
3. Military Necessity: The Manila trials limited the development of the doctrine of 
military necessity as a defence to charges of war crimes. 
  
Command responsibility: In relation to argument number 1, the instances where a 
commander can be held criminally responsible for criminal acts committed by subordinates, 
are: 
1) the existence of superior–subordinate relationship and  
2) evidence that the commander personally participated in the crime or 
3) the commander ordered the unlawful conduct or 
4) the commander failed to prevent the crime (acquiescence) or 
5) evidence that the commander failed to punish the perpetrators of the crime or 
6) whether the commander had knowledge or suspicions of unlawful conduct or 
7) whether the commander incited subordinates into carrying out the unlawful conduct or 
8) the level of control exerted by the individual commander and whether the commander 
failed to control subordinates. 
 
Superior orders: In relation to argument number 2, the defence of superior orders, the Manila 
trials accepted that superior orders could, under the right circumstances, be used as a defence 
to mitigate the harshness of the penalty, but not to absolve criminal responsibility of those who 




Military necessity: In relation to argument number 3, the doctrine of military necessity, the 
Manila trials unequivocally limited its use as a defence to war crimes. The Manila trials did, 
however, articulate—albeit in vague terms—the ‘general rule’ regarding the ‘three 
interdependent principles of military necessity’. Cases were particularly vague in relation to 
how the fault element (mens rea) should be regarded in terms of whether it should be a 
subjective or an objective assessment. Despite this, the Manila trials were consistent with the 
jurisprudence and doctrine of other historical trials supporting the proposition that the doctrine 
of military necessity should not be expanded to what it currently is. This is due to the unlimited 
scope that the defence of military necessity could provide those accused of war crimes since 
any conduct could constitute a defence if that action was carried out in furtherance of fulfilling 
a military objective.  
An assessment of ‘Justice’ at the Manila Trials through the ‘Just War’ Lens 
The judgments of the Manilla trials go beyond the pronouncements of guilt of individual 
Japanese soldiers: they provide an overarching narrative as to how Japanese forces should have 
conducted themselves in relation to US POWs and non-combatants. These principles are 
relevant today as they were then. The ‘just war’ tradition provides an important lens through 
which to assess the validity of the Manila war crimes trials and the law espoused during those 
trials to determine whether justice was served or whether the trials represent nothing more than 
‘victor’s justice’.  
C. Thesis Aims 
The aim of this thesis is to shed light on the doctrinal application of criminal responsibility in 
international criminal law by examining a group of trials conducted by the US Army in Manila 
from 1945 to 19479 and comparing them to other historical trials where similar questions arose. 
Based on a doctrinal legal analysis of the Manila trials and other historical cases from 
elsewhere, the intent is to delineate a normative framework for how the law ought to be 
interpreted in respect to command responsibility, superior orders and military necessity. As 
such, this thesis aims to be of interpretive value not only for other war crimes trials, but also in 
understanding the nature of these complex areas of law. 
The aims will be achieved by using a variety of legal case studies from Manila and elsewhere 
to critically examine and analyse problems centred around criminal responsibility in 
international criminal law. 
 
 
9 As will be discussed in the methodology section, this thesis utilises a vast array of historical case 
studies and legal codes to explore the development of, and provide context to, criminal responsibility 




This thesis is not an attempt to rewrite history nor is it a continuation of the discourse that has 
sought to condemn much of what the Allied trials set out to achieve in the wake of WWII.10 
With that in mind, however, it is important to highlight and acknowledge instances where legal 
mistakes occurred. As will be shown, mistakes did occur along the way. It is arguable that 
certain aspects of the trials did not conform with international notions of ‘justice’11 and as such, 
on some occasions, the trials did little to advance the development of international criminal 
law jurisprudence in relation to war crimes. As unfortunate as these mistakes were, reviewing 
these trials (and others like them) provides an opportunity to learn from the mistakes of the 
past.  
It should also be kept in mind that this investigation in no way serves as an apology for any 
injustices meted out by the Allies against Japanese war criminals who, it must be said, 
undeniably committed some of the most heinous acts against human beings the world has ever 
seen. Rather, this investigation will examine a critical aspect of WWII where important areas 
of war crimes jurisprudence concerning criminal responsibility were developed. 
 
 
10 Much has already been written on condemning the conduct of the Allies in the aftermath of the 
Pacific War. Principally among them, for example, see Richard H Minear, Victors’ Justice: The Tokyo 
War Crimes Trial (Princeton University Press, 1972). In this seminal text, Minear is a vocal opponent 
of the way that the Allied forces established and prosecuted the IMTFE. He provides a substantial 
narrative on the legal deficiencies at international law in relation to the motives behind establishing 
war crimes trials in general and the IMTFE in particular. He also discusses the legal problems 
associated with the specific charges that were levelled at the Japanese defendants such as those 
charges relating to conspiracy, individual responsibility at international law, war of aggression, ex 
post facto liability and so on. Perhaps Minear’s criticisms are best viewed in the context in which he 
wrote this work, which was at the height of the Vietnam War, and one cannot help but feel that 
Minear’s opposition to the IMTFE was predicated, at least to some extent, by the possible hypocrisy 
of the selectivity of US authorities in choosing when and when not to prosecute war crimes. The 
inscription at the opening page says much for this proposition: ‘Dedicated to the many Americans 
whose opposition to the war in Indochina has made them exiles, criminals, or aliens in their own 
land.’ 
Others who have also contributed to criticising the conduct of war crimes trials, particularly the 
IMTFE and General Douglas MacArthur’s role in the trials, include, Dayle Smith, Judicial Murder? 
MacArthur and the Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Createspace, 2013); Dayle Smith, MacArthur’s 
Kangaroo Court (Envale Press, 1999). In recent years, scholars have tried to move beyond the 
common narrative of ‘victors’ justice’ that serves to criticise the IMTFE and look for other ways in 
which to assess legal questions arising from the Tokyo Trial – see, eg, Yuki Tanaka, Tim McCormack 
and Gerry Simpson (eds), Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited, 
International Humanitarian Law Series (Martinus Nijhoff, 2011). 
11 The term ‘justice’ is fraught with interpretational issues and is dependent upon whom is defining it 
and in what period the term is defined. Essentially, the term is normative in the sense that it comprises 
values and other moral ideals as to how societies should or ought to be governed. The Allies during 
WWII referred widely to ‘justice’ and from this, it is possible to glean a sense of the meaning as it 




D. Methodological Approach 
The broad methodological approach adopted for this research can be described as qualitative 
doctrinal legal research (QDLR). QDLR attempts to discover ‘what the law is in a particular 
area. The researcher’s sole aim is to describe a body of law and how it applies’.12 To describe 
what the law is, the researcher engages in an examination of cases, legislation, codes and other 
jurisprudence that sheds light on the doctrinal nature of what the law ‘is’ and what it ‘should’ 
be in accordance with precedential legal doctrine. It is important to discern judicial reasoning 
and other promulgated laws since that is what sets the relevant legal standards at law. These 
standards are then followed or developed in subsequent cases as the facts dictate. The doctrinal 
aspects of command responsibility, superior orders and military necessity are discussed in 
Chapters 1, 2, 5 and 8 respectively. In those chapters, the thesis explores the historical 
foundations of the various doctrines and the legal rationale that underpinned the judgments 
according to each case.  
Having established the relevant legal standards based on cases and other legal instruments, the 
thesis then examines and compares those judgments to key cases tried at Manila. These cases 
will add to the body of case law and will enable an examination of the normative position on 
what the law should be with the fullness of legal doctrine from those cases. The law, as 
determined at the Manila trials, is discussed in Chapters 3, 6 and 9 while the normative 
discussion of what the law ought to be—based on a greater body of cases and other laws with 
the inclusion of the Manila trials—is presented in Chapters 4, 7 and 9. Chapter 10 will then 
provide an overall qualitative assessment of the trials and the law through the ‘just war’ 
theoretical lens.  
E. The rationale for selecting the Manila trials of the US Army 
The original scope of this thesis was to examine archival documents generated from the trials 
of US, UK and Australian military commissions that took place after the Pacific War. The 
source documents of these trials are located in College Park, Maryland (near Washington DC), 
London and Canberra, respectively. While those documents are reasonably accessible in a 
physical and linguistic sense,13 the same could not be said for the original scope of the thesis. 
The original intention to examine three complex legal issues (i.e. command responsibility, 
superior orders and military necessity) spanning three nations would have made the scope of 
the research far too broad. 
 
 
12 Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in Michael McConville and Wing 
Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2007) Chapter 1. 
13 Being predominantly a monolinguist (with intermediate level Japanese language skills), I am 
unfortunately unable to engage with non-English language archives despite the undoubted advantage 




It quickly became apparent whilst reviewing the US Army trial records at the National Archives 
and Records Administration (NARA) at College Park that the Manila records provide a very 
useful discussion on the three legal issues which were being investigated. The US Army’s 
Manila records provide a sufficient number of cases to justify a single research project looking 
at the doctrine of command responsibility and the defences of superior orders and military 
necessity and so the scope of the study was limited to the US Army trials in Manila. 
There are, however, certain advantages and disadvantages of focussing on one set of trial 
documents. One advantage is that one is able to devote more time into one set of archival 
documents and gain a better understanding of the issues and subject matter contained within 
them. A disadvantage of focussing on one group of trials is, however, that one is unable to 
determine with certainty whether one trial series is truly representative of the issues that arose 
at other Allied trials. That being said, however, the legal complexities surrounding the doctrine 
of command responsibility and the defences of superior orders and military necessity have an 
enduring legacy over time and place. The extensive way that the Manila trials dealt with these 
issues provides a useful portal through which to examine these issues in depth. While it may 
not be completely possible to say that the Manila trials of the US Army were representative of 
all Allied war crimes trials, it is arguable that this group of trials is very useful for researchers 
to glean sentencing patterns in relation to the doctrine of command responsibility and the 
defences of superior orders and military necessity. 
A further reason for selecting the US Army’s Manila trials was that they were conducted in the 
shadow of the highly influential and controversial Yamashita v Styer 317 US 1; 66 S. 340 (US 
Supreme Court) (‘Yamashita trial’) and Honma trial conducted in the Philippines shortly after 
the conclusion of the Pacific War. It is interesting to understand whether sentencing patterns at 
other US Army trials at Manila were influenced by the outcome of the Yamashita and Honma 
trials. 
Another reason to investigate the Manila trials is that, despite the scale of the Allied war crimes 
trials conducted in the Asia–Pacific arena, research by legal scholars of the Philippine trials 
has been relatively sparce.14 Albeit with some exceptions, research has predominantly focussed 
on several major trials of World War II such as the International Military Tribunal for 
Nuremberg (IMTN), the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) and, in the 
Pacific context, the Yamashita and Honma trials.15 
 
 
14 One exception to this is Yuma Totani, Justice in Asia and the Pacficic Region, 1945–1952: Allied 
War Crimes Prosecutions (Cambridge University Press, 2015). Totani provides an excellent overview 
of both English and Japanese scholarly literature on this topic. It should be noted, however, as will be 
discussed below in the literature review section, Totani does not exclusively examine the Manila 
trials, but adopts a broad view of the trials and has explored other nations’ trials. 
15 See Jeanie M Welch, The Tokyo Trial: A Bibliography Guide to English-Language Sources 




F. Case Studies 
This study relies on case studies taken from the trials of approximately 200 Japanese 
individuals who were tried at Manila by the US Army. It is not possible, nor desirable, to report 
on every single one of those trials because not all of the cases dealt with aspects relevant to 
command responsibility, superior orders or military necessity. 
With a number of cases, patterns began to emerge that formed convenient categories to group 
the cases. Categories arose such as the nature of the offences, the types of charges, the 
individual traits of the defendants (eg rank and the part the defendant played in the commission 
of the offence), the defences they raised, sentencing, and so on. It was then possible to select 
one or more cases that were representative of that particular group. 
On that basis, case studies were selected in accordance with the following criteria: 
1) rank (eg mid to senior ranks);16 
2) function/ role performed by the individual (eg POW camp commander); 
3) individuals who committed offences against US/ Allied personnel; 
4) individuals who committed offences against Filipino non-combatants; 
5) nature and seriousness of the offences (ie whether the accused was treated differently 
if the offence occurred against US military personnel as opposed to Filipino non-
combatant); 
6) the types of defences raised (ie defence of superior orders or military necessity); and 
7) whether the defendant was charged in accordance with command responsibility.17 
G. Legal Research on Allied War Crimes – Justification of the research 
Notably missing in the war crimes literature in relation to the Asia–Pacific region, is a doctrinal 
study that examines criminal responsibility so far as it relates to the doctrine of command 
responsibility and the defences of superior orders and military necessity. The US Army’s trial 
records emanating from the Manila trials are one set of trials that squarely raise these issues. 
 
 
16 Notably, there appears to be an absence of research regarding trials of lower and mid-ranking 
defendants. There are several publications that have focused on senior military figures. This 
dissertation distinguishes itself from other research due to the focus that this research has on lower 
and mid-ranking military personnel. 
17 For the command responsibility trials, it was clear that anyone exercising effective control over 
another could be charged pursuant to command responsibility and the rank of the superior did not 
matter in the determination of criminal responsibility. 
One major category of defendants was comprised of the POW camp commanders tried for wrongful 
acts of their subordinates. 
Unsurprisingly, those individuals occupying lower positions of authority seemed more likely to raise 
the defence of superior orders or military necessity. Given that scenario, quite a number of these 




The issues raised during those trials are as relevant today as they were over 70 years ago when 
the prosecution struggled to justify why Japanese superior officers should be prosecuted for 
war crimes committed by their subordinates when there was no direct evidence linking them 
to the actual crime. Similarly, dilemmas were identified when Japanese subordinates raised the 
defences of superior orders and military necessity on the basis of the harshness of the law 
versus the leniency in allowing perpetrators to escape criminal liability. Research such as this 
is, therefore, a normative investigation of what the law should be, based on principles of justice 
and the rule of law. 
There has, however, been some exceptional research undertaken on a range of issues regarding 
the Allied military war crimes trials of the Asia–Pacific. It has tended to focus on questions 
associated with evidentiary matters, procedural fairness and other administrative processes in 
establishing the various tribunals.18 Unlike other research projects, this thesis makes a new 
contribution to the knowledge and understanding of this topic because it examines cases that, 
as yet, have remained underrepresented in much of the literature. It is also differentiated from 
other projects by its focus on the legal discourse of command responsibility, superior orders 
and military necessity, as opposed to focussing on other aspects such as the political, 
procedural, or evidentiary matters. As noted above, some authors have specifically written on 
‘command responsibility’, ‘superior orders’, or ‘military necessity’.19 However, often these 
issues were not the primary focus of their investigation. 
One recent exception to this is Yuma Totani20 who provides a very detailed account of 14 
separate trials centred on command responsibility (Totani’s research is discussed in more detail 
below). Researchers often present their findings on command responsibility, superior orders 
and military necessity as a small part—usually just one or two chapters—of a larger research 
project. The result of presenting these issues in this manner is that the reader gains a good, but 
general overview of these matters. In the existing literature there does not appear to be a single 
study that is committed to examining all three of command responsibility, superior orders, and 
military necessity. This study goes beyond recounting individual cases but remains true to legal 
doctrinal analysis and makes a contribution to knowledge by suggesting possible ways to 
enhance the operation of how criminal responsibility is decided. 
With the exception of Piccigallo21 and Totani, researchers of the Allied war crimes trials in the 
Pacific have tended to focus on a single nation as opposed to examining and comparing several 
nations at a time. One recent extraordinary piece of scholarship that focuses on the Australian 
 
 
18 See, eg, Caroline Pappas, ‘Law and Politics: Australia’s War Crimes Trials in the Pacific, 1943–
1961’ (PhD Thesis, University of New South Wales, 1998). 
19 Michael Carrel, ‘Australia’s Prosecution of Japanese War Criminals: Stimuli and Constraints’ (PhD 
Thesis, University of Melbourne, 2005). 
20 Totani, (n 15) 14. 
21 Philip R Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945–1951 




trials is the work of Fitzpatrick, McCormack and Morris and other contributing authors, entitled 
Australia’s War Crimes Trials 1945–1951.22 Published in 2016, this comprehensive study 
comprises over 900 pages, and analyses the 300 Australian trials conducted throughout the 
Asia–Pacific in the aftermath of WWII. In this three-part volume, the authors explore a range 
of themes and legal issues that arose throughout those trials. It contains, inter alia, three 
chapters related to command responsibility 23  and superior orders. 24  Other scholarship 
regarding the Australian trials, includes, for example, authors such as Aszkielowicz, 25 
Fitzpatrick,26 Morris,27 Okada,28 Pappas,29 and Sissons,30 who examined the Australian war 
crimes trials; while Pritchard31  and Sweeney32  researched the British and Canadian trials, 
respectively. Other authors have covered the Yokohama trials; and much is written on the 
Yamashita trial.33 Sharon Chamberlain in her recent book examines the Philippine trials as 
conducted by the newly independent nation of the Philippines after the US Army concluded its 
 
 
22 Georgina Fitzpatrick, Timothy L H McCormack and Narrelle Morris (eds), Australia’s War Crimes 
Trials 1945–1951 (Brill/ Nijhoff, 2016) International Humanitarian Law Series, Volume 48. 
23 See Gideon Boas and Lisa Lee, ‘Command Responsibility and Other Grounds of Criminal 
Responsibility’ in Georgina Fitzpatrick, Timothy L H McCormack and Narrelle Morris (eds), 
Australian War Crimes Trials 1945–1951 (Brill/ Nijhoff, 2016) 134–173; and Yuma Totani, ‘Crimes 
Against Asians in Command Responsibility Trials’ 266–290. 
24 Ibid, Monique Cormier and Sarah Finnin, ‘Obedience to Superior Orders and Related Defences’ 
174–195. 
25 Dean Aszkielowicz, The Australian Pursuit of Japanese War Criminals, 1943–1058: From Foe to 
Friend (Columbia University Press, 2017); Dean Aszkielowicz, ‘After Surrender: Australia and the 
Japanese Class B and C War Criminals, 1945–1958’ (PhD Thesis, Murdoch University, 2012) 
<http://researchrepository.murdoch.edu.au/12180/2/02Whole.pdf>. 
26 Georgina Fitzpatrick, ‘War Crimes Trials, “Victor’s Justice” and Australian Military Justice in the 
Aftermath of the Second World War’ in Kevin J Heller and Gerry J Simpson (eds), The Hidden 
Histories of War Crimes Trials (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
27  Narrelle Morris, ‘“Gross inefficiency and criminal negligence”: The Services Reconnaissance 
Department in Timor 1943–45 and the Darwin War Crimes Trials in 1946’ (2017) 31(2) Intelligence 
and National Security 179–194. 
28 Emi Okada, ‘The Australian Trials of Class B and C Japanese War Crime Suspects 1945–51’ 
(2009)(16) Australian International Law Journal 47. 
29 Pappas (n 19) 18. 
30 ‘Australian War Crimes Trials 1945–1951’, Papers of David Sissons, National Library of Australia, 
MS3092, Series 10, < http://www.nla.gov.au/ms/findaids/3092.html#prefercite1>. 
31 R. John Pritchard, ‘The gift of clemency following British war crimes trials in the Far East, 1946–
1948’ (1996) 7(1) (1996/02/01) Criminal Law Forum 15. 
32 Mark Sweeney, ‘The Canadian War Crimes Liaison Detachment – Far East and the Prosecution of 
Japanese “Minor” War Crimes’ (PhD Thesis, University of Waterloo, 2013). 
33 Adolf Frank Reel, The Case of General Yamashita (Chicago University Press, 1949); Michael L 
Smidt, ‘Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary Military 
Operations’ (2000) 164 Military Law Review; Ilias Bantekas, ‘The Contemporary Law of Superior 
Responsibility’ (1999) 93(3) The American Journal of International Law 573 xv; Richard L Lael, The 




trials in 1947. While Chamberlain examines individual trials, a major focus of her research was 
concerned with the broader implications between the Philippines and Japan and what the trials 
meant for post-war reconciliation. 34  Unfortunately, Dutch, Soviet, French, Chinese and 
Philippine scholars remain underrepresented in the literature. 
Why researchers would focus on a single nation rather than adopting a comparative approach 
is understandable given the voluminous amount of archival material in various languages. 
There are, however, benefits in adopting a comparative approach when researching the Pacific 
trials. Only by comparing how the various nations and, more importantly, individuals operating 
closely after war, interpreted and applied hastily drafted law is one able to glean a deeper 
understanding and make comparisons between each nation in relation to command 
responsibility, superior orders, and military necessity.35 
David Sissons, in his seminal work, The Australian War Crimes Trials and Investigations 
(1942–51)36 provides an account of the command responsibility trials conducted by Australia. 
That account, one section within his broader research project, is limited to the Australian 
context only and does not extend to other Allied nations. Although Sissons provides a fine 
account of command responsibility in so far as the Australian trials are concerned, a broader 
discussion of command responsibility would be useful to gain a more holistic understanding 
of this complex and evolving concept.37 
Similarly, Pappas, in 1998, provided a comprehensive account of Australia’s policies, 
procedures and practices of the trials as part of a PhD thesis.38 She dedicates one chapter to 
‘Senior Officer and Command Responsibility Trials’.39 That chapter is one part of a larger 
question, is not central to the thesis and deals only with the Australian trials. 
 
 
34 Sharon Chamberlain, A Reckoning: Philippine Trials of Japanese War Criminals (University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2019). 
35 These legal and ethical questions relating to command responsibility, superior orders and military 
necessity have existed since war has existed, and are not unique to the Pacific War trials. See, eg, 
Yoram Dinstein, Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (Cambridge 
University Press, 2004); Roberta Arnold, Maria L. Nybondas, ‘Command Responsibility and Its 
Applicability to Civilian Superiors’ (2013) 11(4) (September 1, 2013) Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 943; Aziz Mohammed, ‘Military Culture, War Crimes and Superior Orders’ (PhD 
Thesis, Bond University, 2008). 
36 D C S Sissons, ‘The Australian War Crimes Trials and Investigations (1942–51)’ (undated) . 
37 To gain a deeper appreciation of the complexities and issues that arise with command 
responsibility, this thesis dedicates a substantial section to the doctrine in the hope that one is able to 
discern the origins and evolution of the doctrine. The wish is that by doing so, one is able to further 
the debate of the application of command responsibility as a whole, rather than how it was applied 
solely at one group of trials. 
38 Caroline Pappas, ‘Law and Politics: Australia’s War Crimes Trials in the Pacific, 1943–1961’ (PhD 
Thesis, University of New South Wales, 1998). 




Michael Carrel, in his 2005 PhD thesis, ‘Australia’s Prosecution of Japanese War Criminals: 
Stimuli and Constraints’, 40  dedicates one of fifteen chapters to command responsibility, 
superior orders and military necessity. While Carrel provides a very thorough account of these 
questions within the Australian trial context, the chapter is not central to the thesis as a whole. 
Rather than exploring the doctrinal elements of a particular area of law, Carrel appears to be 
broadening his discussion relating to the establishment and conduct of the trials by Australia. 
Similar to the early works of Sissons and Pappas, Carrel provides only an Australian 
perspective on command responsibility trials. In contrast, this thesis seeks to provide a broad 
discussion of the doctrine of command responsibility—including its historical evolution and 
contemporary context, when applying key findings of the Philippine trials to recent war crimes 
cases. 
Philip Piccigallo: ‘The Japanese on Trial’ 
The work of Piccigallo deserves special mention. It would be nearly thirty years after the 
Pacific trials before someone produced a comprehensive account of the Allied war crimes trials 
in the Asia–Pacific. In 1979, Philip Piccigallo completed his work, The Japanese on Trial: 
Allied War Crimes Operations in the East.41 Picigallo appears to be the first to provide a 
comprehensive commentary of the entire Allied war crimes trials—albeit contained within 265 
pages. He provides various statistical data in relation to the trials. They include the number of 
trials conducted, the number of accused, the number of convictions, numbers relating to those 
who received the death penalty, numbers relating to life convictions, and those who were 
acquitted.42 Piccigallo warns of possible deficiencies with the numbers, however, particularly 
due to the exclusion of Soviet data due to the Cold War. 
The lack of Soviet data does little to detract from the benefit of Piccigallo’s work; the major 
problem with it is his reliance on non-primary trial data—a sentiment echoed recently by 
Totani.43 Piccigallo mostly relies on secondary sources to substantiate his claims44 and this is 
a flaw in his work. He relies mostly on government publications, news accounts, and another 
author, John Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes (Bobbs-Merrill 1954) for 
 
 
40 Michael Carrel, ‘Australia’s Prosecution of Japanese War Criminals: Stimuli and Constraints’ (PhD 
Thesis, University of Melbourne, 2005). 
41 Piccigallo (n 22) 781. 
42 Ibid 264. Piccigallo provides two tables showing disputed figures – Table A from a Japanese 
source: Homu Daijin Kanbo Shiho Hosei Chosabu: Senso hanzai saiban gaishi yo [General History 
of Trials of War Crimes, Tokyo 1973]; while Table B shows consolidated statistics taken from Allied 
governmental sources for American, British, and Australian trials. Despite the slight discrepancy in 
numbers in relation to certain categories, the numbers between the two groups of figures remain 
relatively close with a maximum statistical variance of approximately 5.5%. 
43 Totani (n 15) 145. 




most of his statistics.45  Piccigallo does make the point, however, that his work does not 
‘examine exhaustively’ the thousands of Allied war crimes trials conducted throughout the Far 
East; although he concedes that such a study is ultimately needed.46 One would need to keep 
this in mind when drawing any extrapolations from the numerical data he presents. 
Although not a lawyer, one interesting observation Piccigallo offers is the temporal connection 
between the higher number of death sentences handed down at the beginning of the trials, 
versus the lower number of death sentences given— many of which were later commuted to 
prison terms—in the closing period of the trials. According to Piccigallo, this sentencing 
pattern reflects the level of aggrievement the individual nations felt towards Japan in 1945 and 
that the sentencing practices in the early part of the trials ‘reflected a greater intensity of 
wartime passion, and less tempered compassion’ than sentences in the later stages of the 
trials.47 
Piccigallo has been criticised by some who argue that his analysis sorely ignores the myriad 
deficiencies of the trials. This is despite his express claims of objectivity, in the ‘Von Rankean’ 
tradition.48 Richard Minear is one such critic who argues that Piccigallo’s ‘entire book is an 
attempt to undermine criticism of the Tokyo trial and the many minor trials’.49 Minear makes 
this assertion on the basis that Piccigallo deliberately ignores ‘larger issues’, such as the causes 
of the Pacific War, the fact that the Allies also committed war crimes, and that Piccigallo 
explores nothing of the alleged Japanese crimes themselves.50 Minear, an historian as opposed 
to a lawyer, is critical of Piccigallo due to Piccigallo’s non-critical approach to the Allied war 
crimes trials. In essence, Minear seems to be asserting that Piccigallo is an apologist for any 
errors or injustices that the Allies meted out against the Japanese after the war. 
 
 
45 Ibid 274. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court UN Doc A/CONF.183/9 138, 138–9. 
For example, Piccigallo cites, among others, the following to substantiate his statistical claims 
throughout the book: US Department of State, Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress, Publication 
2671 (Washington, DC, 1947); Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Trials of Class “B” and 
“C” War Criminals. History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan (Tokyo, 1952); 
John Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes (Bobbs-Merrill, 1954); US Department 
of Navy, Final Report, v I; Stars and Stripes (Tokyo); US Department of State, Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1948, 17 October 1948; John R Pritchard, The Nature and Significance of British 
Post-War of Japanese War Criminals, 1946–1948; Australian Encyclopedia, War Crimes Trials; 
United Nations War Crimes Commission, ‘History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
and the Development of the Laws of War’ (HMSO, 1948); and at least 16 different newspapers. 
46 Piccigallo (n 22) 21, xiii. 
47 Ibid 66. 
48 Ibid xv. 
49 Richard Minear, Victors’ Justice (Princeton, 1971) 138. 
50 Ibid 138–9. Although, Piccigallo does offer some reasons why the Japanese committed such acts of 
cruelty, ie, Japanese unyielding adherence to strict discipline; blind obedience; obsessive empire 




That Minear would make such a claim is understandable given the volatile context in which he 
wrote his seminal work, Victor’s Justice. Minear produced this oft-cited work at the time the 
US was embroiled in a bitter conflict in Vietnam. His criticism of the IMTFE and the Pacific 
trials seems somehow linked to his criticism of US foreign policy in relation to Vietnam, since, 
as he asserts, much of the foreign policy of the US in the 1950s and 60s stems from an 
emboldened and victorious US in the European and, especially, Pacific theatres of war.51 
There is some merit in Minear’s accusation that Piccigallo failed to critically reflect upon the 
Allied trials. Minear’s argument is supported by Piccigallo’s tendency to use emotive 
statements such as, the ‘Japanese waged … a ruthless and inhumane campaign against 
opposing military forces and local civilian populations’.52 The apparent irony that the same 
could be said about the Allies, particularly with the bombing of Japanese cities, appears lost on 
him. 
Another useful contribution that Piccigallo offers is the detailed way in which he describes the 
Allied ‘procedures’ and ‘machinery’53 for naming, locating and prosecuting Japanese military 
personnel suspected of engaging in war crimes against each of the Allied nations.54 He asserts 
that his study ‘seeks only to lay the groundwork for … further inquiry into Japanese war crimes 
trials … and makes no claim to definitiveness’. 55  Piccigallo’s objective was to provide 
‘sweeping overviews of each nation’s war crimes trials program’.56 He has thus left open the 
opportunity for others to pick up where he finished but, sadly, few have attempted the 
challenge. Piccigallo’s work stands as a useful introduction for understanding the trials, and as 
a platform for further research into the Allied war crimes trials of the Asia–Pacific. 
His work has influenced this work in so far as Japanese on Trial provided a detailed overview 
of the Allied war crimes programme which, in turn gave an indication of the sorts of records 
that were available, albeit during the 1970s. Given that Piccigallo was not a lawyer, the legal 
analysis contained in Japanese on Trial was general at best, and therefore allows scholars to 
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Yuma Totani: Justice in Asia and the Pacific Region, 1945–1952 
One recent publication that is clearly a standout in contemporary literature on the Asia–Pacific 
war crimes trials is Yuma Totani’s Justice in Asia and the Pacific Region, 1945–1952: Allied 
War Crimes Prosecutions.57 Although Totani does not appear to be trained as a lawyer, but as 
an historian,58 her book is a comprehensive analysis of 14 separate trials of senior ranking 
Japanese army and navy officers. She poses a number of questions primarily concerned with 
understanding how ‘the doctrine of command responsibility, first introduced at the famous 
Yamashita trial (1945) and subsequently applied broadly at other Allied courts, helped the 
prosecution, the defence, and the judges resolve knotty issues’.59 By posing these questions, 
she asserts that, her research 
sheds light on the Allied courts’ complex, and at times contradictory, findings on theories of 
criminal orders and knowledge, the Japanese system of command and control, organizational 
versus individual responsibility, and guilt or innocence of accused persons. A close inquiry into 
the jurisprudential legacy of the Allied war crimes trials will enable one to begin developing 
useful conceptual tools with which to tackle issues of Japanese institutional and individual 
responsibility of WWII-era mass atrocities.60 
Totani is upfront with the reader regarding the boundaries and limits of her research. She 
restricts her analysis to 14 trials out of the thousands conducted, and furthermore, of those 14 
trials, concedes that all were conducted by American, Australian, British, or Philippine 
authorities. In other words, she has only considered trials conducted by the Anglophone 
nations, to the exclusion of the Dutch, Russian, Chinese, and French trials. Her rationale for 
restricting the number of trials is more to do with the plethora of available archival information 
that one would need to assess to widen her scope which could run in excess of millions of 
documents.61 
Totani further argues the case for limiting her analysis to English language sources on the basis 
that Anglo-American proceedings are freely available as opposed to the documents of other 
nations.62 A further reason why she has restricted her analysis to only a few trials is due to the 
fact that by ‘focusing on the trials of high-ranking individuals allows one to see the larger 
picture of the Allied war crimes program …’ which includes the benefits of examining the 
trials in the context of ‘Asian decolonization’ particularly as it related to the British trials.63 
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Such a targeted approach to examining the trials is not without merit and the corollary of 
Totani’s research is an extremely well-researched and articulated narrative of a number of 
significant command responsibility trials. Totani’s analysis is further aided by her ability to 
engage with primary and secondary Japanese language sources—a skill that few Western 
researchers can boast. 
There may, however, have been some benefit had Totani extended her analysis to junior 
ranking personnel to determine whether the same legal reasoning permeated down to those 
ranks, as this thesis aims to achieve. Had she done so, one would arguably be in a position to 
determine whether the same law was being applied holistically, or whether there was a 
disconnect between the application of law based on rank. 
This thesis offers no criticism of Totani’s approach and it agrees with her rationale for selecting 
the methodology she has adopted. In fact, such an approach is very sensible given the practical 
limitations with which researchers are faced. Totani has, however, left open the possibility for 
others to build on her findings in Justice in Asia and the Pacific Region, which could be 
achieved by focusing on, for example, other command responsibility trials, such as the trial of 
Baba Masao and several others.64 
Additionally, while it is obvious that Totani is a fine historian and has squarely raised a number 
of crucial legal elements throughout the book, she has not explored in finer detail the doctrinal 
basis and historical-legal evolution of command responsibility, superior orders, and military 
necessity. It is for this reason that legal scholars are able to offer a crucial point of departure 
from Totani’s fine work. Legal scholars have the opportunity—perhaps even a disciplinary 
imperative—to engage in an exploration of the jurisprudential elements of the trials. As such, 
they are able to explore in greater depth a range of elements of criminal responsibility 
emanating from the trials such as: mens rea, knowledge, strict and vicarious liability, the effects 
of orders, mistake of fact/ law, duress, and necessity, to name a few. 
In so doing, legal scholars are able to explore the underpinning legal principles that perhaps 
explain why these specific principles exist and why currently there are deficiencies in the way 
the law is applied. On that basis, as a point of differentiation to Totani’s work, this thesis 
explores criminal responsibility not just from an historical perspective, but with a view to 
suggest possible reforms for contemporary legal interpretation. 
H. Summary of Observations and Findings from Manila 
As will be shown in the proceeding chapters, the Manila trials were presented with a series of 
complex legal questions that required the tribunals to consider possible defences relating to, 
among others, command responsibility, superior orders and military necessity. Research into 
 
 





these cases reveals common sentencing patterns and legal reasoning that are summarised 
below.  
These findings, when assessed in light of the ‘just war’ tradition, show that overall the Manila 
trials can be considered ‘just’ in so far as the law upheld in the trials was representative of the 
principles according to jus in bello and just post bellum, as will be outlined in Chapter 10. 
Command Responsibility  
The Manila trials:  
1. Applied ‘contingent liability’ where an accused could be convicted due to the position 
they occupied even where evidence was absent that they knew or gave orders relating 
to the crimes; 
2. Implemented a broad interpretation of mens rea: The essential element to convict an 
accused—knowledge—was often broadly interpreted by tribunals so that the accused 
was presumed to have known or would have known that war crimes were being 
perpetrated under their command; 
3. Defined ‘disregarding and failing to discharge’ duties based on the individual’s rank; 
4. Broadened the meaning of the charge ‘permit’ atrocities to occur: Commissions often 
broadened the scope of the term, ‘permit’ to the extent that an accused was held to 
‘permit’ crimes to have occurred even when the accused did not give actual permission, 
or when they did not take pro-active measures to inquire about or punish alleged 
perpetrators; 
5. Applied intermediary liability: Those who occupied positions between subordinates 
and higher raking officers or civilian entities were often held responsible for the actions 
or failures of those more senior; 
6. Applied a broad interpretation of ‘effective control’: Commissions applied a broad 
definition of ‘control’ that effectively made an accused liable when they were 
physically not present or otherwise did not know about the atrocities; 
7. Engaged in inconsistent sentencing due to ‘temporal disconnection’: There were 
significant variations in sentencing—those sentenced early in the trials received harsher 
sentences than did those who were sentenced towards the end of the trials; 
8. Applied the ‘proximal’ principle: An accused could be held liable for similar offences 
where they were in ‘proximal’ location to subordinates who committed other offences; 
9. Did not allow the apparent inability to prevent, punish or deter subordinates from 
committing atrocities to be a valid factor in mitigation.  
 
Superior Orders 
The Manila trials:  
1. Highlighted the difficulties associated with attributing liability by allowing superior 
orders to be used as a full defence to war crimes. There was a concerted effort to 
disallow superior orders as a defence for criminal wrongdoing. Despite the existence 




or in mitigation of sentence, military commissions were reluctant to accept a plea of 
superior orders or to extend the doctrine further. 
2. Demonstrated subjective bias due to the status/ role of the accused: Consideration to 
superior orders was often contingent upon the nature/ status of the accused as to whether 
military commissions would or would not accept superior orders to mitigate the 
sentence. For example, Kenpeitai or others accused of committing offences against US 
military personnel were less likely to be successful in having their sentence mitigated 
on the basis of superior orders. 
3. Relied on the presumption that the defence of superior orders is akin to an admission 
of guilt: An accused who seeks to rely on the defence of superior orders ipso facto 
makes admissions to part or all of the acts for which they are charged. Defendants who 
raised superior orders generally fared no better than if they had denied the acts for which 
they were charged and not raised superior orders as a defence. 
4. Accepted superior orders was a major contributing factor to the crime, in a few cases 
and subsequently, the orders were treated as a point for sentence mitigation where the 
evidence was clear. Some military commissions in Manila accepted that superior orders 
were relevant in so far as the sentence was concerned. Where evidence clearly showed 
the defendant was following orders from higher command, even where those orders 
were manifestly unlawful in the commission’s view, the commissions were prepared to 
reduce the sentence (particularly for sentences involving the death penalty) but not to 
relieve the accused of complete criminal responsibility. 
5. Favoured a mitigation of sentence on the basis of superior orders in instances including: 
(1) where ambiguity existed regarding the lawfulness or unlawfulness of orders; (2) 
where it was clear the accused was following those orders; (3) where the accused did 
not wish to follow those orders, but did so out of legal compulsion; (4) where the 
accused derived no pleasure from and had no desire to and did not intend to commit 
such acts; and (4) where disobedience to those orders would result in severe punishment 
to the accused. 
 
Military Necessity 
The Manila trials:  
1. Developed a definition that did not extend the use and application of the doctrine. 
2. Developed a general rule known as the Three Interdependent Principles: 
(a) The principle of military necessity [is] subject to the principles of humanity and 
chivalry; (b) The principle of humanity, prohibiting employment of any such kind or degree 
of violence as is not actually necessary for the purpose of the war; and (c) The principle of 





3. Developed and applied an ambiguous test in determining the elements of military 
necessity, particularly in relation to whether the fault element (mens rea) was 
subjective or objective: An aspect of military necessity requires that there be no 
‘cruelty’ – but to determine whether cruelty was present, there was no clear 
application in regard to whether the test was subjective (i.e. what was in the mind 
of the accused at the time of the offence), or objective (i.e. whether a reasonable 
person would consider the acts of the accused to be cruel given the circumstances). 
 
Chapter Overview 
Chapter 1 of the thesis begins with a discussion of the establishment of the US Army war 
crimes trials in Manila. It provides important context behind the establishment of the trials with 
a particular focus on the introduction of the legal rules (in particular, the Yamashita trial 
precedent) that were used at the trial. Chapter 1 also provides a general overview of the nature 
of the types of punishments, conviction rates, and the rationale behind the limited availability 
of the defences of superior orders and military necessity. 
Chapter 2 explores the historical attributes of command responsibility and in doing so, places 
the US Army trials at Manila in historical context in relation to command responsibility. The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide greater context and clarity surrounding the problems of 
command responsibility jurisprudence. 
Chapter 3 delves into the Manila ‘Command Responsibility Trials’ and shows how the law 
coming from the trials was often redefined and manipulated to suit a conviction based on 
command responsibility. A cross-section of trials is presented with a view to gaining insights 
into how the various issues in relation to the doctrine of command responsibility were dealt 
with by the military commissions. A substantial focus is dedicated to the jurisprudence coming 
from the trials that clearly show how the tribunals attributed criminal responsibility to Japanese 
commanders for the actions of their subordinates. 
Chapter 4 ties together Chapters 2 and 3 and provides a normative reconceptualisation of the 
elements of command responsibility by elucidating a framework for how command 
responsibility ought to be regarded in international law in light of the Manila trials and other 
trials throughout history where command responsibility was at issue. In view of the problems 
experienced with command responsibility and the inherent injustices associated with arbitrarily 
applying this doctrine, a detailed analysis of the reformulation of the elements of command 
responsibility is offered as a possible mechanism for application in other contexts. 
Chapter 5 examines the first of two defences frequently raised at the Manila trials, the defence 
of superior orders. This chapter explores superior orders in other contexts, most notably WWI 
and how various military codes dealt with superior orders. The chapter shows that while 





Chapter 6 examines how superior orders was regarded at the Manila trials and looks at various 
primary sources that reflect the contradictory positions held by US authorities regarding its use 
as a defence to war crimes. 
Chapter 7 ties together Chapters 5 and 6 and provides a normative framework of how the 
defence of superior orders ought to be regarded in other contexts. It examines jurisprudential 
concepts associated with the identified rules as respondeat superior, absolute liability, the mens 
rea aspects and articulates a new formulation regarding how the defence of superior orders 
ought to be regarded. 
Chapters 8 and 9 move on to the second defence, military necessity. Chapter 8 provides an 
overview of military necessity as it was applied at Manila and in other contexts, in doing so, 
making it clear that military necessity has been used very frequently over time by States to 
justify and legitimise a whole range of actions that could, on the face of it, quite easily be 
deemed to be actions amounting to war crimes. The way the Manila trials dealt with questions 
of military necessity was to largely ignore it as a valid defence to war crimes. This chapter 
squarely raises a vexed issue of profound importance for contemporary international criminal 
law and the Laws of Armed Conflict whereby States will justify military action of their own, 
but will go to great lengths to condemn similar actions when committed by enemy forces. 
Chapter 9 provides the normative rationale of the situations in which military necessity might 
be used as a valid basis for certain actions in order to fulfil a military objective. This chapter 
asserts that a valid theory of military necessity should focus on aspects such as the onus and 
standard of proof and three interdependent principles. 
The concluding chapter of the thesis ties together the discussion by returning to the initial 
question posed in the Introduction: 
This thesis seeks to determine how the jurisprudential approach to defining criminal 
responsibility at Manila contributes to, or provides guidance for other war crimes 
trials. This question relates to the normative aspects associated with how the law ought 
to be in so far as command responsibility, superior orders and military necessity are 
concerned. 
 
In short, as it will be shown, the answer to this question is multi-faceted. While legal historians 
have a multitude of case studies available to them in examining contemporary jurisprudential 
questions, the Manila trials provide a complex array of cases that illustrate how the law should 










ESTABLISHING THE US ARMY WAR CRIMES TRIALS 
IN MANILA 
I. Setting the Rules 
The Judge Advocate Section at US General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area was 
responsible for undertaking war crimes investigations in the Philippines during and for a short 
time after the War.65  Responsibility for investigating war crimes and prosecuting alleged 
violations later changed to the War Crimes Trials Division (WCTD) of the Philippines-
Ryukyus Command once the new body was established in October 1945. 66  Before the 
Philippine authorities reclaimed responsibility for prosecuting the remaining Japanese 
defendants in 1947, the WCTD prosecuted 87 war crimes cases comprising 191 defendants.67 
These trials represent one small, but crucial, part of the Allied war crimes programme in the 
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A. The Yamashita Precedent 
The Manila trials are significant for international criminal law because it was in Manila that 
the first significant attempt was made by US authorities to bring Japanese leaders to justice for 
war crimes allegedly committed in the course of war. The high profile Yamashita trial 
conducted in the Philippines in the early months after Japan’s surrender is still controversial 
and attracts debate to this day. Yamashita, the commander of the Imperial Japanese 14th Area 
Army in the Philippines, was indicted, convicted and later executed on allegations of war 
crimes committed by his forces against Philippine civilians. Given that researchers and 
international jurists have constantly referred to the Yamashita trial in recent times, one wonders 
what other benefits there might be for future war crimes trials the more we uncover about the 
dozens of lesser known cases that were also tried in the Philippines. 
The Yamashita trial laid the groundwork for many of the procedural rules later adopted 
throughout the course of the trials of lesser-ranked individuals that followed. The case also 
created what would become known as the ‘Yamashita precedent’ which set the precedent for 
making superiors criminally liable for war crimes committed by their subordinates.69 Much has 
been written on this trial. Suffice it to say for the purpose of this discussion, General Yamashita 
Tomoyuki was charged with ‘willful [sic] disregard and failure to discharge his duty…’ and 
‘permitting’ war crimes to be committed by his subordinates.70 A total of 123 particulars was 
provided in relation to the charge which read like a litany of some of the most heinous offences 
known to war crimes. These included acts such as: burning, pillage, looting, destruction of 
property, killing, massacre, rape, mutilation, mistreatment of the civilian population, 
extermination of the civilian population, starvation, torture, maiming, burning alive, and so 
on.71 
Yamashita claimed he did not know of, or give orders to commit, any of the acts for which he 
was charged. He also contended that due to the chaos and success of the US counter-offensive, 
Japanese command structures had all but eroded and, on that basis, he should not be held 
accountable for the actions of those whom he had no ability to control. Despite his defence 
team raising these points, and a series of appeals that went to the US Supreme Court, General 
Yamashita was convicted on the basis of command responsibility and was executed on 23 
February 1946.72 General Yamashita was one of the first to be convicted under the command 
responsibility doctrine, hence the term the ‘Yamashita precedent’. 
In broad terms, the Yamashita principle was predicated on the notion that because he was the 
most senior person responsible for the IJA in the Philippines, he therefore bore all 
responsibility. While the Yamashita case was important to highlight the principle that a senior 
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commander could and would be held responsible for the conduct of his subordinates—even 
when no evidence existed that he gave direct orders to commit war crimes—it soon became 
apparent that the Yamashita jurisprudence could not readily be applied to all cases. To do so 
would mean that any commander of any rank could be held liable for unlawful acts committed 
by any subordinate providing there was some link between the subordinate and the commander, 
no matter how tenuous that link might be. Outside of the principle that stated commanders 
could be held liable for acts committed by subordinates, the Yamashita precedent was, to a 
large extent, not operable. The scope of liability was too broad and further refinement of the 
principle was required as and when these cases arose. Yamashita’s status made it less 
problematic to hold him accountable for war crimes due to his executive position over the entire 
14th Area Army in the Philippines but to hold junior officers responsible to the same extent was 
a problem, even for military tribunals.  
The Manila trials dealt with a range of facts that were manifestly different to the Yamashita 
case and needed to be assessed on their own merits. The Manila trials provide significant 
judicial discussion on the finer points of command responsibility jurisprudence and, together 
with Chapters 2 and 3, have contributed to the normative discussion on the reformulation of 
the elements of command responsibility outlined in Chapter 4.  
B. Severity of Punishment 
The US Army’s war crimes commission in Manila prosecuted cases of the most severe kind 
and, as such, the death penalty was frequently applied.73 Although the overall number of trials 
conducted in Yokohama far exceeded the number of trials conducted in Manila, the offences 
tried in Yokohama ranged substantially in severity from minor offences to the more severe 
offences.74 The severity of offences tried at Manila from 1945 to 1947 is reflected also in the 
rate of convictions. According to Piccigallo’s assessment, the number of defendants convicted 
and executed at Manila greatly exceeded that of any other US military commission conducted 
in the Asia–Pacific region. Piccigallo cites statistics that show the number of defendants 
sentenced to death at Manila was around 43% of those tried.75 In other words, nearly half of 
the defendants tried at the Manila trials received the death penalty. 
In comparison, the number of death sentences handed out at other trials in the Asia–Pacific 
were fewer (ie Yokohama 5%, China 13%, and the Pacific Islands 8%).76 Why were these 
figures so low in comparison to the number of death sentences handed down in Manila? Was 
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it to do with the sheer brutality the Japanese forces inflicted upon the people of the Philippines 
and the POWs during their fateful occupation of the Philippine Islands?77 Or were there other 
(political) factors at play? Was there a special vindictiveness displayed by the US military 
commissions in the Philippines due to the loss of face the US military experienced at the hands 
of an advancing Japanese expeditionary force several years prior? The extraordinarily high 
numbers of prosecutions and death sentences (in comparison to other US military commissions 
elsewhere) make the Philippine trials a compelling series of trials to examine. 
C. High Rate of Convictions for Command Responsibility 
The command responsibility trials, as they came to be known, arose because the Allies wished 
to prosecute Japanese commanders and staff officers of all ranks for certain acts committed by 
subordinates.78 The objective behind the use of the doctrine of command responsibility is to 
hold liable those persons (including civilian and military) in positions of responsibility, for the 
acts perpetrated by subordinates under their command. The idea of command responsibility is 
to hold those in positions of influence to account even where there exists little or no evidence 
that the superior participated in, knew of, or ordered war crimes to be committed. Each of the 
Allied nations that participated in the trials prosecuted senior Japanese officers for crimes 
against Allied POWs and civilians.79 The various charges related to, for example, the ill-
treatment of POWs on the Sandakan–Ranau death marches, failure to discharge their duties as 
Commander to control the conduct of the members of their command, and failure to prevent 
brutal atrocities and other crimes.80 
A unique perspective of the legal discussion surrounding command responsibility by the US 
military is offered by Adolf Frank Reel in his book, The Case of General Yamashita.81 Reel 
was one of six US military defence lawyers assigned to defend General Yamashita Tomoyuki. 
While unique in terms of being a firsthand account, Reel’s book deals only with one trial—
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albeit an important precedential trial for US and Allied trials—and is limited in its discussion 
in regard to other US trials conducted subsequent to the Yamashita trial. 
D. The Limited Availability of the Defence of Military Necessity 
The accused at Manila were, for the most part, deprived of the opportunity to claim ‘military 
necessity’ as a valid excuse for certain acts committed where it was alleged those acts, while 
potentially a war crime, were committed to achieve a military objective. The term ‘military 
necessity’ is generally defined as covering those acts by a belligerent that serve to ‘legitimize 
destructive actions and to privilege military considerations at the cost of humanitarian 
values’.82 Throughout the Manila trials, military necessity was repeatedly raised by an accused 
as a defence to charges of war crimes on the basis that the circumstances in which the accused 
acted was purely to promote a military objective, rather than satisfy any ‘blood lust’ or criminal 
intent.83 
At the time of the Manila trials, the concept of military necessity was nothing new. But it was 
not until 1956 when the United States Department of the Army Field Manual (‘US Army FM’) 
defined military necessity as: 
that principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which are 
indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible. Military 
necessity has been generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden by the customary and 
conventional laws of war inasmuch as the latter have been developed and framed with 
consideration for the concept of military necessity.84 
E. The Limited Scope of the Defence of Superior Orders 
Throughout the Manila trials, defendants frequently pleaded, with little success, the defence of 
superior orders on charges of war crimes. The defence of ‘superior orders’ is predicated on the 
assumption that an accused should avoid criminal responsibility for acts done while under the 
orders of a superior, simply because soldiers owe a ‘duty of obedience … to their superior 
officers’.85 The ‘defence’ of superior orders, as it is often called, however, is not an absolute 
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defence to an allegation of war crimes under international law. The way ‘superior orders’ is 
regarded by most scholars is that it works to mitigate punishment rather than to completely 
defeat the charge. Some possible problems exist with this interpretation given the severity of 
punishment that a subordinate would face if he or she refuses even unlawful orders. 
Possibly one of the most articulate legal scholars to enunciate the operation of superior orders 
is Yoram Dinstein in his seminal text, The Defence of ‘Obedience to Superior Orders’ in 
International Law.86 Originally based on his doctoral thesis, submitted in 1964, Dinstein’s 
detailed analysis of the concept of superior orders covers a wide range of legal scholarship and 
leading cases spanning centuries with emphasis on trials including WWI, WWII and other 
subsequent trials where superior orders was raised.87 
However, despite a smattering of references to several Allied trials of Japanese B and C class 
soldiers, the vast majority of legal scholarship concerning superior orders makes scant 
reference to superior orders in relation to the Asia–Pacific trials.88 This would indicate that 
legal scholars, on the whole, have had little, if any, engagement with the immense archival 
record with a view to better understand superior orders as it was applied during the Asia–
Pacific trials.89 
As is explained as part of the separate chapter dealing with superior orders at the Manila trials, 
this thesis puts forward several suggestions on how international law might better operate to 
deal with difficulties that arise when subordinates raise this defence. Primarily, the law needs 
to reflect the reality of the harshness of the consequences of disobeying orders and therefore 
incorporate both a subjective and objective assessment of the mental element of the offence. In 
addition, there exist sound arguments to allow a full defence to charges of war crimes on the 
basis of superior orders and not, as it currently stands, merely apply them to mitigate the 
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sentence. The Manila trials provide several leading cases where such findings were warranted. 
Naturally, however, there are consequences to allowing superior orders to operate as a full 
defence to a charge of war crimes, and these too, are examined. 
The following chapter will explore the concept of command responsibility at the Manila trials. 
In doing so it will become clear that much of the historical-legal context of command 
responsibility, was not entirely applied at the Manila trials. Instead, as the individual cases 
show, it was often the case that the law at Manila was an amalgam of some of the legal 
principles described above mixed with legal principles unique to the Manila trials. As a 
consequence, the law was not always applied consistently and often it was difficult to discern 






COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
I. Introduction 
This chapter examines the doctrine of command responsibility in three historical periods and 
in doing so, establishes a comparative context for the doctrine at the Manila trials. The purpose 
of this chapter is to provide an examination of the jurisprudential rationale, underlying 
principles and judicial and legal standards that have underpinned the doctrine of command 
responsibility over the centuries. Taking into account a wide array of cases from various 
theatres of war (including several high profile US Army cases in the Philippines that preceded 
the bulk of trials at Manila), this chapter will highlight both the inherent flaws, deficiencies 
and desirable aspects of the application of the law surrounding command responsibility. 
Command responsibility is a term applied in military and at international law to attribute 
criminal responsibility to those in positions of leadership—military and non-military—for the 
criminal wrongdoing of their subordinates.90 Historically, through the application of command 
responsibility, superiors have been convicted of crimes such as genocide and crimes against 
humanity committed by subordinates.91 To be liable for war crimes and other international 
crimes under the doctrine of command responsibility, a superior must have known ‘or had 
reason to know that the subordinate will commit such acts or had done so and the superior 
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the 
perpetrators’. 92  Mitchell argues that the purpose of command responsibility is to ensure 
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commanders and leaders ‘control their subordinates and to establish objective standards of 
diligence’.93 
A. Problems with the Command Responsibility Doctrine 
Osiel points out that making a superior criminally responsible on the basis of command 
responsibility poses a practical problem since the ‘breadth of liability’ is such that it 
discourages intermediate level commanders from initiating prosecutions of subordinates for 
fear that any investigation would ‘invite attention to his own behaviour regarding the 
underlying crimes’.94 Osiel further points out that the doctrine is problematic in an ethical sense 
because ‘imposing liability for wilful blindness illegitimately transforms offenses requiring 
knowledge into crimes of simple negligence’.95 The prosecution needs only to prove that the 
accused was in the position of authority and therefore would or should have been in a position 
to prevent or punish any wrongdoing by subordinates. The problem with this approach to 
imposing liability, as Damaska points out, is that it has long been a principle of law that 
criminality for war crimes should be assigned to those who have clear responsibility for 
criminal wrongdoing. As shown in the trial of General Yamashita Tomoyuki in the aftermath 
of the US retaking control of the Philippines in 1945, there is not always clear evidence that 
the superior either participated in the acts, gave the orders to commit the criminal acts, or even 
knew that subordinates were engaging in the acts in question.96 
The key problem with using command responsibility as the basis of criminal responsibility, as 
noted by Colonel Clarke, senior defence counsel for General Yamashita during the trial, is the 
ambiguous and unlimited scope of liability for superiors for acts of subordinates: 
The Accused is not charged with having done something or having failed to do something, but 
solely with having been something. For the gravamen of the charge is that the Accused was the 
commander of the Japanese forces, and by virtue of that fact alone, is guilty of every crime 
committed by every soldier assigned to his command.97 
That is, a person can be liable for war crimes merely because of the position they occupy rather 
than because there is any clear evidence of him having committed the unlawful acts or having 
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given the orders to commit the acts. As will be shown in the next chapter, this is exactly the 
type of problem that manifested during the US Army trials in Manila. Japanese defendants 
were convicted purely, it would seem, due to the position they occupied at the time offences 
were alleged to have occurred. 
A further practical problem with attributing liability on the basis of command responsibility is 
determining where the chain of command begins and ceases since there is technically no limit 
to who could be held accountable for any act committed by subordinates. 
While accepting that strict liability may create a sense of injustice for those in positions of 
authority, on the other hand the question centres on the injustices that would result if liability 
was assigned only to the actual perpetrators, thereby relinquishing the responsibility of those 
in positions of authority. Such was the legal dilemma that existed in the Yamashita98 and 
Kuroda99 trials. 
II. The Foundations of Command Responsibility as a Legal Doctrine 
The legal basis for attributing criminal responsibility to leaders for the acts of subordinates is, 
unsurprisingly, not new. The development of the command responsibility doctrine has varied 
greatly according to the context and the nature of the conflict and there appears to be variance 
in the way in which command responsibility was applied at various times even within trials 
conducted by the same authority.100 As one traverses the historical landscape of international 
criminal law, a degree of uncertainty remains as to how best to achieve justice in regard to 
holding those in positions of authority to account.101 On the one hand there is the need to punish 
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those who author and lead others to commit barbarous acts of wanton cruelty against fellow 
human beings, while on the other, there is the need to ‘stay the hand of vengeance’102 to ensure 
individuals are not prosecuted merely because of the position they occupy. 
Holding leaders to account for war crimes—both civilian and military—has been and continues 
to be problematic for a number of reasons. As history has shown, it is not always clear as to 
who should be held to account and all too often it is those who occupy the lower to mid-ranks 
of seniority who are held to account, while those who occupy positions of senior leadership 
avoid liability.103 Why is it that some leaders are held to account, while others escape liability? 
What fundamental elements must be present in determining the extent of criminal 
responsibility of an individual? Clearly the question as to whom should be held accountable in 
times of war has existed for millennia as demonstrated by the ancient teachings of Sun Tzu. 
A. Command Responsibility and Sun Tzu 
Some commentators place the initial recorded evidence of the doctrine of command 
responsibility as far back as 500 BC with the writings of Sun Tzu: 
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When troops flee, are insubordinate, distressed, collapse in disorder, or are routed, it is the fault 
of the general. None of these disorders can be attributed to natural causes.104 
Although it is clear that Sun Tzu places a great deal of responsibility on the commander in 
relation to the behaviour of subordinates, he expresses nothing about attributing blame to 
commanders when their subordinates ill-treat the enemy or non-combatants. It is not clear, 
therefore, whether Sun Tzu believed that responsibility should be assigned to commanders 
when subordinates mistreated their enemy or non-combatants. 
B. Command Responsibility and the Renaissance 
In a similar vein, King Charles VII of Orleans in 1439 introduced a law that stated: 
the King orders that each captain or lieutenant be held responsible for the abuses, ills and offenses 
[sic] committed by members of his company. … If, because of his negligence or otherwise, the 
offender escapes and thus evades punishment, the captain shall be deemed responsible for the 
offense as if he had committed it himself.105 
It is clear that the King’s orders adopted the position that attributed responsibility to a ‘captain’ 
or a ‘lieutenant’ for ‘abuses, ills and offenses [sic] committed by members of his company’. 
The orders do not specify, however, against whom these acts must be committed in order to be 
liable, and on that basis, one can only presume that the orders intended to make captains and 
lieutenants responsible for acts committed against any person, whether enemy or not.106 
A further two points can be made about the King Charles’s orders. Firstly, it appears that strict 
liability is imposed on captains and lieutenants for the wrongdoing of their subordinates. The 
initial part of the order makes it clear that liability is strict in the sense that responsibility for 
any wrongdoing committed by a subordinate automatically assigns to captains and lieutenants 
merely because of the act having been carried out by the subordinate. In other words, all that 
is required is the actus reus and no consideration is given as to whether the superior gave any 
orders or whether he intended or allowed the subordinate to commit the offending behaviour. 
Secondly, the order imposes a form of liability on captains as if to make them a party to the 
offending behaviour, in the event that the captain fails to prevent the offender from escaping 
and they evade punishment. 
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The imposition of strict liability on superiors and making them a party to the offence is 
something with which successive tribunals have grappled over the years. The idea of imposing 
strict liability was anticipated and argued at a number of Japanese war crimes trials in 
Manila.107 
As for making civilian leaders responsible for the acts of military personnel, Solis cites a 1925 
translation of the seventeenth century writings of Hugo Grotius who articulated that non-
military leaders could be held to account for the crimes of their subjects. Grotius stated that 
‘[a] community or its rulers may be held responsible for the crime of a subject if they knew of 
it and did not prevent it when they could and should prevent it’.108 Later this chapter delves 
into the issue of responsibility of civilian leadership and investigates the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (‘IMTFE’ or the ‘Tokyo trials’). 
Around the same time as Grotius, in 1621, Adolphus of Sweden promulgated Article 46 of the 
‘Articles of Military Lawwes to be observed in the Warres that no Colonel or Captaine shall 
command his souldiers to do any unlawful thing; which who so does, shall be punished 
according to the discretion of the Judges [sic]’.109 This law does not provide any greater clarity 
than the examples cited above and, one could argue that the wide discretion afforded to ‘judges’ 
in fact makes it even more difficult to ascertain whether those other than ‘Colonel or Capitaine’ 
would be held accountable for the unlawful conduct of subordinates. 
C. Early American Influences on the Development of Command Responsibility 
In relation to assigning criminal responsibility to commanding officers for the acts of 
subordinates, greater clarity came some one hundred and fifty years later in colonial America 
during the American Revolution. During the struggle to gain independence from Great Britain, 
the Continental Army needed enforceable rules of military conduct. The Massachusetts 
Articles of War in 1775110 was promulgated and Article 11: 
Every Officer commanding, in quarters, or on a march, shall keep good order, and to the utmost 
of his power, redress all such abuses or disorders which may be committed by any officer or 
Soldier under his command; if upon complaint made to him of Officers or Soldiers beating or 
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otherwise ill-treating any person, or committing any kind of riots to the disquieting of the 
inhabitants of this Continent, he, the said commander, who shall refuse or omit to see Justice 
done to this offender or offenders, and reparation made to the party or parties injured, as soon as 
the offender’s wages shall enable him or them, upon due proof thereof, be punished, as ordered 
by General Court-Martial, in such manner as if he himself had committed the crimes or disorders 
complained of.111 
Article 11 is significant for a number of reasons. First, the provision squarely places 
responsibility for certain types of wrongdoing at the feet of ‘every officer’ which is a departure 
from earlier lex scripta that tended to hold responsible only those who were mid-ranking 
officers (eg captain and lieutenant). This meant that those who occupied any position of 
authority—no matter how junior or how senior—could be held accountable for the acts of their 
subordinates. Secondly, Article 11 placed a positive duty on the commanding officer to ‘keep 
good order’ and to ‘redress all such abuses or disorders which may be committed by any officer 
or Soldier under his command’. This provision, therefore, required all officers to take positive 
steps to ensure these measures were undertaken. Consequences for failing to do so were also 
dealt with under Article 11 which made the superior susceptible to court-martial as if he had 
committed the offences. 
A number of years later, in 1806, the US promulgated Article 33 of the American Articles of 
War.112 This provision squarely placed the responsibility of any ‘commissioned officer’ or 
‘soldier’ to assist authorities in the apprehension of any person under his command who was 
accused of a ‘capital crime’ or had used violence against another person or property. In the 
event that the superior failed in this endeavour, for whatever reason—either through neglect or 
refusal to apprehend an accused, then that officer would be ‘cashiered’.113 Article 33 stated: 
When any commissioned officer or soldier shall be accused of a capital crime, or of having used 
violence, or committed any offense against the person or property of any citizen of any of the 
United States, such as is punishable by the known laws of the land, the commanding officer and 
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officers of every regiment, troop, or company to which the person or persons so accused shall 
belong, are hereby required, upon application duly made by, or on behalf of, the party or parties 
injured to use their utmost endeavors to deliver over such accused person or persons to the civil 
magistrate, and likewise to be aiding and assisting to the officers of justice in apprehending and 
securing the person or persons so accused, in order to bring him or them to trial. If any 
commanding officer or officers shall wilfully neglect, or shall refuse upon the application 
aforesaid, to deliver over such accused person or persons to the civil magistrates, or to be aiding 
and assisting to the officers of justice in apprehending such person or persons, the officer or 
officers so offending shall be cashiered.114 
With the outbreak of the Civil War in 1861, it quickly became evident that the 1806 Articles of 
War were insufficient to deal with many new problems arising such as guerilla fighters, non-
combatant sympathisers, spies, the use of slaves in the fighting, and the humane treatment of 
prisoners. In response to these ethical challenges, in 1863, with the assistance of the Union 
general-in-chief, Henry Halleck, Frans Lieber drafted what became known as the Lieber 
Code.115 Article 71 of the Lieber Code stated: 
Whoever intentionally inflicts additional wounds on an enemy already wholly disabled, or kills 
such an enemy, or who orders or encourages soldiers to do so [emphasis added], shall suffer 
death, if duly convicted, whether he belongs to the Army of the United States, or is an enemy 
captured after having committed his misdeed.116 
Out of necessity, what began to emerge from the various conflicts was that there were certain 
instances where it became acceptable to hold superiors to account for the acts of their 
subordinates. Necessity, it must be said, was borne out of the fundamental need to reign in 
excessive conduct of subordinates to prevent acts of cruelty and unnecessary destruction of life 
and property. The way to do that was to hold their immediate superiors to account to ‘establish 
objective standards of diligence’ on the part of superiors. 117  As the following examples 
illustrate, there are now discernible elements in this mode of criminal responsibility stemming 
from a variety of conflicts that form part of the customary laws and usage of international law. 
* * * 
The doctrine of command responsibility has been applied in varying ways over the ages. The 
evolution of the doctrine can be traced to Sun Tzsu and possibly beyond, and the one constant 
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in the application of the doctrine throughout the ages is the inherent desire to make superiors 
responsible for the acts of subordinates. The rationale that underpins the doctrine also varies. 
In one sense the reason behind the doctrine is based on the need to maintain military discipline 
so as to ensure the military operates effectively as it can. In another sense, making superiors 
criminally responsible for the acts of their subordinates appeals to a sense of justice. That is to 
say we believe it is just to hold superiors to account for giving unlawful orders or when they 
are derelict in their duty to control subordinates when the superior creates the conditions 
(whether knowingly or otherwise) that result in wanton acts of violence against others. 
However, when one talks of fairness and its relationship to command responsibility, several 
problems arise. Chief among them is whether the current concept of liability with command 
responsibility is whether the right people are held to account or whether the application of 








THE MANILA COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY TRIALS: HOLDING 
COMMANDERS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE ACTS OF 
SUBORDINATES 
I. Introduction 
With the conviction and execution of General Yamashita Tomoyuki, the law of command 
responsibility seemingly appeared settled at Manila. Simply stated, the principle was that those 
who occupied positions of authority could be held to account for the acts and omissions of their 
subordinates. However, as the number of trials increased for lower to mid-ranking Japanese 
military personnel charged for ‘failing to control’, or ‘permitting’ troops under their command 
to commit war crimes, it soon became evident that the law as pronounced in the Yamashita 
trial was simply not transferrable to all cases. A more nuanced assessment of criminal 
responsibility was needed. Each case needed to be assessed on the merits of evidence and the 
particular legal questions arising in that case. Japanese superiors often found themselves 
answering charges in relation to crimes for which they claimed to have had no prior knowledge. 
This was certainly the case in the joint trial in 1947 of Lieutenant-Colonel Onishi Seiichi, 1st 
Lieutenant Kawahara Hajime, and 2nd Lieutenant Ogata Tsugiharu (‘Onishi’s case’). In 
Onishi’s case, the Tribunal seemed to favour circumstantial evidence mostly predicated on the 
accused’s position. In other words, the criminal responsibility of the accused was contingent 
upon the position they held at the time of the alleged offences and not based on specific orders 
they gave to subordinates or knowledge they had in relation to offences committed. The notion 
of ‘contingent liability’ was a common mode by which the accused was found guilty based on 
the contingency associated with a person’s superior rank to that of the perpetrators. 
Onishi’s case further illustrates that tribunals seemed less likely to accept the defence’s 
argument that superiors had little to no control over the actions of their subordinates. A 
common argument by Japanese camp commanders was they had little control over subordinates 
due to the dire conditions of the camps prior to the conclusion of the war.118 
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The ‘no control’ argument was not entirely without merit. Japanese forces were engaged in 
intense combat with the advancing US forces and the Filipino guerrilla insurgency in the 
months prior to the defeat of Japan in the Philippines. This created immense difficulties for 
communication between Japanese command and field operations. 119  The lack of 
communication meant that there was often a break in the chain of command and Japanese 
forces in the field were left to their own devices. The chaotic and dire circumstances in which 
the retreating Japanese forces endured, incubated the circumstances for ill-discipline and 
bandit-like behaviour. The prosecutorial way around the apparent lack of knowledge on the 
part of the accused was to broaden the scope of the essential element for certain crimes. The 
guilty mind or mens rea was redefined to include situations where the accused ‘would’ or 
‘should’ have known about atrocities committed under their leadership and were therefore 
criminally liable. 
This was certainly the case in Onishi’s case. In Onishi’s case it was shown that the higher the 
rank occupied by the accused, the greater the requirement was for them to ensure subordinates 
were not breaching the laws of war. This case illustrates that superiors can be held strictly liable 
for the criminal acts of subordinates based on the duty of a commanding officer to control their 
troops. 
In the trial of Lieutenant Ko Shiyoku (‘Ko’s case’), the principle of ‘intermediary liability’ was 
brought into question. Intermediary liability exists whereby an intermediary (in this case, Lt-
Gen Ko) is held criminally responsible for the actions or failures of a higher entity (i.e. the 
Japanese Government for failing to enforce the Geneva Convention against committing 
atrocities). Ko’s case further indicates that criminal responsibility can ensue where the accused 
is physically removed from the scene of the atrocities and is even unable to exercise ‘effective 
control’ over subordinates who commit atrocities. 
At other times, tribunals showed an apparent disregard for sentencing principles espoused in 
previous trials. The rationale for a guilty verdict by the Tribunal in the trial of Vice Admiral 
Osugi Morikazu (‘Osugi’s trial’) appeared to be consistent with other trials, however, Osugi’s 
trial differed in terms of the sentence – he received a term of imprisonment while others in 
similar cases received the death sentence. The apparent reason was the quantum of killing. Vice 
Admiral Osugi Morikazu of the 23rd Naval Base Area, Imperial Japanese Navy was charged 
and convicted of war crimes committed by his subordinates during his command at Makassa, 
Celebes, Netherlands East India (as it was then known).120 He somehow managed to avoid the 
death penalty and received life imprisonment for his part in the commission of war crimes 
against downed US airmen. 
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The ‘proximal’ and ‘temporal’ connection of an accused to offences was another legal principle 
examined at the Manila trials. In the trial of 2nd Lieutenant Minoru Kato (‘Kato’s case’) it was 
held that where a superior who personally engaged in one (or more) instances of war crimes, it 
was sufficient to show that the same commander could be liable for other killings under the 
doctrine of command responsibility even where there exists no evidence of such orders. This 
rationale raises questions about the validity of guilt when a person is held criminally liable for 
past acts that have little or no relevance to the specifics of other criminal acts. The mode of 
finding liability solely rests on the ‘proximal’ and ‘temporal’ connection of the accused and 
the acts committed. 
Tribunals in Manila redefined the law by placing a higher standard on some Japanese military 
organisations in relation to the duty to prevent and punish subordinates for war crimes, the 
failure of which was sufficient to constitute ‘acquiescence’. The trial of Colonel Nagahama 
Akira of the Imperial Japanese Military Police (Kenpeitai) was an example of this. The 
harshness of the sentence meted out to Nagahama seemed to be related to his membership of 
the dreaded Kenpeitai and there was little regard given (even to mitigate the severity of the 
sentence) in relation to clear evidence of an inability to prevent the atrocities. 
II. Command Responsibility Cases at Manila 
A. Trial of Lieutenant-Colonel Onishi Seiichi, First Lieutenant Kawahara Hajime, 
Second Lieutenant Ogata Tsugiharu, Imperial Japanese Army, 
Manila, 22–29 August 1946 
This case illustrates that military commissions in Manila were at times seemingly willing to 
broadly interpret the fault element (mens rea) where that element was present in the offence. 
In addition, Onishi’s case demonstrates that commissions in Manila were more than willing to 
convict the accused based on the position, rank or other circumstances of the accused. A term 
that appears appropriate in this context is ‘contingent liability’ whereby the accused’s criminal 
responsibility was ‘contingent’ solely upon the position the accused occupied. 
Onishi’s case121 could be described as a typical ‘command responsibility’ case involving the 
conviction of a mid-ranked Japanese army officer for the alleged unlawful killing of a Filipino 
civilian. The case centred on the actions of Lt-Col Onishi in so far as whether he either gave 
orders or allowed the killing of Gavino Fuertes, a civilian who was suspected by members of 
a unit under the command of Onishi of engaging in guerrilla activities.122 
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Together with 1st Lt Kawahara and 2nd Lt Ogata, Onishi was charged with the unlawful torture 
and killing of Fuertes on 7 April 1944 at Dumanjug, Cebu Island. Like many of the cases that 
involved the killing of civilians by the Japanese in the Philippines at this time, the fact that 
Japanese forces were embroiled in a fierce guerilla war with local militia provides some context 
to the way that the Imperial Japanese Army (‘IJA’) engaged with suspected guerrillas. These 
cases involved significant levels of brutality meted out against those suspected of carrying out 
insurgent attacks against IJA forces. 
Lt-Col Onishi was the commanding officer of the 173rd Infantry Battalion stationed on Cebu 
Island. Onishi’s primary role was to establish garrisons throughout the island to suppress 
resistance from local Filipino militia and maintain control over the population and civilian 
infrastructure.123 On 1 April 1944, Lt Akamine Yutaka, the company commander in Dumanjug 
was killed in attacks by guerillas in the area. In reprisal, it was alleged that Onishi gave orders 
to round up any suspected guerillas in the area and one of those apprehended was Fuertes. 
Prosecution witnesses claimed that Fuertes was a shoemaker who entered the town looking for 
work and was not a member of the resistance.124 Witnesses claimed he was hung by his hands 
from a tree and severely beaten by the Japanese who used an assortment of weapons to inflict 
severe wounds on him over several days. Fuertes eventually died of his wounds, but prior to 
his death, witnesses claimed he was paraded around the town and forced to carry a heavy stone 
above his head. A sign was placed around his neck that read, ‘don’t imitate me’.125 It was 
alleged by the prosecution that Fuertes’s body was later dumped and burned by the Japanese. 
Conflicts of Evidence and the Subjectivity Dilemma when Establishing Facts 
Due to the extent of conflicting and contradictory testimony offered by the defence and 
prosecution witnesses, Onishi’s role in the killing can be described as unclear, to say the least. 
There is no direct evidence that linked Onishi to any orders for the actual beating and eventual 
killing of Fuertes, and certainly no evidence to indicate that Onishi either took part in the actual 
beating or witnessed the beating. Defence and prosecution witness testimonies were at odds 
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and the Commission needed to wade through contradictory but equally plausible statements on 
both sides to make a determination of fact in relation to the role Onishi played in the killing of 
Fuertes. 
How then, would the Commission treat such discrepancies? Despite being equally plausible, 
the Commission in Onishi’s case favoured the prosecution’s version of events without 
providing any substantial justification for doing so. The Commission’s position in favouring 
the prosecution can, in a way, be viewed through a prism of subjectivity on the part of the 
accusers and underscores one of the primary flaws of war crimes trials—which is that there 
exists a perception of bias on the part of the accusers. 
(a) Disputed Fact Evidence 
A number of Filipino witnesses for the prosecution claimed that although they did not see 
Onishi directly taking part in the beating and torture of Fuertes, Onishi was seen looking in the 
direction of the beating as it occurred.126 A witness claimed that Onishi was looking out from 
a window from the barracks at Fuertes being beaten and that the noise of the beating (including 
the blows and Fuertes’s screams) would have been clearly audible and, despite this, Onishi did 
nothing to stop the beatings.127 
Other witnesses claimed that Onishi gave direct orders to the townspeople, including the Mayor 
of the town, to beat Fuertes as he was being paraded by the Japanese through the town. The 
Mayor claimed that neither he nor anyone else beat Fuertes—a point that was directly 
contradicted by 2nd Lt Kato Minoro who stated that he saw the Mayor and other townspeople 
strike Fuertes as he was paraded through town.128 
For his part, Onishi claimed that he never issued orders to kill civilians connected with guerilla 
activities and was unaware of any civilians who were hung from a tree and beaten to death by 
those under his command.129 These assertions were backed up by several defence witnesses 
who claimed that no orders were given by Onishi to mistreat any Filipino prisoners during the 
time Onishi was in the vicinity and that Fuertes was killed on the orders of WO Sakamoto.130 
The same witness testified that Onishi was not in the same town on the day Fuertes died.131 
The Application of ‘contingent liability’ 
The conflicting evidence meant the Commission needed to make a decision of fact as to key 
parts of Onishi’s involvement in the killing. What is clear from the trial documents is that the 
Commission focussed primarily on the position that Onishi occupied in relation to the accused. 
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The case clearly shows that Onishi’s liability rested primarily on the fact he occupied a position 
of authority over the actual perpetrators and this seemed to be sufficient grounds on which to 
convict. The position adopted by the Commission in regard to the criminal responsibility of the 
accused can be described as being ‘contingent’ upon the position he occupied. 
The Commission ruled that ‘there is little doubt that the facts presented by the prosecution 
prove a case of command responsibility…’.132 That the Commission reached such a conclusion 
is instructive given that it ruled out any direct participation by Onishi in the killing. However, 
besides excluding actual participation, the Commission sought to determine whether Onishi 
gave the orders to beat prisoners—either explicitly or implicitly. If such orders were given, 
then according to the Commission, such a finding would be ‘sufficient to make him a 
participant even though physically [he] did not touch the prisoner and was not present at the 
crime’.133 
The Commission ruled that in view of the testimony it received, Onishi would have at least had 
some prior knowledge of the killing before, during and certainly after it had occurred. The fact 
that Onishi was in such close proximity to the killing and the likelihood he would have known 
of the apprehension of any suspected insurgents, coupled with the fact he had the power to stop 
the killing but failed to do so, led the Commission to believe that he gave the orders to kill 
Fuertes.134 Interestingly, for reasons that were not made abundantly clear, Lt Kawahara and 2nd 
Lt Ogata were acquitted of the charge. 
Principal Offender or an Accessory After the Fact? 
The Commission examined a variety of US and other legal sources for the purpose, it seems, 
of a palatable way to convict the accused. The Commission appeared as though it wanted to 
convict Onishi, but had a dilemma as to what legal basis the conviction should stand. During 
the trial the Commission considered whether Onishi was a ‘principal’, an ‘aider and abettor’ or 
an ‘accessory before the fact’.135 Ultimately, the Commission ruled that it mattered not what 
category applied, the fact he had a role in the killing was sufficient for a finding of criminal 
responsibility. The Commission quoted several early decisions from US courts martial and 
penal statutes that, in the words of the Commission, show that: 
an officer, who commands or advises his subordinates and others under his control to commit a 
crime, is liable as a principal, even though he was an accessory or aider and was not present at 
the time the crime was committed. He can be charged with doing the act himself, regardless of 
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the fact that the proof shows that his agents, subordinates and others, under his control did the 
act at his instigation or control.136 
Hence, Onishi was found liable as a principal offender on the basis that the Commission made 
a determination of fact that he gave the order to kill Fuertes. In reaching this conclusion of law 
in relation to Onishi being a principal offender, the Commission relied heavily upon what it 
believed to be sound precedent in the case of America vs. Koe Mikami.137 To be tried as a 
principal, all the Commission needed to do was make a finding that Onishi gave the order to 
commit the unlawful act. 
Once the Commission found that Onishi did give the order to commit a homicide, it ruled that 
‘he [Onishi] is just as guilty of the crime as if he swung the club or rifle that did the actual 
killing’.138 The Commission ruled that the order to kill Fuertes was the ‘first link in a chain of 
acts which resulted in the unlawful torture and killing of Gavino Fuertes’.139 
Broad Interpretation of ‘mens rea’ 
Onishi’s case further illustrated a problem that re-emerges continually throughout the Manila 
trials which relates to the exact nature of the fault element (or mens rea) that was required to 
prove the charge. No discussion was apparent in the review documentation as to whether 
Onishi satisfied the fault elements as it related to the mens rea aspect of the offence for which 
he was charged. The elements of the charge stated that 
Seiichi Onishi … did … wilfully and unlawfully torture and murder Gavino Fuertes, an unarmed, 
defenseless Filipino civilian, by hanging and beating him, in violations of the laws of war.140 
The first element related to the physical act or the actus reus—in this case, the torture and 
murder. Given the Commission ruled that he gave orders to carry out the conduct that led to 
the death of Fuertes, it may be taken that Onishi did satisfy the actus reus element of the 
offence. The second element related to the fault element or the mens rea—in other words, what 
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Onishi was thinking or had in his mind at the time he gave the orders. It is this aspect of the 
offence that proved somewhat elusive and questionable in regard to the findings of his guilt. 
As specified in the charge, the prosecution still needed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that 
Onishi ‘wilfully’ tortured and murdered Fuertes. The requirement to prove mens rea at 
common law is crucial when making a determination of murder.141 Without finding that the 
defendant satisfied the mens rea element of the offence, the question becomes whether or not 
he or she should be found criminally responsible. The prosecution still needed to prove 
therefore, that Onishi wilfully tortured and murdered his victim—albeit indirectly through the 
orders he gave to subordinates. In the absence of such a finding in relation to the defendant’s 
state of mind at the time of the commission of the offence, it appears as though the Commission 
and the subsequent reviewing authority simply interpreted the knowledge aspect in a broad 
sense. On that basis it would appear as though the law, as determined by the Commission, was 
that Onishi, as the commanding officer in the area, was strictly liable for the death despite the 
requirement for the prosecution to prove that Onishi ‘wilfully’ acted to cause the torture and 
murder of Fuertes. The method used to determine Onishi’s guilt by the Commission, is of 
crucial importance for international law because such a finding means that it would then be 
easier for the prosecution to prove a single element (in this case, the actus reus) in other similar 
cases. 
A further point of interest in this case relates to the fact that Onishi’s co-accused (Lt Kawahara 
and Lt Ogata) escaped liability completely for the killing. One explanation that can be offered 
for acquitting Kawahara and Ogata may have been the fact that Onishi was convicted on the 
basis of command responsibility—that is, he gave the orders, whereas, Kawahara and Ogata 
gave no such orders as Onishi took on that responsibility himself. Kawahara and Ogata’s 
conviction, therefore, could not be made out because they gave no such orders, and were no 
different to many other lieutenants in the unit. 
Sentence mitigated by the ‘volume’ of killing as opposed to the act of killing per se 
Upon conviction, Onishi received a sentence of life imprisonment. Interestingly, however, 
despite the heinous nature of the crime and the brutality levelled at the victim and the fact that 
the killing was a consequence of prolonged and painful torture, Onishi did not receive the death 
penalty. 
Also of interest in relation to the sentencing is the fact that the Commission (and subsequent 
review) did not seem to consider the killing of Fuertes to be a ‘reprisal killing’ given that the 
victim’s torture and murder only came after Lt Akamine was killed by the guerilla insurgency. 
The Commission may or may not have accounted for this to mitigate the sentence. The trial 
documents do not seem to shed any light on whether the life sentence incorporated punishment 
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for ‘reprisal killings’. By contrast, it would be of interest to ascertain whether the same penalty 
would have applied had a reprisal killing been carried out on US military personnel. 
That the Commission gave Onishi life imprisonment as opposed to a death sentence for the 
murder, seemed to place a premium on the number or volume of those killed rather than 
condemning the actual act itself. Although not expressly indicated in the judgment, one could 
ascertain from the sentence, when it is compared to others, that the Commission related the 
severity of the sentence to the quantum of victims. The life sentence Onishi received indicates 
that the greater the number of victims affected by the actions or omissions of the accused, the 
more likely it was that an accused would be subjected to the death penalty. If one victim was 
murdered, even under the most heinous of circumstances, a life sentence may be appropriate. 
Such a sentencing principle differentiates the seriousness of the offence of murder on the basis 
of scale. Emphasis on scale—as opposed to the fact that murder was committed—distorts the 
perception of murder. Under such a sentencing protocol, the crime is reduced to a numerical 
assessment so that sentencing becomes dependent upon enumeration of the dead as opposed to 
condemnation of the act itself. 
B. Trial of Lieutenant-General Kono Takeshi, High Commissioner’s Residence, Manila, 
12 April 1946 
Kono’s case shows that a lack of evidence proving knowledge on the part of the superior of 
war crimes committed by subordinates is not an impediment to a conviction. The higher the 
position occupied by the accused, the greater the requirement is to ensure subordinates are not 
breaching the laws of war. Kono’s case further illustrates that superiors can be held strictly 
liable for the criminal acts of subordinates. 
Lieutenant-General Kono Takeshi of the 77th Infantry Brigade of the IJA142 is one of several 
senior members of the IJA considered in relation to the command responsibility trials.143 Much 
of the jurisprudence considered at Kono’s trial, according the prosecution, was based on the 
Yamashita trial and the precedents contained therein.144 A senior member of the IJA, Lt-
General Kono was charged with crimes committed by Japanese troops against mainly Filipino 
civilians. The period in which the alleged crimes occurred spanned several years of the 
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Japanese occupation of the Philippines Islands. Many of the atrocities committed by Japanese 
troops for which Kono was charged occurred on the island of Panay as part of the fierce and, 
at times, insurmountable battle that IJA forces waged against local guerrilla groups and the 
advancing US forces.145 
Kono’s case is important for understanding how military commissions dealt with the law 
surrounding the issue of command responsibility in the early stages of the Manila trials for 
senior ranking IJA officers in the months after the execution of General Yamashita. One of the 
controversial elements of Kono’s case, as with other senior military trials dealing with the 
doctrine of command responsibility at Manila, was the volume of atrocities allegedly 
committed by Japanese forces which was attributed to one senior person, despite the absence 
of specific evidence that that person either knew or ordered the acts. 
In accordance with the precedent established with the Yamashita trial, evidence that directly 
tied the senior person to have knowledge of the atrocities was seemingly unnecessary and 
conviction was primarily based on the position he occupied within the military structure. 
Commonly referred to as ‘strict liability’, all that was required to be shown was that the accused 
occupied a position of authority within the relevant chain of command. Once the chain of 
authority was established, it was not too difficult to establish the guilt of the accused on the 
basis that they ‘permitted’ atrocities to occur, simply because there was evidence that atrocities 
occurred and that the senior person did not prevent, control or punish subordinates for carrying 
out those acts. 
As it will be discussed in Part II of this thesis, the application of strict liability in situations 
such as Kono’s is problematic for a variety of reasons—primarily due to the arbitrary way that 
responsibility is attributed. There does not appear to be any formula or test that can be discerned 
to provide some semblance of consistency in regard to criminal attribution. As will be shown 
below and in the discussion in Part II, such an application of criminal responsibility leads to 
uncertainty and, in some cases, injustice for the accused. 
The Charge and Specifications – ‘Unlawfully Permitting’ 
Lt-General Kono was arraigned at the High Commissioner’s residence at Manila on 15 April 
1946.146 The charge stated that Kono 
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… did …unlawfully disregard and fail to discharge his duties in controlling the operations of 
members of his command by permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes 
against the people of the United States and the Philippines.147 
Relating to the Charge, the indictment listed 49 separate specifications that gave details of 
specific incidents from which the charge flowed.148 Each of the 49 specifications outlined 
allegations involving the unlawful killing of individuals, groups or both of ‘unarmed, 
noncombatant Filipino civilians … in violation of the laws of war’.149 Each specification 
outlined the name and place in which each victim was killed150 or gave an approximate number 
of victims killed in that location within an approximate date.151 At times the specification 
simply mentioned that Kono permitted forces under his control to kill an ‘unascertained 
number of unarmed, noncombatant civilians …’.152 The total number of those allegedly killed 
and tortured by Japanese forces in this area during the period of Kono’s command on the island 
of Panay amounted to several thousand victims. 
Of crucial importance here for the prosecution of Kono was the wording of the specification 
that related to the fact that Kono ‘unlawfully permitted’ the killing of non-combatants. No 
specification alleged Kono gave direct orders to kill, and no specification alleged he witnessed 
or took part in the actual killings. According to the charge and specifications, his apparent 
criminal responsibility rested solely on the fact he permitted the unlawful killings to take place. 
Defence’s Objections to the Charge: Clarification of the obligations of commanders for 
subordinate criminal conduct 
The defence raised a series of comprehensive objections that extended to over 50 pages in 
relation to certain particulars of the specifications. The most contentious points for the defence 
rested on a number of aspects such as the meaning of ‘permit’ to kill, the ambiguities relating 
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to the ‘unascertained’ number of victims, the actual perpetrators of the offences and the actual 
places where the killings took place. These objections were put to the prosecution in the form 
of a ‘bill of particulars’.153 
First and foremost, the defence argued the charge should be set aside because the prosecution 
was unable to provide any evidence the atrocities were committed with the knowledge or 
‘scienter’ of the accused.154 The defence further stated that, in the event the Commission 
refused to strike out the charge, the defence should be provided with answers to a series of 
questions regarding the 49 specifications. As a prelude to the defence’s objections, the defence 
requested the prosecution address five specific questions: 
(a) What duties of a Lieutenant General of the Imperial Japanese Army is he charged with 
disregarding and failing to discharge? 
(b) How and in what manner did he disregard and fail to discharge the duties referred to in 
(a) above? 
(c) What measures for the control over members of his command, if any, should he have 
taken and is charged with disregarding or failing to discharge? 
(d) What is meant by the phrase ‘permitting them’, and does it allege a crime of commission 
or a crime of omission? 
(e) What ambiguities exist regarding the laws of war relating to the charge?155 
These preliminary questions go to the heart of the obligations of a commander in the field for 
acts committed by subordinates—acts which may not have been known or knowable by the 
commander. In asking these questions, the defence sought clarification of the boundaries of 
criminal responsibility for commanders. It requested from the prosecution a response in 
relation to the duties of a commander (in this case, a Lieutenant General) in regard to 
‘disregarding and failing to discharge’ their duties. 
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The Prosecution’s Answers to the Defence’s Objections 
(a) The Duty of the Commanding Officer to Control his Troops 
The prosecution responded to the defence’s questions and objections, albeit in five pages.156 In 
an extraordinary attempt to explain what the prosecution meant by reference to the ‘violation 
of the laws of war’, the prosecution stated that the violation of the laws of war as it related to 
Kono occurred 
in that the gist [emphasis added] of the charge is an unlawful breach of duty by the accused as a 
commanding officer to control the operations of the members of his command by ‘permitting 
them to commit’ the atrocities specified.157 
The use of the term ‘gist’ is hardly a specific reference to any law that Kono violated. The 
prosecution attempted, however, to shed further light on the meaning of how Kono violated 
the laws of war by referring to the US Supreme Court’s decision in the Yamashita trial. The 
passage from the Yamashita trial upon which the prosecution relied to explain how Kono 
violated the laws of war, stated that the ‘law of war’ required commanders, ‘who are 
responsible for their subordinates’ to take reasonable measures to ensure ‘civilian populations 
and prisoners of war are protected from brutality’ from an invading army.158 
The prosecution stated that Kono had a positive obligation as commander to ensure he 
acquainted himself with what was occurring in the field so that his troops did not ‘violate the 
laws of war’ when it came to the protection of civilians and POWs. Such a duty being operative, 
would therefore render Kono, as commander, liable even if he claimed he had no knowledge 
of the atrocities committed, on the basis that he had a positive duty to ensure he acquainted 
himself fully of what was occurring in the field. In other words, the prosecution set up a cleverly 
constructed charge that would render Kono liable whether he knew or did not know of the 
atrocities. The prosecution stated that ‘if the accused says he did not know [of the atrocities], 
that admission in and of itself will support the charge that he failed to exercise proper control 
as a commanding officer’.159 
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runway, attempted to argue that his client’s rights were within the ‘vibe’ of the law. See The Castle 
(Directed by Rob Sitch, Working Dog Productions, 1997). 





The prosecution made it quite clear in their answer to the defence that it believed that Kono 
was criminally responsible as a military commander for failing to fulfil his duty to ‘exercise 
control over his troops’.160  Such an important and fundamental principle, the prosecution 
argued, 
distinguishes an army from a mob. It is a precept as old as armies themselves. For the commander 
to deny that he has control over his troops is for him to deny he has an army in the first place.161 
From this, it would appear that the prosecution sought to charge Kono on the basis that his role 
alone as commander was sufficient for him to have the requisite responsibility. 
(b) Meaning of ‘Permit’ 
In addressing the meaning of the term ‘permit’, the prosecution relied upon a general definition 
to show that permit is to ‘tolerate’, to give ‘consent’, ‘to grant (one) license or liberty’, or to 
‘authorize’.162 To prove their point further, the prosecution provided examples of antonyms to 
the term ‘permit’ that indicated the opposite of ‘permit’ is to ‘forbid’ or ‘prohibit’ something. 
In other words, Kono was criminally responsible because he failed to ‘forbid’ or ‘prohibit’, 
thereby ‘permitting’ his troops to commit atrocities. The prosecution went on to state that 
because Kono was under a positive obligation to control the conduct of his troops and failed to 
do so, he made himself a party to the unlawful conduct.163 
Despite the defence’s request in the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution would not be drawn on 
stipulating whether it asserted that to ‘permit’ something was akin to a ‘commission’ or an 
‘omission’.164 Unfortunately, the prosecution did not elaborate on why it did not need to argue 
whether Kono’s liability rested upon a specific act in ‘permitting’ his troops to commit 
atrocities, or an omission by him to prevent his troops from committing atrocities. 
One can only speculate that the argument for not distinguishing between an act (or commission 
of the offence) and failing to control (or the omission to control) was simply due to the fact 
that to do so would invite a legal debate on the jurisprudential elements of the offence for which 
Kono was charged. Perhaps the prosecution feared that the more it was drawn into defining the 
offence for which Kono was charged, the more challenges they would face in distinguishing 
that charge from a charge akin to the common law tort of negligence—a charge which would 
have been non-existent under international criminal law. The prosecution strongly resisted the 
request by the defence to more fully define the charge and its requisite elements.165 
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Broadening of the term ‘permit’ – implications for international law? 
The prosecution argued strongly that Kono’s conviction should rest upon a factual 
determination of the scale of atrocities committed by his troops while he was in command of 
his forces on the island of Panay as they carried out ‘punitive expeditions’ against civilians for 
the acts of Filipino guerilla forces.166 Kono pleaded not guilty to the charge and denied all 
knowledge of the 49 specifications. The Commission, however, was satisfied with the factual 
evidence submitted by the prosecution and was, therefore, of the opinion that Kono was 
criminally responsible for ‘permitting’ atrocities to be committed by forces he commanded. On 
1 May 1946, the Commission sentenced Kono to death by hanging. 
Kono’s case raised some interesting and important points for future trials in Manila and, no 
doubt, beyond. Of primary interest here is the fact that the Commission seemed to accept the 
wording of a charge that operated to make a superior criminally responsible for ‘permitting’ 
others to carry out unlawful acts irrespective of whether the superior knew of the acts in 
question. It was clear that the Commission aided and thereby advanced the understanding of 
how command responsibility would apply to the accused. In essence, the meaning of ‘permit’ 
as adjudged by the Commission in Kono’s case, amounted to, inter alia, a failure to ‘control’. 
The Commission was willing to accept a broad definition of ‘permit’, whereby a senior person 
such as a Lieutenant-General could be held accountable for the actions of his subordinates even 
when he was neither present during the commission of those acts nor knew of the acts in 
question. Given that the Commission ruled that even a person as far removed physically from 
the atrocities could still be held criminally responsible, this had severe consequences for 
findings in trials of lesser ranked Japanese soldiers, as will be shown. 
C. Trial of Lieutenant-General Ko Shiyoku, Imperial Japanese Army, 
Manila, 15 March 1946 
Ko’s case is indicative of the principle that criminal responsibility can apply where the accused 
is blamed for atrocities of the actions or inactions of a superior entity (in Ko’s case, the 
Japanese Government and senior military command) to enforce the Geneva Convention. This 
case brought squarely into question the concept of ‘intermediary liability’. Intermediary 
 
 
the acts were committed, the prosecution simply stated that they believed the defence’s requests were 
unreasonable and that the prosecution had provided sufficient detail to enable the defence to prepare 
its case. Evidently, the Commission agreed with the prosecution as the Specifications were largely left 
intact albeit with minor amendments to downgrade some of the initial estimates of atrocities by 
several hundred overall. Suffice it say, however, that the downgrade ordered by the Commission did 
nothing to reduce the overall culpability of Kono as the scale of the atrocities clearly showed a 
widespread pattern of behaviour. For the downgraded number of victims, see Findings page 8–9, 
specifications 10, 19, 21, 22, 27, 31, 34, 39, 43, 44, 45 and 47. 
166 Ibid 86. The term ‘punitive’ is used throughout the Manila trials by the prosecution to indicate the 




liability exists when an intermediary (in this case, Lt-General Ko) is held criminally responsible 
even though he was not able to exercise ‘effective control’ over the subordinates who 
committed the atrocities. 
While Lt-General Kono was prosecuted for the unlawful killing of Filipino civilians,167 Lt-
General Ko Shiyoku168 was charged and convicted for the mistreatment and unlawful killing 
of US POWs and dozens of US non-combatant internees while they were held captive by the 
Japanese in various places throughout the Philippines and whilst en route to POW facilities in 
Japan.169 
Similar to the underlying circumstances involving Kono’s criminal responsibility for the 
actions of his subordinates, Ko was physically nowhere near the scene of the alleged crimes 
and was at times thousands of kilometres from the actual brutality and killings meted out by 
his subordinates against their victims in the camps and elsewhere. For the most part, Ko was 
moving throughout the Philippines and was often away from the camps. 
One unique feature of Ko’s trial was the fact that his heritage lay not with Japan, but with 
Korea. Ko Shiyoku was born in a small village outside Seoul in 1889 and, as a young man, 
went to the Korean Military Academy and later studied in Japan at the Japanese Central 
Military Preparatory School and the Imperial Japanese Army Academy before Japan annexed 
Korea in 1910.170 Thereafter, he rose quickly through the ranks of the Imperial Japanese Army. 
This fact was notable as his defence team attempted to argue that Ko should not be criminally 
responsible in accordance with the doctrine of command responsibility, since his authority was 
largely undermined by his subordinates’ contempt towards him due to his Korean heritage, 
thereby negating the very essence of command. 
 
 
167 NARA, RG331 UD1321 290/12/12/1 Box 1563. 
168 Trial documents for United States of America v Shiyoku Ko are located at NARA, RG331 UD1321 
290/12/12/1 Boxes 1559–60, volumes 1 and 2. Unless specified otherwise, all archival documents 
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169 Many of the brutalities committed by Japanese forces against civilian and military POWs 
throughout the Asia–Pacific region where Japanese forces operated POW camps, have been 
extensively popularised since the Pacific War in film, television and books – see, eg, Unbroken 
(Angelina Jolie, Legendary Pictures, Jolie Pas, 3 Arts Entertainment, 2014); Empire of the Sun 
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The Charge reflective of Ko’s Responsibility for the Welfare of POW and Civilian Internees 
From March 1944 until January 1945, Lt-General Ko Shiyoku was part of General Yamashita’s 
14th Area Army in the Philippines and was the commanding General for all POW and civilian 
internees. During this time he had oversight of, and was responsible for, the supervision, 
supply, transportation, welfare and administration of all detainees held captive by the IJA. 
Given this level of responsibility, the prosecution alleged that his failure to properly exercise 
his duty in relation to the welfare of thousands of detainees rendered him criminally liable for 
the mistreatment and brutality meted out by his subordinates. Specifically, Ko was charged 
with: 
Unlawfully and wilfully disregard, neglect and fail to discharge his duties of command by 
permitting and sanctioning the commission of brutal atrocities and other high crimes against … 
prisoners of war and noncombatant civilian internees; and … thereby violated the laws of war.171 
The Specifications of the Charge Linked to Ko’s Administrative Responsibility for POW and 
Civilian Internees 
Accompanying the charge were twelve specifications, each detailing hundreds of specific 
allegations of incidents involving inhumane and cruel treatment committed by IJA forces 
against US POWs and civilian internees. Each incident outlined by the prosecution occurred in 
numerous places during Ko’s incumbency as the commanding General of POWs and civilian 
internees: Cabanatuan prisoner of war camp, the Sakura Detached Hospital Camp, the Davao 
penal colony prisoner of war camp and its branch at the Lasang Air Field, the Bilibid prisoner 
of war camp and hospital, the Santo Tomas civilian internment camp, the Baguio civilian 
internment camp, the Los Banos civilian internment camp, the Las Pinas prisoner of war camp, 
Pasay Elementary School prisoner of war camp, Palawan Air Field prisoner of war camp, and 
the transfer of prisoners of war and internees from Davao, Mindanao, to Cabanatuan, Luzon, 
via Manila.172 
The types of incidents alleged by the prosecution consisted of treatment by IJA officers and 
NCOs such as deliberate starvation, failure and refusal to provide medical treatment and 
adequate medical facilities, failure to provide adequate housing and clothing, pilfering and 
confiscation of food packages from the American Red Cross, brutal treatment (including 
beatings, solitary confinement, torture and murder) of named US servicemen and civilian 
internees, forced labour (including of or by those who were sick and wounded), and infliction 
of brutal, unlawful and arbitrary disciplinary punishment.173 Of particular note was the cruel 
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and inhumane treatment of US POWs and internees whilst on board various Japanese ships en 
route to POW camps in Japan.174 
The prosecution went to great lengths to argue that such treatment of US POWs and civilian 
internees was in direct breach of the various international conventions and treaties, namely the 
Hague Convention of 1907, the Prisoner of War Convention of 1929 and the Red Cross 
Convention of 1929. The prosecution cited article after article of the respective conventions 
outlining how Japan had breached its international obligations with respect to its treatment of 
POWs and civilian internees and, importantly, argued that Ko knew or suspected what was 
occurring within the camps. 
Defence’s Argument as to why Command Responsibility Should Not Apply 
Lt-General Ko’s defence team did not appear to challenge the veracity and strength of the 
evidence that outlined the extent, nature and scale of mistreatment meted out against US POWs 
and civilian internees. Nor did it directly challenge the point about Ko having some knowledge 
about the conditions in the camps.175 Eyewitness testimony was overwhelming and, although 
arguable that some details might have been open to better scrutiny by the defence,176 on the 
whole, it could see no reason to challenge the veracity of the eyewitnesses. 
(a) Lt-General Ko unable to exercise command and control 
 
Instead, the defence, rightly or wrongly, appeared to challenge the underlying rationale as to 
why Lt-General Ko should be held accountable pursuant to the doctrine of command 
responsibility. Lieutenant Weston for the defence raised several points. Firstly, he stated that 
Ko’s case was a first of its kind for the Manila trials (and no doubt elsewhere) since the trial 
involved a Korean national who had made it to the senior ranks of the Japanese military and 
was now charged with ‘command responsibility’.177 
 
 
174 Ibid 35–41. The allegations surrounding the mistreatment of prisoners whilst en route to Japan, as 
alleged by the prosecution consisted of detainees being placed below decks for extended periods of 
time in extremely hot and overcrowded conditions without adequate water and sanitary conditions. 
The prosecution alleged the conditions below decks became so bad that officers ceased going below 
for roll call. The sanitary conditions also became intolerable to the extent that buckets were lowered 
by ropes each day in the morning and raised again in the afternoon to remove human waste – often the 
waste would spill over people (often intentionally) as it was removed through a small hole. 
175 Ko must have had at least some knowledge of the appalling conditions within the camps due to the 
fact that the defence highlighted evidence that General Muto admitted under cross examination that 
Lt-General Ko had ‘protested to General Yamashita concerning the food situation in the prisoner of 
war camps and civilian internment camps’ – see Box 1560, page 1415. 
176 For instance, the details accompanying the twelve specifications often omitted even general dates 
as to when certain incidents were supposed to have occurred. 




Lt Weston stated that, due to Ko’s heritage, the Commission should consider him somewhat 
differently to his Japanese counterparts, purely on the basis that he was ‘for many years 
suppressed by the Japanese and … a Korean in the Japanese Army would have very little 
weight in any command position.178 He went on to state that ‘it is my contention that [Lt-
General Ko] had very little influence in the Japanese Army. He was resented by his 
subordinates, he was looked down upon by the officers over him.179 Indeed, if it was the case 
that Lt-General Ko’s subordinates and superiors regarded him with as little respect as the 
defence maintained, then there is some merit in the argument that Ko would have indeed 
struggled to reign in the excesses of his subordinates. 
The defence tried to paint a picture that rendered Lt-General Ko, in effect, impotent as a 
commander in relation to his command of POW and civilian internment camps throughout the 
Philippines and beyond, and thereby invited doubt as to whether he was in a position to do 
anything at all to remediate the conditions within the camps. 
(b) Ko’s command responsibility was effectively dependent upon Japan’s unwillingness to 
abide by the Geneva Convention 
A second point the defence raised in support of the argument that Lt-General Ko was, at least 
to some extent, powerless to change the plight of POWs and civilian internees was due to the 
fact that Japan, at the start of the war, never intended to abide by the Geneva Convention, 
especially when it came to the matter of POWs and other internees. Lt Weston stated that: 
The War Ministry in Tokyo had no intention whatsoever of following or abiding by the Geneva 
Convention, yet here you have an accused, a middle man, furthermore a Korean, who is charged 
with violating the Geneva Convention. One man in the middle could not on his own follow the 
Geneva Convention. His superior officers, the headquarters in Tokyo, ignored the Geneva 
Convention. His subordinates knew nothing, practically, about the Geneva Convention. I ask you 
as members of this Commission, how could this Accused abide by the Geneva Convention under 
those circumstances. … Now, if anyone is to be held responsible for the violation of the Geneva 
Convention it is not the Accused. The responsibility lies in the Imperial Headquarters in Tokyo, 
the War Ministry.180 
Lieutenant Weston’s point is well made. By casting doubt on the chain of command in relation 
to Ko’s circumstances, the defence argued that Ko was not solely responsible for the way that 
POWs and internees were treated by Japan. Rather, the fate of the tens of thousands of people 
who were unfortunate enough to be taken prisoner by the Japanese during the Pacific War, was 









(c) Ko unable to exercise effective control due to advancing US and guerrilla forces 
A third point the defence raised as to why Ko should not be held accountable for the deaths 
and mistreatment of US POWs and internees in the Philippines was the success of the US 
military campaign to reclaim the Philippine islands 181  and the incessant Filipino guerilla 
insurgency that was wreaking havoc among stranded Japanese forces. 182 Such conditions, 
argued the defence, would have made it extremely difficult for Ko or anyone else, to maintain 
a semblance of decency in the face of advancing US and guerilla attacks and, as must have 
been plainly clear to those Japanese troops, the inevitable defeat of Japanese forces in the 
Philippines. 
In relation to the prosecution’s allegation that Lt-General Ko deliberately starved those held 
captive by the Japanese, Lt Weston made the following observation: 
Now, we all know that at that time [November 1944 to December 1944] Japanese shipping was 
practically non-existent. Our planes were raiding the mainland, they were raiding all shipping, 
and the majority of the Japanese ships were sunk. Now, how could they actually supply their 
camps and their own army under those conditions? The havoc and chaos created by our own 
armed forces was responsible for a good deal that went on.183 
The efficiency of the advancing US and guerilla forces made it virtually impossible to ensure 
the survival of Japanese forces let alone Japanese held POWs and internees. Japanese forces 
were virtually cut off from supplies and reinforcements, and due to the necessity created by the 
circumstances in which Japanese forces found themselves, there was little doubt that POWs 
and internees would not have been able to receive better rations. 
Commission’s findings on the concept of ‘effective control’ 
Despite the defence’s best efforts, the Commission did not agree with the defence’s arguments 
in relation to the minimalist level of control that Lt-General Ko exerted over the dire conditions 
in the camps. The Commission ruled that Ko had a form of control over his subordinates and 
it was his responsibility to exercise that control to ensure his subordinates were adhering to 
international laws and customs regarding internees and POWs. Essentially, the Commission 
applied a broad test in defining the concept of ‘effective control’. The findings seemed to 
indicate that a superior could still exercise ‘effective control’ even in the face of plausible 
arguments to suggest that the accused did not have ‘actual control’. 
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Such a finding broadened the definition of ‘effective control’ in so far as the term related to 
senior officers who were physically removed or isolated from their area of delegation. The 
expanded understanding of ‘effective control’ meant that there was a high bar required to avoid 
criminal responsibility. Ko’s circumstances were not sufficient to sever control. For his part in 
the mistreatment, starvation, torture and murder of thousands of US POWs and civilian 
internees, Lt-General Ko was found guilty of the charge and sentenced to death. He was 
executed on 26 September 1946. 
Ko was the most senior person on the ground in the Philippines whose responsibility it was to 
administer the supervision, welfare and transportation of thousands of detainees. Seemingly, 
he failed in this role and paid the ultimate price for it. Having actual knowledge of the 
widespread, appalling privations and cruel treatment committed by Japanese guards in POW 
and internment camps under his command, and the scale of actual fatalities, it would have been 
extremely difficult for the Commission to consider any finding other than guilt. 
In finding him guilty of the offence as charged, the Commission sent a clear message for other 
trials as to how it viewed the imperative for commanders to control subordinates, particularly 
when it came to the very sensitive matter of POWs. Very little credence was given by the 
Commission to the intervening events that made Lt-General Ko’s command virtually 
impossible. The Commission found him guilty on the basis of command responsibility despite 
the fact, as it was argued by his defence, Ko’s command was compromised to such an extent 
that he was ineffectual as a commander, not just simply because of the contempt his 
subordinates and superiors exhibited towards him, but also due to the dire circumstances in 
which Japan found itself at this juncture of the War. The same level of ineffectualness could 
well have been experienced by anyone occupying that role, including a native Japanese officer 
of equivalent rank. 
Retribution for the loss and mistreatment of US POWs and civilian internees is an overriding 
feature of Ko’s case. Someone needed to pay for the death and brutality that came out of 
Japanese POW and internment camps. By virtue of the position Ko occupied (despite not 
having actual control over many facets of his post), the Commission expanded the operation of 
the doctrine of command responsibility to the extent that a person could still be criminally 
responsible even where they were unable to exercise effective control over their subordinates. 
The precedent established in Ko’s case could render a person liable even if the commander 
took steps to rectify or alleviate the offences by subordinates for which they were charged. 
Simply by virtue of the position they occupied, a person could now be held liable. The 
commander’s guilt is one of strict liability. The finding of guilt where a commander has taken 
actual steps to change the deleterious circumstances, as will be shown, does not compare well 
to other cases. Where a commander has taken steps to alleviate the wrongdoing, then such 
actions should be taken into consideration, at least in part to mitigate the sentence. That Ko 





The strict liability approach applied in Ko’s case by virtue of him being a commander, however, 
was not necessarily uniformly applied in all cases. As the next case highlights, the Commission 
was at times willing to give the benefit of doubt to the accused commander where the evidence 
was unclear that he played a specific role in the commission of war crimes. 
D. Trial of Vice Admiral Osugi Morikazu, Imperial Japanese Navy, 
Manila, 22 January 1947 
Vice Admiral Osugi Morikazu of the 23rd Naval Base Area, Imperial Japanese Navy was 
charged and convicted of war crimes committed by his subordinates during his command at 
Makassa, Celebes, Netherlands East India (as it was then known).184 Vice Admiral Osugi 
somehow managed to avoid the executioner and received life imprisonment for his part in the 
commission of war crimes against downed US airmen. 
Charge and Specifications 
Osugi was simply charged with violating the ‘laws of war’.185 Specifically, that charge related 
to the execution of nine US airmen whose planes were shot down during US bombing raids 
over Indonesian islands in the latter part of 1944. The airmen were held prisoner for 
approximately 40 days before they were taken to two separate locations—four were taken to 
Maros Airfield, Makassar, Celebes (then the Netherlands East Indies) and the remaining nine 
were taken to Kendari, Celebes—and were beheaded by individuals of the Imperial Japanese 
Navy (‘IJN’). 
The specifications to the charge asserted that Osugi unlawfully permitted and consented to, or 
‘ratified’ and failed to prevent and take corrective and punitive action against the executions 
of thirteen US airmen.186 
Similar to the charges levelled against other senior Japanese military figures, there was no 
direct evidence, nor was there any claim by the prosecution, that Osugi personally participated 
in or witnessed the killings. A large question to settle was whether Osugi gave the orders to 
execute the thirteen airmen, or whether he knew that the executions were going to take place 




184 For all documents referred to in the discussion of the Trial of Vice Admiral Osugi Morikazu, see 
NARA, RG331, UD1321, 290/12/12/1 Boxes 1571–3, Volumes I–XXII. 





Sentence and Findings 
Osugi pleaded not guilty to the charge, however the Commission found (as did the approving 
authority)187 that Osugi was criminally responsible for the deaths of the 13 airmen and, on that 
basis, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.188 
Rationale for Osugi’s Criminal Responsibility 
(a) Resolving Contested Fact on the basis of Subjective Fact Bias? 
There was much factual conjecture between the prosecution and defence as to whether Osugi 
gave direct orders for the executions or at least had knowledge of them prior to them being 
carried out. The prosecution introduced several witnesses who claimed to have been present in 
the same room as Osugi when the matter of executions was discussed and when the decision 
to execute the men was made. In contradiction, the defence presented eyewitness testimony 
that suggested Osugi had no knowledge of the executions. 
Chief among the witnesses for the defence was Osugi himself. He claimed to have no 
knowledge of the downed airmen as he was, at the time, struck down with dengue fever and 
some three kilometres from where the US airmen were being held. Osugi claimed that when 
he learned about the executions he was ‘flabbergasted’.189 He further claimed that upon hearing 
of the unauthorised executions, he had planned to investigate and, if necessary, punish those 
who executed the airmen in absence of specific orders to do so.190 However due to the US 
bombing raids occurring each day, he was unable to follow through with his planned 
investigation and the punitive measures against his subordinates.191 
Despite Osugi’s protestations, the Commission favoured the prosecution’s evidence. The issue 
remains as to whether the apparent favourable treatment of the prosecution’s version of events 
was a direct result of the concept of ‘subject fact bias’. Subjective fact bias, as argued in other 
cases, occurs where facts are interpreted and established according to preconceived notions 
that fit within the beliefs of those sitting in judgment. 
(b) The Concept of ‘Acquiescence’ as the mode of liability – the Prosecution Claimed that 
Osugi ‘let’ his Subordinates Execute the Airmen 
The Commission found that the prosecution’s evidence—namely, eyewitness testimony of IJN 
personnel who were close to the Vice Admiral at the time the offences occurred—indicated 
that, although he did not order the executions, Osugi was aware the killings were going to take 
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place and failed to prevent them. On this basis, Osugi failed in his duty to prevent the unlawful 
killings. Given this failure and the fact Osugi was in a position of authority, he was criminally 
responsible. One qualification that the Commission did concede, however, was that all of those 
who gave evidence against Osugi were awaiting trial themselves. As a result of that personal 
interest, the Commission held that all of the prosecution witnesses ‘related their stories in 
words and meanings as they pleased to establish an atmosphere of innocence as far as they 
were personally concerned. Instances of this were numerous in the cases and the writer of this 
opinion has kept this fact in mind’.192 
Despite the fact the prosecution’s evidence may have been tainted by self-interest on the part 
of the witnesses, the Commission still favoured the prosecution’s version of events in so far as 
Osugi’s knowledge of the executions.193 The Commission acknowledged that letters received 
on his behalf maintain that Osugi is not a ‘bad or vicious person at heart’ but that 
the effect of his tolerance alone is enough to convict him of major crime. He ‘let’ his subordinates 
kill 13 American airmen and the evidence shows that several of these airmen were passed around 
to various units for execution. They seemed to make quite an occasion of it when the … men 
were executed.194 
As is discussed at length in Part II of this thesis, acquiescence as a mode of liability at 
international law is a complex concept and something that has arisen across many contexts 
over the history of war. The fact that acquiescence is a basis on which to hold a person 
criminally responsible, places a positive obligation on superiors to ensure subordinates are held 
to an appropriate standard of behaviour in accordance to the relevant laws. Failure to do so, as 
in Osugi’s case, could be sufficient at international law to render a person criminally 
responsible. 
(c) Responsibility of Commander to Uphold International Law 
The Commission in Osugi’s trial made it clear the accused would not escape criminal 
responsibility for, in essence, failing in his duty to prevent the executions from occurring. 
Acquiescence occurred here due to the fact the Commission adjudged that Osugi had some 
prior knowledge the executions would take place and did nothing to prevent them occurring. 
The prosecution made the point in their opening address that 
[c]ommanders of troops who fail to prevent the commission of wrongs in violation of laws of 
war are themselves, war criminals. Justice Jackson, in his report to the President on June 7, 1945, 
stated, ‘We do not accept as the paradox that legal responsibility should be the least where the 
power is the greatest.’195 
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Given that Osugi had knowledge, and chose to do nothing, the Commission found he therefore 
gave ‘tacit approval’ to the acts. That Osugi would be deemed responsible for the executions 
is neither surprising nor out of step with the other cases examined above, particularly so given 
the Commission ruled that he had actual knowledge of the executions. 
Life Imprisonment – a response to the temporal relationship between the offence and trial? 
What is also noteworthy about this case, was the sentence of life imprisonment that Osugi 
received when compared to the sentences handed down in cases such as Yamashita, Kono and 
Ko, which were all death sentences. Why, then, did Osugi receive life imprisonment for 
knowingly allowing the unlawful executions of thirteen US airmen when, in other cases, death 
was the verdict? There are several explanations for this. 
One explanation, as macabre as it may be, is that the number of victims in Osugi’s case was 
limited to thirteen US airmen as opposed to the large scale wanton murder and destruction 
committed under the commands of General Yamashita and Lt-Generals Ko and Kono. A 
further reason that cannot be ignored relates to the dates during which Osugi was prosecuted, 
which were in 1947. By this time the Manila trials had been going since the Yamashita trial in 
late 1945 and there is some argument that sentences had relaxed, albeit slightly, since that time. 
That the US wanted to expedite their trials to bring them to a speedy conclusion, may also have 
played a part. 
A further explanation relates to the fact that perhaps the Commission simply could not dismiss 
the charge—as sought by the defence—in the face of the unlawful executions of thirteen US 
airmen. Someone in a senior position needed to be held accountable for these deaths and, 
despite there being some questions surrounding the veracity of the prosecution’s evidence, the 
Commission was not prepared to allow Osugi to walk free. But at the same time, the 
Commission was not prepared to condemn him to death. 
E. Trial of 2nd Lieutenant Minoru Kato, High Commissioner’s Residence, 
8–21 August 1946 
Findings by a Commission that a superior personally engaged in one (or more) instance of war 
crimes is sufficient to show that the same commander, therefore, ordered other killings and is 
likewise guilty by the doctrine of command responsibility for other war crimes committed by 
subordinates within a reasonable proximal and temporal space. 
The trial of 2nd Lieutenant Minoru Kato196 of the IJA is of interest in so far as the case illustrates 
that where a superior personally engages in war crimes, that person, therefore has provided the 
necessary authority to his subordinates to carry out similar acts.197 On that basis, a commander 
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may be deemed guilty for both personally committing the unlawful act, and also guilty for 
providing the necessary command or orders to his subordinates. 
The Mode of Liability Arises from Orders to Commit Atrocities and by Personal Participation 
– liability continues until contrary orders to cease atrocities are given 
Lieutenant Kato was charged with the ‘violation of the Laws of War’ as far as he unlawfully 
ordered and participated in the torture and murder of named and unnamed Filipino non-
combatants on Cebu Island in 1944.198 The nature of the torture and killings was particularly 
gruesome and involved the beating, burning and eventual murder of approximately 26 
individuals. 199  On evidence provided at the trial, Kato was personally found to have 
participated in some, but not all, of the killings. On the basis of his participation, he was found 
guilty for the specific acts related to the torture and eventual deaths, but he was also found 
liable for the acts of his subordinates who had committed similar acts not under the direct 
orders of Kato. Kato was found guilty of war crimes and was sentenced to death by hanging. 
On review, the Reviewing Authority confirmed the original sentence.200 
Legal Principle of ‘temporal’ and ‘proximal’ connection to the offence 
The legal argument espoused by the defence was centred around the fact Kato should not be 
liable for acts committed by his subordinates on the basis he did not order them to engage in 
all acts for which he was charged. The Commission found there was sufficient evidence from 
several eyewitnesses who survived and could identify Kato as one of those present and ‘who 
 
 
accused would be liable for acts he neither ordered nor committed, but had at some point committed 
and thus signaled to his subordinates that such acts were necessarily condoned. In regard to the case 
of Sgt Major Yoshida involved the offence of, inter alia, rape, Yoshida had previously, in company 
with several of his men, raped and murdered several Filipino women. His subordinates later 
committed similar acts without the knowledge of Yoshida, yet Yoshida was charged for those acts 
committed by his subordinates and was convicted for failing in his duty as their superior by failing to 
prevent those acts and was adjudged as liable as the perpetrators. He received the death penalty. It 
would seem that the Commission in Manila was consistent in their findings of guilt for those who 
committed acts of murder as for those who committed rape against non-combatants. See the trial of 
Yoshida Tadashi and Ishisaka Iwao RG331 UD1243 290/11/31/05 Box 1276. 
198 “Review of the record of trial by a Military Commission of Second Lieutenant Minoru Kato, ISN 
51J-41070 of the Imperial Japanese Army”, RG331 UD1243 290/11/31/05 Box 1276, page 1. 
199 For a full description of the atrocities committed by Kato and his subordinates, see specifications 
1, 2 and 3 RG331 UD1243 290/11/31/05 Box 1276, page 2. As outlined in the three specifications, 
atrocities were of such a nature to include inter alia, beatings of victims with bats, placing wooden 
boards across victims’ throats and ‘seesawing’ from side to side until the victims were unconscious, 
engaging in ‘watercure’ treatment (commonly known as waterboarding in contemporary parlance), 
burning victims with cigarette butts, hanging them upside down from trees, and burning victims to 
death. 
200 Reviewing Authority as per Major General George F Moore, Commanding General, United States 




was exercising authority over the Japanese soldiers who tortured and killed others’ at the 
various scenes where the atrocities occurred.201 
The defence tried, unsuccessfully, to claim others had provided the necessary orders which 
resulted in the unlawful killings and that Kato was not in command at the time. Curiously, the 
fact that someone other than Kato may have actually been in command at the time of the 
killings did not seem to affect the Commission’s finding of guilt, and the Judge Advocate 
stated: 
What the defense offered amounted at most to evidence that another than the accused was in 
command of the garrison and company on paper when these incidents occurred. If the facts were 
as contended by the defense, this circumstance would neither exculpate the accused nor in any 
way mitigate his guilt.202 
Unfortunately, Colonel Shaw JA did not elaborate on this statement. One can speculate, 
however, that Colonel Shaw—as did the original Commission who heard the initial evidence—
considered that personal participation in criminal offences where the acts are later replicated 
by subordinates not under direct orders is sufficient to render a superior criminally responsible 
for the later criminal acts. That is, given that the superior personally authorised, participated in 
and observed initial unlawful conduct, this fact alone is sufficient to indicate to his subordinates 
that future acts are likewise acceptable and perhaps even desirable under certain circumstances. 
The superior has set a precedent to which subordinates may adhere. Future unlawful conduct 
committed by subordinates under these circumstances is, therefore, sufficient to attract criminal 
sanction for the superior in the absence of direct orders to his subordinates to refrain from 
engaging in such conduct or where no evidence exists that the superior purported to punish 
subordinates for committing the said atrocities. Colonel Shaw made it clear that Kato was 
unable to rely on, or seek mitigation of sentence, on the basis of the fact that Kato did not order 
all the unlawful acts against Filipino non-combatants. 
What is one to make of the legal principle stemming from such a finding? The original 
Commission which heard Kato’s case, has, whether intentionally or inadvertently, provided a 
very interesting summation of the law as it relates to the ‘temporal’ and ‘proximal’ connection 
of the accused to the commission of the unlawful conduct. In finding Kato guilty, not purely 
for the acts he personally committed against non-combatants, but also for acts committed by 
his subordinates for which he may not have had full knowledge, it created a ‘temporal’ and 
‘proximal’ relationship regarding the commission of the first and subsequent offences. In other 
words, time and place relative to the accused and the commission of the offences are relevant 
to a finding of criminal responsibility. Applying this line of argument, because Kato had 
ordered and participated in the initial acts, it was reasonable, therefore, to conclude he was 
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sufficiently responsible for similar acts committed at a later date. The chain of Kato’s 
‘temporal’ and ‘proximal’ connection between the first and subsequent unlawful conduct was 
not sufficiently broken. 
F. Trial of Colonel Nagahama Akira, Imperial Japanese Military Police (Kenpeitai), 
Manila, 25 February – 11 March 1946 
The trial of Colonel Nagahama shows that a failure to prevent and punish subordinates for war 
crimes is sufficient to constitute acquiescence of a mid-ranked officer, even though no evidence 
existed that the accused had actual knowledge of the scale of atrocities committed by 
subordinates. Inability to prevent atrocities is not a valid excuse and not a mitigatory factor in 
sentencing. 
Charge and Specifications 
Colonel Nagahama of the IJA, commander of the Kenpeitai in the Philippines, was charged 
with ‘failing to control members of his command, permitting them to commit atrocities against 
the people of the United States, its allies’. He was also charged with ordering atrocities in 
violation of the laws of war. 203  There were four specifications and eight additional 
specifications to the charge that centred around Nagahama’s role as a commanding officer in 
the torture and murders of Filipino civilians and members of the US and Philippine armies. 
The events took place in and around Fort Santiago, Cortabitarte, Wack Wack Golf and Country 
Club, and the Far Eastern University, all within the vicinity of Manila between 30 September 
1942 and 8 January 1945. 
After pleading guilty to the charge and all specifications for his role, Nagahama was convicted 
of the charge and sentenced to death by hanging. Details of the extent of the killings reads as a 
litany of depraved murder, torture and undisciplined debauchery committed by a defeated and 
depleted Japanese military police in the closing stages of the Pacific War. Most of the killings 
occurred in the latter stages of 1944 and early 1945 as US forces began landing at Leyte and 
elsewhere on the Philippine Islands. 
Evidence of the killings that the prosecution produced extended to over 800 pages comprised 
predominantly of testimony of eyewitnesses who managed to survive captivity during 
Nagahama’s command of various locations housing US and Filipino military and civilian 
personnel. Fort Santiago was the site of the worst of the killings and exhibits were produced 
by the prosecution that showed decapitations of four US civilians, executions of US aviators 
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Establishing Nagahama’s Criminal Responsibility 
Nagahama’s criminal responsibility for the deaths of several thousand civilians and US military 
personnel held in captivity in various places near Manila, like that of other officers prosecuted 
at Manila, seemed to be predicated on the position and role within the military that he occupied 
at the time the atrocities were committed. As such, Nagahama’s case (and others like it) 
represent a class of cases that imposed criminal liability on the accused, not for actual 
knowledge or direct participation in war crimes but on a strict basis of command responsibility 
so that the person in command was held accountable. Colonel Nagahama was the commanding 
officer of the Japanese military police (Kenpeitai) in the Philippines and records from his trial 
and subsequent review appear to indicate that his criminal responsibility rested on this point 
alone. Colonel Shaw JA stated that 
The responsibility of the accused is established beyond question. The evidence shows that he 
was, from about 1 October 1942 to 7 January 1945 commander of Military Police operations in 
all of the Philippines, maintaining his headquarter during that period … that he visited the rooms 
where prisoners were investigated; and that he acquiesced in the execution without trial of 
General Natividad and nine other officers of the Philippine Army; that he took no action against 
the guards; and that the officer who directed the confinement was permitted thereafter to remain 
in charge of prisoners at Fort Santiago.205 
Nagahama had little reason to dispute the extensive eyewitness testimony that clearly 
implicated his subordinates in the commission of war crimes, but he did offer, by way of a 
defence, his purported inability to prevent atrocities from occurring. His defence team put 
forward the proposition that Nagahama, even if he did know or suspect that prisoners were 
being mistreated and murdered by his subordinates, he had no way of preventing such crimes 
from occurring since ‘he was not strong enough to overcome the great forces which worked 
against any good intentions he had on arrival in the Philippines’.206 His defence team claimed 
that Nagahama’s inability to control his subordinates was exacerbated by the advancing US 
forces and the effectiveness of guerrilla campaigns orchestrated by locals.207 He also claimed 
that his men were forced to ‘live off the land’ due to shortages of food.208 
The law of command responsibility extended by the Commission 
These arguments failed to sway the original tribunal and the subsequent reviewer. Likewise, 
clemency was rejected (despite receiving petitions from Nagahama’s mother and relatives). 
Nagahama’s criminal responsibility seemed to rest on the fact that he failed to prevent the 










the Commission, and subsequent reviewing authorities, broadened criminal liability to those 
who were arguably not in a real position to control the day-to-day actions of their subordinates. 
Given that Nagahama was merely a colonel and had assumed enormous responsibility for 
thousands of prisoners and Japanese military personnel, it is arguable that he did lack the 
authority to control his subordinates. General Yamashita claimed even he lost authority in the 
closing phases of the Philippine campaign, so there was little hope a colonel could prevent 
atrocities from occurring in the extreme circumstances in which the Japanese found 
themselves. 
The Commission kept this fact from disturbing the original death penalty and they affirmed the 
original sentence.209 The law, as it now stood was clear—unless the accused could show clear 
evidence that he at least attempted to prevent and punish subordinates for atrocities, it mattered 
little of the circumstances surrounding the superior. Criminal responsibility was firmly 
established merely on the role or occupation of the accused. That such a proposition would be 
founded during the Manila trials is hardly surprising given the earlier finding at the Yamashita 
trial. 
What was now illuminating, however, was the propensity of military commissions to apply the 
‘Yamashita precedent’210 to those much more junior in rank who, importantly, did not have the 
same level of authority as a general. Why did the Commission refuse to acknowledge this fact 
and at least consider it as a point in mitigation that criminal responsibility should be shared? 
Instead, the Commission was satisfied with applying a strict precedent that as long as there was 
a connection (‘temporal’ and/ or ‘proximal’) then criminal responsibility was sure to follow. A 
further plank of command responsibility was clearly developed. 
* * * 
As it should now be clear, the Manila trials highlighted several problematic features in relation 
to command responsibility. In short, the main problems with command responsibility 
stemming from those trials appear to be: 
• the application of ‘contingent liability’; 
• the broad interpretation of mens rea (especially, ‘knowledge’); 
• subjective bias with disputed fact evidence; 
• ambiguities regarding charges relating to ‘disregarding and failing to discharge’ their 
duties; 
•  a broadening of the meaning of the charge ‘permit’ atrocities to occur; 
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• the application of intermediary liability; 
• the broad interpretation of ‘effective control’; 
• inconsistent sentencing due to ‘temporal disconnection’; 
• the application of the ‘temporal’ and ‘proximal’ principle; and 
• that the inability of the accused to prevent, punish or deter atrocities is not a valid factor 
to mitigate the sentence. 
 
These problems, and how best to deal with them, are the subject of the following chapter, in 
which command responsibility is examined in its historical context to determine the requisite 






A NORMATIVE RE-CONCEPTUALISATION OF THE PRINCIPLES 
OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 
I. Introduction 
The application of command responsibility throughout history, as shown by the cases at Manila 
and other cases, is far from uniform. The extent to which commanders have been held liable 
for the conduct of their subordinates has varied greatly and the decision as to whether to 
attribute guilt to those at all levels of civilian and military leadership seems to depend very 
much on the context and circumstances of the events in question. There are, however, several 
discernible elements or principles borne out by the cases and the lex scripta that can provide 
some clarity regarding criminal responsibility in relation to command responsibility.211  
One eminent legal figure who articulated the elements of individual responsibility was Robert 
H Jackson of the US Supreme Court and the US Chief Prosecutor, during his opening statement 
at the International Military Tribunal for Nuremberg (IMTN). During his address, Jackson 
provided some indication of what he believed were some of the essential elements of individual 
criminal responsibility for war crimes that applied to everyone and which were reflected in the 
IMTN Charter. He stated that, 
[t]he Charter also recognizes individual responsibility on the part of those who commit acts 
defined as crimes, or who incites others to do so, or who join a common plan with other persons, 
groups or organizations to bring about their commission.212 
Here, Jackson alluded to three essential elements for a person (including a civilian or military 
commander)213 to face criminal responsibility: that is, where they have actually committed the 
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act; or where they have incited others to do so; or where they have conspired with others to 
commit the acts in question. While there is little doubt that Jackson’s statement holds true, the 
elements he outlined are far from exhaustive and, as will be discussed, history has shown that 
there are other instances where a commander could be found criminally liable for the acts of 
their subordinates. 
A different case that provides additional insights into those other possible instances is the case 
of Brigadefuhrer Kurt Meyer which was conducted in accordance with the Canadian War 
Crimes Regulations.214 In summing up the case as it pertained to the elements of command 
responsibility, the Judge Advocate stated that the following considerations needed to be 
present: 
The rank of the accused, the duties and responsibilities of the accused by virtue of the command 
he held, the training of the men under his command, their age and experience, anything relating 
to the question whether the accused either ordered, encouraged or verbally or tacitly acquiesced 
in the killing of prisoners, or wilfully failed in his duty as a military commander to prevent, or to 
take such action as the circumstances required to endeavour to prevent, the killing of prisoners, 
were matters affecting the question of the accused’s responsibility.215 
Others have stipulated that evidence of command responsibility must contain elements that 
clearly show that a superior–subordinate relationship exists, the superior knew or should have 
known a crime was committed or will be committed, the superior had the ability to prevent the 
crime, and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable steps to prevent or punish 
the criminal conduct.216 Parks in his definition of the elements of command responsibility has 
added further details by stating that command responsibility includes other essential 
ingredients: evidence that the superior ‘incited’ subordinates to commit unlawful acts, that the 
superior failed in their duty to prevent unlawful acts, that there exists an executive structure 
placing the superior above the position of the subordinate, that the superior had knowledge 
(actual or constructive) and that the superior was negligent in their duties that allowed or 
facilitated the unlawful conduct.217 
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The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government 
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214 Trial of BrigadefuhrerKurt Meyer (The Abbaye Ardenne Case) Canadian Military Court, Aurich, 
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215 Ibid 108. 
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Similarly, Solis characterises the elements of command responsibility as the ‘commander’s 
seven routes to trial’.218 He states that a commander will be held accountable where he or she: 
(1) personally commits violations of international law; (2) personally orders a subordinate to 
commit unlawful acts; (3) fails to take action for the acts of subordinates for violations of which 
he or she is aware or does not take action to punish wrongdoers; (4) incites subordinates to 
commit unlawful acts; (5) fails to control troops who commit unlawful acts; (6) acquiesces in 
relation to the commission of unlawful acts; or (7) passes on manifestly illegal orders to 
subordinates. 
II. ‘Objective’ and ‘Subjective’ Formulation of the Elements 
In broad terms, the elements of command responsibility comprise ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ 
standards. Nybondas asserts that ‘[…] the elements may best be divided into objective and 
subjective elements referred to actus reus and mens rea respectively’. 219  By ‘objective’, 
Nybondas refers to elements that can be objectively determined by discernable evidence that 
would indicate the superior did or failed to do an act preparatory or in furtherance to an offence. 
Examples of objective elements could be such actions as those Solis terms, ‘personally 
committing violations of international law’ or what Jackson identifies as ‘inciting’ criminal 
acts. 
The ‘subjective’ element, on the other hand, goes to a determination of the ‘guilty mind’ of the 
accused and looks to establish what the accused knew or should have known in relation to the 
acts of his or her subordinates. An example would be what most authors identify as being the 
‘knowledge’ element. 
III. Reformulating the Principles of Command Responsibility 
While there is broad agreement across the literature in regard to the requisite elements of 
command responsibility, each of the formulations cited above are deficient since they fail to 
incorporate a more comprehensive list of factors that various tribunals and courts examined in 
the post-WWII war crimes in Nuremberg, the Philippines and beyond. 
A consolidated list of the elements that incorporates additional elements of command 
responsibility as evidenced by post-WWII trials, would comprise the following: 
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A. evidence the commander personally committed the underlying crime;220 
B. evidence the commander ordered the acts in question;221 
C. whether or not the commander failed to act to prevent the crime (acquiescence);222 
 
 
220 For example, see Trial of Henry Wirz, Letter from The Secretary of War Ad Interim, in Answer to 
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290/12/31/05 Box 1276. For a contemporary example, see Prosecutor v Milosevic IT-98-29/1-T (12 
December 2007). 
222 For examples of those convicted on the basis of acquiescence, see The Trial of Sakamoto Yuichi 
reproduced in the Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, 
United Nations War Crimes Commission, HMSO, volume IV, 1948, 86. See also USA vs Takeshi 
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D. evidence the commander failed to punish the perpetrators of the crime;223 
E. the existence of a superior–subordinate relationship between the subordinate and 
superior;224 
F. the state of knowledge that the commander had prior to, during and after the event;225 
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(1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 573, 578–87; Prosecutor v Delalic, Mucic, Delic, 
and Landzo IT-96-21-T (16 November 1998) (‘Celebici case’) 
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H. the level of control exerted by the individual commander and whether the commander 
failed to control the conduct of subordinates.227 
 
These elements will be discussed in significant detail, in the next section, providing the basis 
of the main elements of the doctrine of command responsibility. 
A. Evidence that the Commander Personally Participated in the Crime 
One would expect little controversy surrounding the question of criminal responsibility of a 
commander where clear evidence exists to support a charge that he or she directly participated 
in war crimes. However, history has shown that in cases where there is evidence that a superior 
officer has directly participated in war crimes—even where he or she has participated in the 
killing of another—the pronouncement of criminal responsibility was not always clear cut. 
There have been several high profile cases where, despite clear evidence supporting a 
conviction—such as those of US servicemen involved in the My Lai-4 Massacre that occurred 
during the Vietnam War—findings of guilt and the administering of punishment, were far from 
uniform. As borne out in the cases discussed below, guilt and punishment is often dependent 
upon which side is prosecuting the crime and which side is being prosecuted. It was sometimes 
the case in situations where the prosecuting authority and the accused were from the same side, 
there was a different application of the law than in cases where the prosecuting authority and 
accused were from opposing forces. This raises the spectre of ‘victors’ justice’, but it also raises 
the unfortunate point that the application of law during or after war, was rarely uniform and 
often infused with politics. 
An additional inconsistency appears to have occurred where there was a decision to prosecute 
an individual who occupied a position of authority and who was alleged to have committed a 
war crime, but at the same time there was no corresponding decision to prosecute the 
subordinate who committed the unlawful act. This situation is curious because tribunals have 
overtly insisted that the plea of superior orders will not act as a bar to prosecution or a tool to 
relieve an accused of criminal responsibility. One speculation as to why this occurred in the 
past is possibly due to the need to reduce the number of prosecutions and also the desire to 
prosecute more senior ranking individuals as opposed to lower ranking individuals. 
The following examples illustrate some of the complexities that have existed in relation to 
prosecuting superiors accused of directly committing war crimes. 
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The Trial of Captain Henry Wirz, August 1865, Washington DC 
Not long after the promulgation of the Lieber Code, at the conclusion of the American Civil 
War, the Code was tested during the trial of Captain Henry Wirz before a military commission 
convened at Washington DC in August 1865.228 The case is demonstrative on a range of levels, 
not least of which involve early legal discussions of individual criminal responsibility for war 
crimes involving prisoners of war which directly implicated a person in authority for directly 
killing prisoners. 
Captain Wirz, originally Swiss but became a US citizen prior to the Civil War, was a doctor 
and commandant of a Confederate prisoner of war camp at Andersonville in Georgia.229 Wirz 
was charged and convicted by a military commission for violating the Lieber Code for his part 
in permitting the torture, mistreatment and death of Union prisoners of war while he was 
commandant of the facility. 230  The first charge related to Wirz’s alleged part in a joint 
conspiracy with at least five others and others whose names were unknown, to torture and kill 
members of the Union army by subjecting prisoners to extreme confinement, exposing 
prisoners to extreme temperatures in summer and winter, forcing prisoners to drink 
contaminated water and causing starvation among the Union prisoners. The second charge 
related to wilful murder alleged that he personally killed prisoners under his control. None of 
the 13 specifications to the charges identified any of the victims but stated the victims 
comprised ‘the number of one thousand, whose names are unknown, sickened and died by 
reason thereof’.231 The prosecution called over 160 witnesses, including Colonel G C Gibbs of 
the Confederate Army who was the commandant of the prison prior to Wirz’s arrival.232 
Colonel Gibbs conceded, even though Gibbs was superior to Wirz in rank, the management of 
the prisoner of war camp was not under Gibbs’s control and that Wirz was given ultimate 
control over the running of the camp at Andersonville.233 The implication for Gibbs, of course, 
was that if the prosecution could show that Gibbs somehow had control of what occurred at 
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the camp during Wirz’s tenure as commandant, then Gibbs, too, could be implicated in the 
charges. 
Interestingly, the prosecution relied on Gibbs’s testimony to establish Wirz’s authority over 
the camp. By establishing that Wirz had ultimate control over the camp, the prosecution could 
then argue that Wirz’s liability rested in the fact that he, and he alone, was responsible for the 
treatment of Union prisoners under his command. Not only did Gibbs make it clear that he was 
not in control of the camp, due to his reassignment to Camp Sumter prior to Wirz’s arrival at 
the prison,234 he also made it abundantly clear that much of the pain and suffering of prisoners 
was avoidable had Wirz taken the necessary steps. Under cross-examination, Gibbs stated: 
I was Wirz’s superior in rank. In many respects Wirz was under my command, but so far as the 
prison was concerned he was not.; there was food enough to feed all; the rations served to the 
troops and the prisoners were equal; … if the quality of the ration was unsound a board of survey 
could have been summoned to condemn it…235 
Other witnesses for the prosecution were no less forthcoming with evidence regarding Wirz’s 
responsibility for the appalling conditions and treatment of prisoners. Witnesses gave detailed 
accounts of the cruel and inhumane treatment of prisoners by guards at the prison. Although 
the Commission acknowledged that much of the conduct was committed by others, the 
overwhelming impression from the individual testimonies was that such treatment occurred 
because of Wirz’s encouragement, negligence in preventing the abuse, and at his own hands. 
Individual testimonies detailed the pain and suffering inflicted upon the prisoners due to 
extreme overcrowding, the lack of adequate clothing, food, medical treatment and the rampant 
incidence of disease.236 
For his part, Wirz vehemently protested his innocence. He argued that he should not be 
convicted of the charges. He blamed his circumstances on the harsh conditions and attributed 
some responsibility to his superiors. He said: 
I was then ordered to report to the commandant of the military prison at Andersonville, Georgia, 
who assigned me to the command of the interior of the prison. The duties I had to perform were 
arduous and unpleasant, and I am satisfied that no man can or will justly blame me for things that 
happened here, and which were beyond my power to control. I do not think that I ought to be 
held responsible for the shortness of rations, for the overcrowded state of the prison, (which was 
of itself a prolific source of fearful mortality) for the inadequate supplies of clothing and want of 
shelter, &c., &c. Still I now bear the odium, and men who were prisoners have seemed disposed 
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to wreak their vengeance upon me for what they have suffered. I, who was only the medium, or, 
I may better say, the tool in the hands of my superiors. This is my condition.237 
Wirz’s defence team asserted several grounds for his defence. They were primarily based on 
the defence of superior orders and jurisdictional error on the part of the Commission in 
conducting the trial in the first place. Regarding jurisdictional error, the Commission did not 
agree with the defence’s argument that it lacked the requisite jurisdiction. In relation to the 
defence of superior orders, Wirz asserted that whatever his role was in relation to the conditions 
of the prison at Andersonville, he should not be found guilty for following orders.238 His 
defence went on to state: 
Furthermore, if he [Wirz], as a subaltern officer, simply obeyed the legal orders of his superiors 
in the discharge of his official duties, he could not be held responsible for the motive that dictated 
such orders. … From his position at Andersonville, he should not be held responsible for the 
crowded condition of the stockade, the unwholesome food, etc., for the following reasons, among 
others, viz.: he was not responsible for the selection of the location, as it was located by W. S. 
Winder in 1863, while he was yet in Europe; that he did not assume command until March, 1864; 
the Colonel Persons, one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution, testified that the stockade 
was sufficiently large and properly located for the accommodation of ten thousand prisoners; that 
Colonel Persons’ testimony fully exonerated him (Wirz) from complicity in the selection of the 
location, overcrowding the stockade, or failure to provide proper shelter for the prisoners;…239 
The Commission paid little attention to Wirz’s defence based on superior orders and held him 
criminally responsible for both charges, namely, that he did conspire with others to violate the 
laws of war, to impair and injure the health, and to destroy the lives of large numbers of Federal 
prisoners. 240  Wirz was sentenced to death and was executed in Washington DC on 11 
November 1865. 
Wirz’s trial was notable for several reasons. It was the first time the US, as a nation, prosecuted 
a US citizen for war crimes committed against fellow US citizens and as such could be 
described as a watershed moment in the development of the law in relation to criminal 
responsibility for superiors specifically, and the development of war crimes theory more 
generally. The Trial of Captain Wirz represents an important indication as to how the US law 
would develop in terms of holding those in positions of authority accountable for cruel and 
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inhumane actions of subordinates or for allowing their subordinates to act in such ways. It 
would be naïve to assume that this legal analysis did not permeate into other US cases where 
command responsibility was in question. Several other US cases where US military personnel 
were prosecuted on the basis of their position of command are worthy of discussion. 
Wirz’s case also illustrates the point that the Commission hearing the evidence was satisfied 
of Wirz’s guilt in relation to the second charge that alleged he directly participated in the 
unlawful killing of Union soldiers. This was despite the fact there was little in the way of 
specification as to the identity of the alleged victims, and moreover, evidence that Wirz had 
actually taken a direct role in the killings. The Commission accepted oral testimony that Wirz 
had directly killed Union prisoners of war despite overwhelming and non-contested evidence 
that others had also killed prisoners. The fact that no others were brought to trial is indicative 
of the point that the Commission was primarily concerned with securing the conviction of 
Captain Wirz and not his subordinates. In fact, so intent was the Commission on securing 
convictions of those in superior positions within the Confederacy, the first charge in relation 
to conspiracy was drafted in such a way so as to include senior members of the Confederate 
Army, namely, John H Winder, Richard B Winder, Joseph White, W S Winder, and R R 
Stevenson. Only Wirz was ultimately brought to trial and convicted for the deaths of Union 
prisoners of war at the Andersonville prison. One can only speculate as to the reasons why 
Wirz alone was convicted of the crimes, but political expediency would have no doubt played 
a part in his eventual trial and execution. It was political in the sense that the US was then at a 
critical juncture in its healing and charging senior Confederate figures for war crimes would 
only have exacerbated existing tensions between the two former warring factions. 
Political expediency as shown by the way the Commission acted in choosing Wirz to be 
prosecuted when clearly there were others who were equally, if not more culpable, was a sign 
of the way in which other future war crimes commissions would operate, and it has been a 
constant criticism of war crimes commissions. 
US v Calley 48 CMR 19 (USCMA, 1973) My Lai Massacre 
One of the most infamous and legally questionable war crimes cases in modern times involved 
the US Army prosecuting one of its own. The case notoriously became known as the My Lai 
Massacre and some have said that the case irreparably changed public sentiment about the 
Vietnam War in the US and around the world.241 This was the case involving Lieutenant 
William Calley, whereby Calley was charged and convicted for war crimes that he both directly 
committed and ordered to be carried out against Vietnamese non-combatants. Calley 
commanded the 1st platoon of ‘Charlie Company’,242 as it went into the South Vietnamese 
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hamlet of My Lai-4 on 16 March 1968. The charges involved horrific acts of murder and sexual 
abuse of South Vietnamese non-combatants.243 Calley himself was charged and convicted of 
the premeditated murders of twenty-two men, women and children. 244  He was initially 
sentenced to dismissal from the Army, and confinement at hard labour for life.245 
On appeal to the US Court of Military Appeal, Calley claimed his initial conviction should be 
set aside on four grounds: that he was acting under superior orders,246  that his trial was 
prejudiced due to the amount of negative publicity associated with his case, that there was 
insufficient evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt he committed the alleged acts, and 
that the military judge was prejudicial in relation to Calley’s trial.247 The Court of Military 
Appeal affirmed his conviction and rejected the grounds of appeal, however, in relation to the 
sentence, US president Richard Nixon, and later the Secretary of the Army reduced his sentence 
to ten years, and having already served approximately one-third of his sentence, he was 
immediately eligible for parole.248 
The Calley case is significant on a range of levels, not least of which is illustrative of the point 
that war crimes are committed by all sides in war. The significance of this case, however, 
represents one of the most obvious instances where the legal outcome of a war crimes trial was 
influenced by the political exigencies perceived by a government at the time. At the time that 
this incident became known to the public, it was widely accepted throughout much of the 
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commentariat and the wider community in the US and elsewhere that political influence played 
a large part in the obtuse way the Nixon Administration dealt with this matter. 249 
In terms of the doctrine of command responsibility, Calley’s case represents an example of the 
inconsistency associated with sentencing for a conviction of war crimes when those on trial 
were prosecuted by their own side. Furthermore, the punishment Calley received was arguably 
disproportionate to the crimes for which he was convicted. Even during the trial, it was clear 
the political sensitivities were such that the US Government intervened and did what it could 
in relation to the sentence of Lieutenant Calley. 
The command responsibility doctrine, if applied as it was in other cases, would have implicated 
those much higher than Lt Calley. The then future Secretary of Defence, John Kerry, while at 
a protest in New York, encapsulated the idea that the doctrine of command responsibility 
should have operated to ensnare many more up the chain of command than only Lt Calley. 
Kerry stated that: 
We are all of us in this country guilty for having allowed the war to go on. We only want this 
country to realize that it cannot try a Calley for something which generals and Presidents and our 
way of life encouraged him to do. And if you try him, then at the same time you must try all those 
generals and Presidents and soldiers who have part of the responsibility. You must in fact try this 
country.250 
However, the outcome of the military investigation into the incident—known as the Peers 
Commission as it was headed by Lieutenant General William Peers—was misleading and 
excluded important testimony from eyewitnesses regarding orders in relation to the killing of 
non-combatants. Those orders allegedly came from General William Westmoreland who, at 
the time of the massacre, was the commander of US forces in Vietnam. According to Porter, 
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in 1967, General Westmoreland addressed a commando unit by the name of Tiger Force just 
months prior to the massacre and stated that, 
[i]f the people are in relocation camps, they’re green, so they’re safe. We leave them alone. The 
Vietcong and NVA are red, so we know they’re fair game. But if there are people who are out 
there—and not in the camps—they’re pink as far as we’re concerned. They’re Communist 
sympathizers. They were not supposed to be there.251 
This statement by Westmoreland was supposedly made in the context of US Army Directive 
525-3 which stipulated that ‘[s]pecified strike zones should be configured to exclude populated 
areas except those in accepted VC bases [emphasis added].252 The village of My Lai-4 was 
understood to be in a zone that was a ‘specified strike zone’ from which the VC and NVA 
actively operated and was, therefore, not subject to the protections of non-combatants in non-
strike zones. The result of this directive and statement by senior command structures of the US 
Army led subordinates to believe that non-combatants could be lawful targets of Charlie 
Company. 
Porter outlined in his article the reasons why the Peers Commission attempted to exclude this 
crucial information from the report and thereby limit the involvement of those in the US Army 
chain of command. 253  According to Porter, Lieutenant General William Peers was more 
concerned about his own career prospects than ensuring the truth surrounding the events of the 
massacre was revealed. 
The Peers Commission report was released November 1974 and at the time it was released, 
Westmoreland was the Army Chief of Staff and, therefore, directly overseeing the work of the 
Peers Commission. Any adverse findings of the Peers Commission would have direct 
consequences for Westmoreland and, therefore, potentially for the chief author of the report.254 
The result of the investigation and the muddying of the details of orders within the chain of 
command meant that it was more difficult to point to any specific directive that would implicate 
members of the military other than those who actually perpetrated the events on the ground 
that fateful day. The My Lai-4 Massacre is a prime example of how politics can operate to limit 
the responsibility of senior commanders. The ‘politics of prosecution’ as it is termed,255 can 
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step in to obstruct and bend the outcome of prosecuting those who should be charged with war 
crimes. 
B. Where the Commander Ordered the Unlawful Conduct 
A commander will face liability where there is sufficient evidence that he or she ordered the 
unlawful conduct but did not necessarily take part in the actual commission of the act or 
omission. Generally, the cases associated with this form of criminal responsibility fall into one 
of two broad categories. The first category consists of cases where there is clear evidence the 
superior gave an unlawful order to a subordinate and the subordinate carried out the order. The 
second category consists of those cases where an order was alleged to have been made and that 
order was carried out, but there is some ambiguity in relation to the order or where there is a 
firm denial that such an order was actually given. Other situations where the latter category has 
frequently occurred are cases involving war crimes committed against prisoners of war.256 
One of the problems associated with proving that unlawful orders existed in the first place 
relates to obtaining the requisite evidence of such orders. This is because orders are often given 
orally and no written record of them exists. 
Another evidentiary problem exists where an order is given at a senior level in vague or broad 
terms which, by their nature, are open to interpretation by numerous individuals as the order 
passes down the chain of command. As is often the case, vital evidentiary matters are lost in 
the ‘fog of war’ and all that remains is witness testimony regarding the commission of the act, 
but not necessarily the actual orders that precipitated it. The order becomes lost in the chain of 
command. A lack of evidence about who gave the order often leads to a conviction of the 
person who perpetrated the act, as was characteristic of Calley’s case. 
The following examples illustrate the second instance where a commander will be held 
criminally responsible for war crimes; that is, where a commander has given orders to a 
subordinate to commit an offence. 
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Court-martial of Brigadier General Jacob Smith US Army, Manila, April 1902 
The twentieth century heralded several important cases that dealt with the thorny issue of 
attributing criminal responsibility to commanders within the same army. 257  The case of 
Brigadier General Smith, held in Manila in 1902, addressed the issue of whether a brigadier 
general in the US Army could be held criminally responsible for orders given in relation to the 
killing of enemy insurgents. 258  The case clearly shows a pattern of behaviour that large 
institutions, such as the US military as early as the 1900s, were more adept at avoiding the 
issue of war crimes by disregarding the nature of the acts committed by their forces, or devising 
clever ways to present charges so that the issue of war crimes was not even addressed. 
Brig. Gen. Jacob H Smith of the US Army was the commanding general of the Sixth Separate 
Brigade in the Philippines during the United States’ hostilities in the island of Samar. Smith 
was charged with ‘conduct to the prejudice of good order and military discipline’ which was 
specified on the basis that he gave instructions to Major L W T Waller of the US Marine Corps 
that stipulated that Smith wanted ‘no prisoners’ and that he wanted Waller to ‘kill and burn. … 
[t]he more you kill and burn, the better you will please me. … The interior of Samar must be 
made a howling wilderness’.259 Further instructions from Smith stipulated that he ‘wanted all 
persons killed who were capable of bearing arms’. When Major Waller enquired as to ‘who 
were capable of bearing arms’, Smith confirmed that the age limit was 10 years of age and 
older.260 
Upon receiving these instructions, US forces engaged in a number of brutal tit-for-tat attacks 
against Filipino insurgents. It was not long until details began to emerge in the US of the brutal 
nature of the way that US forces dealt with the insurgency. Estimates differ but some have 
stated that US forces engaged in a brutal campaign of burning and destroying suspected 
insurgency infrastructure throughout the island of Samar and, in the process, killed an 
estimated 2500–5000 insurgents—not all of whom, it was alleged, were combatants.261 Only 
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after Major Waller’s court-martial commenced did it emerge that Smith had given orders for 
the conduct for which Waller was then on trial. Smith was later charged, not with war crimes, 
but with offences that were more concerned with bringing the Army into disrepute and 
dishonour. 
Smith was ultimately found guilty as charged. His sentence was forced retirement from the 
military with no further punishment. However there were no charges brought against him for 
murder or war crimes and the sentence was extremely light given the purpose for which his 
orders were clearly intended. The Army was therefore able to avoid an embarrassing war 
crimes prosecution of one of their own due to the clever way the charges were framed. 
Instead, the Judge Advocate General, George B Davis, went to great lengths to play down the 
nature of the orders by indicating in clear language that: 
The Court is thus lenient in view of the undisputed evidence that the accused did not mean 
everything that his unexplained language implied; that his subordinates did not gather such a 
meaning, and that the orders were never executed in such sense, notwithstanding the fact that a 
desperate struggle was being conducted with a cruel and savage foe.262 
In avoiding the possibility that Smith’s orders had anything to do with the brutalities meted out 
to Philippine insurgents and the fact that Smith was not charged with actual war crimes, Davis 
went to stated that: 
As the charges were drawn the real offense of the accused was not made the subject of judicial 
inquiry. The specification alleges that certain instructions were given by General Smith to his 
subordinates, but does not allege that the circumstances under which and the manner in which 
they were given constituted a military offense, and were a substantial departure from the laws of 
war.263 
The Judge Advocate General concluded by saying that … ‘the Court does therefore sentence 
him … to be admonished by the reviewing authority’.264 Ultimately, the Court acknowledged 
that Smith’s orders were certainly unlawful, but it stopped short of trying Smith for war crimes. 
It did this by interpreting the facts in such a way that played down Smith’s part in causing the 
brutality. Despite this reluctance on the part of the military to place limits on its own forces in 
fighting a brutal insurgency, a clear message needed to be sent—to whom the message was 
directed was not entirely clear, but, nonetheless, a message was sent. 
 
 
investigation was undertaken. Dumindin provides several archival sources (newspaper clippings and 
illustrations) published at the time and reported on the scale of the massacres. Some of the newspaper 
illustrations were political cartoons in reference to Smith’s orders, that depicted US forces executing 
blindfolded boys under the looming presence of ‘Old Glory’ with the inscription, ‘kill everyone over 
ten – General Jacob H Smith’. 






President Theodore Roosevelt proved this when he approved Smith’s sentence on 14 July 1902. 
While acknowledging Smith’s proud military record and clearly stating the problems that the 
US Army had encountered during the bloody and costly Philippine insurrection, President 
Roosevelt made the point that, 
[t]he very fact that warfare is of such character as to afford infinite provocation for the 
commission of acts of cruelty by junior officers and the enlisted men, must make the officers in 
high and responsible positions peculiarly careful in their bearing and conduct so as to keep a 
moral check over any acts of an improper character by their subordinates. Almost universally the 
higher officers have so borne themselves as to supply this necessary check …265 
President Roosevelt clearly articulated the point that senior officers have a duty to junior and 
officers and enlisted men in relation to cruel conduct in time of war. The problem that existed, 
and still exists to this day, is that there is a natural reluctance to hold one’s own forces to the 
same standard as the enemy when it comes to ensuring superior orders are within lawful limits. 
US v Kinder 14 CMR 742 (AFBR 1954) and US v Schreiber 18 CMR 226 (CMA 1955) 
A successful prosecution of a superior for manifestly unlawful orders given to a subordinate is 
demonstrated by the cases of US v Kinder and US v Schreiber in 1954 and 1955, respectively.266 
During the Korean War, a US airman critically shot and wounded a South Korean non-
combatant when the non-combatant unlawfully entered a US air base in South Korea. When 
the incident was reported up the chain of command, the airman’s superior instructed him to 
‘take him to the bomb dump and shoot him’, to which the airman replied, ‘is that an order?’267 
The airman’s superior replied that it was an order. The airman complied and shot and killed 
the non-combatant in the manner described in the order.268 
When those further up the chain of command became aware of the incident, separate courts-
martial were ordered and both individuals were convicted for unlawful killing. The Lieutenant 
who gave the unlawful order, upon conviction, was dismissed from the USAF.269 Examples 
such as these clearly demonstrate that where there exists evidence that the order was given, 
then it should be unproblematic that a conviction would follow. 
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C. Whether the Commander Failed to Prevent the Crime (Acquiescence) 
Due to the types of command and control structures in place within the military and civilian 
hierarchies, the more senior the person, the more unlikely it is that he or she would have directly 
participated in the commission of war time atrocities.270 Instead, as history has repeatedly 
shown, the actual atrocities, such as torture or murder, for example, have been committed by 
those who occupy the lower ranks of the military.271 In effect, rank can therefore provide a 
buffer against criminal responsibility for those in positions of authority because, unless there 
is clear evidence linking the superior to the crime—such as evidence the superior ordered the 
unlawful conduct—criminal responsibility will prima facie rest with the subordinate.272 
That junior ranking soldiers face criminal responsibility for their part in atrocities when their 
actions were condoned or allowed to flourish or, at the very least, go unchecked by their 
superiors, does not sit well with conventional notions of justice. Can justice be said to have 
been achieved if those in positions of authority, whose role it is to maintain strict military 
discipline and ensure the laws of war are maintained, were able to escape sanction merely 
because they may not have given explicit orders to ‘kill’, or pulled the trigger themselves? 
What of the injustices that would result, particularly for subordinates, if those in positions of 
 
 
270 To illustrate this point, on numbers alone, war crimes prosecutions coming out of the Asia–Pacific 
trials showed a highly disproportionate ratio of those who were subject to war crimes trials in the 
junior ranks as opposed to those in the senior ranks. Although figures vary slightly, the Allies 
prosecuted approximately 5700 Japanese individuals (see Philip R Piccigallo, The Japanese on Trial: 
Allied War Crimes Operations in the East, 1945–1951 (University of Texas Press, 1979) 264, Tables 
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271 The disproportionate nature of the number of junior-ranking individuals prosecuted versus the 
number of senior Japanese military and civilian individuals prosecuted, can be described as 
resembling a pyramid—that is, more junior ranks occupying the lower rungs of the pyramid versus 
fewer individuals occupying the upper levels of the pyramid. Also of note here is the fact that the 
Emperor escaped prosecution and questions surrounding his level of authority and role in Japan’s 
wartime activities. Although it is not necessarily a useful comparison given that far fewer individuals 
occupy senior government and cabinet positions, the asymmetrical nature of war crimes prosecutions 
clearly illustrates the perverse point that those in the lower ranks of the military bear the greatest 
burden during and after war. 
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authority were to invoke the ‘buffer’ of rank to protect themselves while their subordinates 
faced criminal sanction?273 
International criminal law and laws of war have long identified the injustices with this scenario 
and that is why the law has developed in such a way so as to hold those to account in positions 
of authority for failing to ensure their troops are not engaging in unlawful conduct. There are 
obvious injustices that could result if a superior was not held to account merely because he or 
she acquiesced or failed in their duty to prevent atrocities from occurring. 
One solution to hold superiors to account for not maintaining strict military discipline is based 
on the premise that a superior will be criminally responsible for the acts of their subordinates 
if the superior knew (having either actual knowledge or constructive knowledge) and merely 
chose to do nothing to prevent the acts or punish the acts. 
The superior’s acquiescence to the subordinate’s criminal conduct, therefore, forms a major 
element in holding commanders liable for war crimes. 
The meaning of ‘acquiescence’ 
A general definition of acquiescence is to passively accept something or some action without 
offering any protest or objection.274 A legal definition of the term is similar but contains several 
key elements that are thought to be present for acquiescence to occur. These elements require 
a party to be silent in the wake of known actions of another, the party must know they have 
legal rights or an obligation to speak out, they must know that another party may act on the 
party’s silence, and further action has occurred as a result of the party’s silence. 275  At 
international law, acquiescence has been described as ‘equivalent to tacit recognition 
manifested by unilateral conduct which the other party may interpret as consent…’.276 In the 
Gulf of Maine case, an ICJ-determined case involving a dispute between the USA and Canada 
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[o]ne government’s knowledge, actual or constructive, of the conduct or assertion of rights of the 
other party to a dispute, and the failure to protest in the face of that conduct, or assertion of rights, 
involves a tacit acceptance [emphasis added] of the legal position represented by the other Party’s 
conduct or assertion of rights.277 
Essentially, acquiescence connotes some form of passivity by one party in relation to the 
actions of another thereby accepting, albeit in a tacit way, the conduct of the other party. The 
question then becomes, at law, whether the party who acquiesces shares the same responsibility 
as the party who actually performed the act, and if so, what of the legal consequences for the 
person who acquiesces? 
The consequences for one party who acquiesces with knowledge of the conduct of another, 
varies according to the circumstances and context. In the context of customary international 
law regarding the conduct of states, according to Henry, 
inaction by a state faced with alleged violations of international law by another state can have … 
two distinct sets of legal implications: first, it can affect rights and obligations of the acquiescing 
state … or, alternatively, it can play an indirect role in the customary norm-creating process …278 
Although Henry was writing in the context of the obligations and rights of states at international 
law in relation to legally binding custom, similarities exist in regard to individual criminal 
responsibility when it comes to assessing the consequences of one individual acquiescing on 
the actions of another. From this, inaction by one individual in a position where he or she has 
a positive obligation to act under certain circumstances—such as the superior–subordinate 
relationship—can, as Henry, asserts, ‘affect rights’ of the person who acquiesces thereby 
making them accountable for the actions of the subordinate. Several war crimes trials have 
dealt with the issue of criminality arising out of a superior’s supposed acquiescence that 
allowed subordinates to commit war crimes, thereby rendering the superior also liable for the 
criminal wrongdoing. 
According to Parks, the criminal responsibility of a superior on the basis of acquiescence can 
vary from that of a principal offender to a ‘dereliction of duty’ which is more akin to 
responsibility through negligence.279 The degree of culpability, argues Parks, is related to the 
degree of acquiescence where greater accountability will result where the superior displayed 
an intention to assist the perpetrator.280 
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The ‘Doolittle Trials’ – Trial of Lieutenant-General Sawada Shigeru et al, United States 
Military Commission, Shanghai, 27 February – 15 April 1946 
Lieutenant-General Sawada of the Imperial Japanese 13th Expeditionary Army in China was in 
command when eight members of the USAAF and ‘joint Army-Navy bombing project’,281 also 
known as the Doolittle Raiders, were captured in China in 1942. Sawada’s trial was conducted 
by a US Military Commission in Shanghai from 27 February to 15 April 1946. 
(a) Background to the ‘Doolittle Raids’ 
The Doolittle Raiders, so named after the expeditionary leader, Colonel James (Jimmy) H 
Doolittle, were a group of 80 volunteers whose mission was to fly sixteen B-25 Mitchell 
bombers off the deck of the USS Hornet in the Western Pacific approximately 600 miles off 
the east of Tokyo, and make their way to the main island of Japan. From there they were to 
pass over the Japanese cities of Tokyo, Yokosuka, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kobe and Osaka at 
which time they would bomb a number of strategic military targets. After completing that part 
of the mission the group were to proceed to China where they would land in various places and 
seek refuge with the Chinese before each of the men would be reunited with US forces.282 
The raid went ahead as scheduled and was very successful in terms of the low casualties 
experienced during the raids and also during each of the crash landings in various locations in 
China and, for one plane, in the eastern part of the Soviet Union. 
Although the Doolittle mission did not inflict substantial damage on the Japanese military 
effort or its civilian infrastructure, the mission was heralded as a huge success in terms of 
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boosting morale in the US after the devastating defeat at Pearl Harbor in December the previous 
year.283 The raid also signalled to Japan and its people that its home islands were not immune 
to outside attack, despite the seemingly swift victory it experienced over the US in December 
1941.284 
It is for these reasons that the Japanese treated the raids very seriously and went to great lengths 
to ensure as many US fliers were captured as was possible and that all Chinese airfields in the 
area were secured.285 In the process, eyewitness accounts reported the Japanese military in 
China embarked upon a direct and ruthless campaign against support given to the US survivors 
of the raid by Chinese civilians.286 It is perhaps with this heightened sense of urgency by the 
Japanese during this part of the early campaign of the Pacific War that one needs to view the 
way that Japanese authorities treated the captured airmen. Particularly relevant also was the 
fact that Japan had by then been embroiled in a vicious guerilla war of attrition with China for 
a number of years. 
The charge against Sawada was that he did ‘at or near Shanghai, China, knowingly, unlawfully 
and wilfully and by his official acts cause eight named members of the United States forces to 
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be denied the status of Prisoners of War and to be tried and sentenced by a Japanese Military 
Tribunal in violation of the laws and customs of war’.287 
The specifics of the charge alleged that Sawada ‘caused’ the deaths of the eight captured 
American airmen on the basis that ‘he had the power to commute, remit and revoke … 
sentences handed down by a Japanese Military Tribunal’.288 In support of the charge, the 
prosecution detailed accounts of how the US airmen was transferred to Tokyo for several 
months then returned to Shanghai where a supposed trial took place on 28 August 1942. In 
relation to the trial, the United Nations War Crimes Commission (‘UNWCC’) Law Reports of 
Trials of War Criminals (‘LRTWC’) makes it clear that the prosecution went into a fair amount 
of detail regarding the procedural deficiencies of the Japanese Military Commission. 
Apparently lacking was an English translation of the charges and evidence of the offences for 
them. Lacking also was legal representation for the US airmen and the opportunity for the 
airmen to argue against the allegations made against them. Furthermore, in response to the 
Doolittle raids and the captured US airmen, the Supreme Commander at Nanking, General 
Hata, issued the ‘Enemy Airmen’s Act’ to take retrospective effect on any captured airmen. The 
effect of the enactment would, inter alia, allow any airmen who were captured to be sentenced 
to death or receive a minimum of ten years imprisonment. 
All eight airmen were convicted and sentenced to death, however, five sentences were 
commuted to life imprisonment while three were affirmed and were carried out on 15 October 
1942. 
(b) The Verdict – Acquiescence 
Sawada was found guilty as charged, however, he was found ‘not guilty’ of ‘knowingly’ and 
‘wilfully’ failing to commute, remit or revoke the sentences handed down to the eight airmen. 
In his favour was the fact that Sawada did make several oral protestations, to no avail, to 
General Hata that the death sentences were too harsh. When Sawada’s protestations were not 
accepted, Sawada failed to do anything further to prevent the executions from occurring. 
The Commission did accept the fact that Sawada was not present in Shanghai at the time the 
airmen were tried, however, the Commission made special mention that, as the commander of 
the 13th Army: 
General Sawada, prior to his leaving Shanghai on 12th October, 1942, made no attempt to 
exercise any powers with respect to suspension, remission or mitigation of the sentences given 
by the court.289 
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The Commission also made particular mention that Sawada was familiar with the Geneva 
Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war and that he exercised total control over the 
prison which was being used to house the prisoners. The Commission stated that ‘although this 
prison was only three hundred yards from his personal headquarters he never went inside it or 
concerned himself about its prisoners’.290 
The Commission asserted that Sawada was culpable due to, inter alia, the fact that he, in 
essence, failed in his duty to further investigate the unlawful trial that was conducted in his 
absence against the eight US airmen. Given that the trial was conducted under his authority,291 
and the fact that Sawada did not make further protestations to Tokyo to prevent the executions, 
the Commission found that Sawada failed in his duty and thereby was liable to be convicted. 
The Commission did, however, accept the defence’s plea that Sawada did not ‘wilfully’ or 
‘knowingly’ seek the executions of the three airmen. Instead, the Commission acknowledged 
that Sawada did try, albeit fleetingly, to change the outcome of the Japanese tribunal, to no 
avail. The existence of evidence to support his claim of being opposed to the executions was 
no doubt a very welcome thing for Sawada given the likely possibility that otherwise, it is very 
likely he would have met the same fate as the three executed airmen. Instead he was found 
guilty on the basis that he failed to prevent the executions and was sentenced to five years 
imprisonment. 
The Commission did stress the point that the finding of ‘not guilty’ in relation to ‘knowingly’ 
or ‘wilfully’ would not apply in every instance merely because the accused does not fulfil their 
duties to prevent war crimes from occurring. The Commission was satisfied in this instance, 
however, that Sawada did at least attempt to prevent the executions and that was sufficient to 
mitigate the sentence, as opposed to relieving him of criminal responsibility. The Commission 
stated ‘[t]he action of the Commission in finding the accused not guilty on this, … cannot, 
however, be taken necessarily as meaning that inaction in such circumstances would not 
constitute a war crime had it been proved; since there was evidence that the accused had made 
some protest against the sentences and had been told that the matter was in the hands of the 
Tokyo authorities’.292 
In reaching this conclusion, the Commission referred to the principle outlined in the Yamashita 
trial: 
In the Yamashita Trial it was held that a Commanding General has the affirmative duty to take 
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The verdict in Sawada was an interesting development at law since it was an example of a 
military commission exercising leniency towards an accused, even though he had full 
knowledge of the war crimes that were committed under his authority. There was no question 
that Sawada had actual knowledge and this point was not argued by the defence. In fact, 
Sawada never tried to hide the fact he had knowledge of the impending executions prior to 
them being carried out after he returned to headquarters because he produced evidence that he 
had attempted to prevent the executions from being carried out. 
(c) The Trial of Wilhelm List and Others (The Hostages Trial), United States Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg 8th July, 1947 – 19th February, 1948 
The Hostages trial involved the prosecution of senior German military officers for the deaths 
and ill-treatment of thousands of European non-combatants, suspected communists, Jews, 
gypsies and others suspected of engaging in insurgent activities against the German Wehrmacht 
during WWII.294 The US Military Commission examined, inter alia, the criminal responsibility 
of twelve senior German officers295 for their part in failing to prevent reprisal war crimes being 
committed against non-combatants following the deaths of German soldiers. The reprisal 
killings by German forces arose out of an ‘attempt to maintain order in the occupied territories 
in the face of guerrilla opposition’.296 
The charges against the German officers stated that they were: 
principals in and accessories to the murder of thousands of persons from the civilian population 
of Greece, Yugoslavia, Norway and Albania between September 1939 and May 1945 by the use 
of troops of the German Armed Forces under the command of and acting pursuant to orders 
issued, distributed and executed by the defendants at bar.297 
Evidence in relation to the charges consisted of oral testimony and documents regarding orders 
to kill hostages as reprisals for the killing of German soldiers.298 During the trial, evidence was 
presented in relation to each of the accused’s position relative to the reprisal murders that took 
place throughout the various European regions. Each of the accused occupied senior positions 
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that rendered them in ultimate control over the Wehrmacht throughout various regions.299 It 
was alleged that, depending on the office held, each of the senior officers had subordinate to 
them, divisions and battalions that were directly responsible for the killings. 
By September 1941, attacks against German forces by insurgent groups in the Balkans, 
Yugoslavia and Greece had intensified to such an extent that the matter was being treated with 
the utmost importance by the German High Command.300 German commanders in the field 
were applying their own measures to counter attacks levelled against them by the insurgents. 
In the early stages of insurgent attacks against German forces, reprisals were generally limited 
to those who were responsible for the attacks, as indicated by List’s orders of 5 September 
1941: 
Ruthless and immediate measures against the insurgents, against their accomplices and their 
families. (Hanging, burning down of villages involved, seizure of more hostages, deportation of 
relatives, etc, into concentration camps).301 
However, with the growing effectiveness of insurgent attacks against German forces, on 16 
September 1941, Hitler issued an order to List to ‘suppress the insurgent movement in the 
Southeast’ and ordered that for every German soldier killed, one hundred reprisal killings 
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would be carried out.302 List then commissioned General Franz Boehme to handle matters in 
Serbia and, in doing so, transferred executive power to Boehme. Boehme remained subordinate 
to List during this time. Boehme then issued stern orders on 25 September and 10 October 1941 
to units under his control that effectively widened the counterinsurgency to target ‘the whole 
population’ of Serbia. This included ‘communists, male residents suspicious of such, all Jews, 
a certain number of nationalistic and democratically inclined residents to be arrested as 
hostages’.303 In keeping with Hitler’s earlier directives, Boehme’s orders went on to state that, 
[i]f losses of German soldiers or Volksdeutsche occur, the territorial competent commanders up 
to the regiment commanders are to decree the shooting of arrestees according to the following 
quotas: (a) For each killed or murdered German soldier or Volksdeutsche (men, women or 
children) one hundred prisoners or hostages, (b) For each wounded German soldier or 
Volksdeutsche 50 prisoners or hostages.304 
Further orders were issued by others with the requisite authority that more or less restated the 
initial orders in relation to the reprisal taking and executions of hostages. However, in reality 
the interpretation of these orders were approached with vigour, particularly by units of the SS, 
the SD305 and local police units that were not, as was conceded at trial, subordinate to the 
auspices of the German Army and therefore not under the control of List and others in the 
Army.306 Also conceded at trial was the fact that List had requested additional troops from 
Hitler to counteract the insurgency, however such requests were met with instructions to 
subjugate the insurgency by a more concerted ‘campaign of terrorism and intimidation of the 
population’.307 
Trial records indicate that the defence raised numerous factors in mitigation. Each of those 
factors predominantly focused on the lack of control and knowledge that they had in relation 
to the extent and nature of the reprisal killings. The mitigating factors raised by the accused 
can be summarised as follows: 
• There was a lack of evidence to substantiate allegations that the accused gave specific 
orders on their own accord to kill the number of hostages that were killed;308 
• The accused were merely following Hitler’s directives regarding the ratio of hostages 
that were to be executed;309 
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• The accused did not have full control over their areas, as the German High Command 
in Berlin impeded their authority and distributed contradicting orders;310 
• The accused were not aware of the full extent of the killings as they were physically 
absent at times during the campaign and were not informed by their subordinates at all 
times;311 
• The gathering of hostages and the number of executions in the field were carried out in 
a manner contrary to instructions;312 
• The accused lacked the requisite authority to issue orders on their own initiative and 
that they merely acted as conduits for orders from Berlin and distributed them as 
instructed;313 
• At times the accused questioned the legality of the orders given from above;314 
• The accused took measures at certain times to correct the misapplication of particular 
orders;315 
• The accused resisted some orders and, therefore, reduced the number of those who were 
executed.316 
Despite the pleas of not guilty to the charges, the Tribunal found all but one of the accused 
guilty. The Tribunal did concede, however, that, for various reasons, each of those found guilty 
were not completely guilty as originally charged. The Tribunal held that there was no evidence 
to support an allegation that each of the accused participated in a ‘preconceived plan to 
decimate and destroy the populations of Yugoslavia and Greece’ and that there was no 
‘convincing evidence that [the] defendants participated in such measures for the preconceived 
purpose of exterminating the population generally’.317 
Particularly favourable to List and Kuntze were the Tribunal’s findings in relation to the status 
of guerilla fighters in occupied territory. The Tribunal found that because Yugoslavia and 
Greece had capitulated to Germany, both countries were thereby ‘occupied’ and remained so 
according to international law during the time that List was Commander Southeast.318 This was 
a significant finding because it affected the applicability and operation of international law in 
relation to guerilla fighters. The Tribunal stated: 
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It is clear from the record also that the guerillas participating in the incidents shown by the 
evidence during this period were not entitled to be classed as lawful belligerents within the rules 
… We agree, therefore, with the contention of the defendant List that the guerilla fighters with 
which he contended were not lawful belligerents entitling them to prisoner of war status upon 
capture. We are obliged to hold that such guerillas were franca tirerurs who, upon capture, could 
be subjected to the death penalty. Consequently, no criminal responsibility attaches to the 
defendant List because of the execution of captured partisans in Yugoslavia and Greece during 
the time Armed Forces Commander Southeast.319 
For their part, List and Kuntze were sentenced to life imprisonment. While a sentence of this 
nature might appear harsh—particularly given the Tribunal agreed with substantial parts of 
their arguments—the sentence could have been much worse. The other defendants received 
sentences ranging from seven to twenty years imprisonment. In light of the severity of the 
charges and the number of deaths recorded during this time, all defendants were quite fortunate 
that the Tribunal reached the conclusions it did, given that the death penalty was a real option. 
Instead, each was found guilty on various counts but not all as first charged.320 That the 
Tribunal took into account at least some of the mitigating factors was clear, given the relatively 
light sentences each received. 
(d) Responsibility for the ‘Commanding General of Occupied Territory’ – Acquiescence not a 
defence to war crimes 
The Tribunal did, however, go into quite some detail in relation to the standard of responsibility 
commanders in occupied territory must maintain. In so discussing, the case raised several 
important points for the responsibility of commanders in general. The Tribunal stated in clear 
terms that the responsibility of commanders in occupied territory is to ‘maintain peace, order, 
punish crime and protect lives and property’.321 Such a duty, argued the Tribunal, applies to 
the occupiers as much as it does to the occupied so that the commander is responsible for 
ensuring his own troops maintain peace and order and are punished for crimes they commit 
during periods of occupation. 
Furthermore, the Tribunal stated that a commander will not be absolved from criminal 
responsibility merely because his troops obeyed an unlawful order from someone not under the 
control of their immediate commander. This was reference to the German Army taking orders, 
in relation to gathering and execution of hostages, from the SS which was under the control of 
Heinrich Himmler, who was not answerable to List. 
Instead, the Tribunal made it abundantly clear that, 
[t]hose responsible for such crimes by ordering or authorising their commission, or by a failure 
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account if International Law is to be anything more than an ethical code, barren of any practical 
coercive deterrent.322 
Evidence adduced at the trial made it clear also that List and several others were not active 
participants in the origination of the orders to execute hostages. The Tribunal did stipulate, 
however, that it was incumbent upon commanders at all levels to take steps to inform 
themselves, or to make inquiries to ensure unlawful conduct is not committed by their troops—
particularly since List and the others knew of the orders from Hitler, as evidenced by the fact 
that they themselves had directed their subordinates in relation to those orders. Clearly, List 
and the others failed to adhere to this requirement and the Tribunal held that such a failure 
amounted to acquiescence on their part and on the part of their subordinates. 
Acquiescence was effectively characterised by the Tribunal in List’s case, as occurring where 
the commander fails in their duty in relation to any of the following:323 
i. to keep abreast of occurrences within his territory of control (an exception to 
this is if the commander is temporarily outside of the region, however, the 
commander is required to ensure his temporary replacement is also abreast of 
happenings and that regular reports are transmitted to the commander; 
ii. to acquaint themselves with the content of reports; 
iii. to condemn unlawful killing of combatants and/ or non-combatants; 
iv. to bring to account those responsible for the killing of innocent people, 
particularly, in instances where the killings occur for reprisals in relation to acts 
by unknown members of the population; 
v. to terminate (or fail to attempt to terminate) unlawful killings; and 
vi. to prevent (or fail to attempt to prevent) unlawful killings in the future. 
Although the defendants managed to stave off the death penalty for their part in the offences, 
the circumstances of their command and the crimes committed against thousands of people as 
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D. Evidence that the Commander Failed to Punish the Perpetrators of the Crime 
Prior to the introduction of several ICL statutes that explicitly referred to a superior’s duty to 
punish a subordinate for their criminal acts,325 it was not entirely clear whether the failure to 
punish subordinates was an offence sui generis or rather that the superior would attract criminal 
responsibility for the same offence as committed by subordinates. Several leading cases post-
WWII went some way to answer this question and, from these, it appeared as though the answer 
was that superiors would be liable for the same offences committed by their subordinates in 
the event that they failed to punish those subordinates for the criminal acts of the subordinates. 
However, several judgments arising out of the ITCY seem to have cast doubt on whether a 
superior would be responsible for the underlying criminal acts where he fails to punish his 
subordinates.326 Rather, the preferable position now appears to be that the superior would be 
 
 
charged for disseminating several illegal orders to his troops that resulted in war crimes. Von Leeb 
was found not guilty in relation to one of the charges due to the fact that von Leeb had no direct 
control over the issuing of the orders. However, he was found guilty in relation to a second order as it 
was found that he implemented an order by passing it down the chain of command that resulted in war 
crimes. At international law, he, therefore, assumed some responsibility for it and was guilty on the 
basis of a dereliction of duty to ensure the order was not implemented or its affect was mitigated. The 
Tribunal stated: 
Under basic principles of command authority and responsibility, an officer who merely stands by 
while his subordinates execute a criminal order of his superiors which he knows is criminal, violates 
a moral obligation under International Law. By doing nothing he cannot wash his hands of 
international responsibility. … Criminality does not attach to every individual in this chain of 
command from that fact alone. There must be a personal dereliction. That can occur only where the 
act is directly traceable to him or where his failure to properly supervise his subordinates constitutes 
criminal negligence on his part. In the latter case, it must be a personal neglect amounting to a wanton, 
immoral disregard of the action of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence. (LRTWC Vol XII, 75-
6) 
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the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (September 2009) (‘ICTY Statute’) art 7(3) 
<http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf>; Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international 
armed conflicts (Protocol I) opened for signature 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 17512 (entered into force 
7 December 1978) art 86. 
326 Prosecutor v Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Trial Judgment 91-100 (15 November 2005) 
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liable for failing to punish subordinates responsible for committing the unlawful act. This 
position is, to some extent, at odds with several early, post-WWII decisions in relation to this 
element of command responsibility. 
The Obligation to Undertake an Investigation as a Prerequisite to Punishment 
A number of tribunals in the past have raised concerns about a failure of superiors to investigate 
or seek further information when instances of war crimes have been brought to their attention 
or when they suspect war crimes to have occurred under their command. The various tribunals 
have noted that the duty to punish includes a duty to investigate and this is something that must 
be done preparatory to any decision to punish their subordinates.327 
Citing the judgment in Kordic and Cerkez IT-95-14/2 (26 February 2001) Trial Judgment [446] 
(‘Kordic case’), 328  the Chamber in Prosecutor v Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48-T, Trial 
Judgment 91-100 (15 November 2005) (‘Halilovic case’) extended the legal principle that held 
that, 
the duty to punish at least includes the obligation to investigate possible crimes or have the matter 
investigated, to establish the facts, and if the superior has no power to sanction, to report them to 
the competent authorities.329 
The Chamber in the Halilovic case also cited, with approval, the obligation to carry out an 
investigation as a prerequisite to punishing subordinates for unlawful conduct as decided in the 
Yamashita trial and the Shigemitsu and Tojo judgments from the IMTFE.330 In the Yamashita 
trial, it was decided that, 
where murder and rape and vicious, revengeful actions are widespread offences and there is no 
effective attempt by a commander to discover and control the criminal acts, such commander 
may be held responsible, even criminally liable, for the lawless acts of his troops ...331 
In a similar vein in the judgment regarding Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru at 
the IMTFE in Tokyo in 1948, it was held that the defendant Shigemitsu, 
took no adequate steps to have the matter investigated ... He should have pressed the matter, if 
necessary to the point of resigning, in order to quit himself of a responsibility which he suspected 
was not being discharged.332 
Also decided at the IMTFE in Tokyo, was that Prime Minister Tojo Hideki likewise did not 
take any adequate steps, 
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to punish the offenders and to prevent the commission of similar offences in the 
future. ... He did not call for a report on the incident. ... He made perfunctory 
inquiries about the march but took no action. No one was punished.333 
The Obligation to ‘Punish’ 
There are several early examples that provide an express obligation for those in positions of 
authority to facilitate the punishment of subordinates, or assist others to bring subordinates to 
justice in the event of criminal wrongdoing. King Charles VII of Orleans in 1439 made it an 
express requirement that a captain ‘will be deemed responsible for the offense as if he had 
committed it himself … [if] …because of his negligence or otherwise, the offender escapes 
and thus evades punishment’.334 Similarly, during the American War of Independence against 
the British, article 11 of the Massachusetts Articles of War stipulated that commanding officers 
‘shall keep good order … and redress all such abuses or disorders which may be committed by 
an officer or soldier under his command’.335 A similar requirement was also included in Article 
33 of the American Articles of War in 1806 which included the express obligation for a 
commanding officer to deliver any subordinate to a civil magistrate if that person was charged 
with a ‘capital crime’ or has ‘used violence’ or ‘committed any offense against the person or 
property of any citizen of … the United States’.336 
 Article 507(b) of the US Field Manual 27-10 places an obligation on commanding officers of 
the US military to ‘insure that war crimes committed by members of their forces against enemy 
personnel are promptly and adequately punished’.337 This obligation was not, however, present 
during the time that the US and its Allies conducted the war crimes trials in Europe or in the 
Asia–Pacific. The inclusion of an express obligation to punish US military personnel was not 
included until the 1956 edition of the Field Manual. 
The Hostages case also touched on the issue of punishment for those in positions of authority. 
In that case, it was held that ‘[t]he primary responsibility for the prevention and punishment of 
crime lies with the commanding general, a responsibility from which he cannot escape by 
denying his authority over the perpetrators’.338 
As was shown in the Hostages case, a failure to punish a perpetrator for a specific crime has 
been used as part of the justification for a superior being criminally responsible for the actions 
of a subordinate. The Tribunal in the Hostages case intimated that the superior’s failure to 
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punish the criminal wrongdoing of a subordinate indicates a tacit acceptance of the criminal 
wrongdoing.339 
In the High Command case, the International Military Tribunal (IMT) alluded to the fact that 
those in authority did have an obligation to punish their subordinates for illegal acts. The 
Tribunal commented on the inadequacy of the punishment that General von Salmuth ordered 
in relation to an excessive number of executions carried out by non-unauthorised German units 
on civilians in Kodyma, central Ukraine in August 1941. General Hans von Salmuth 
(Commander-in-Chief of the German 15th Army) distributed an order on 2 August that stated: 
Participation of soldiers in actions against Jews and Communists 
The fanatical intent of the members of the Communist party and of the Jews to stop the German 
Wehrmacht at all costs must be broken under all circumstances. In the interest of the security of 
the army rear area it is therefore necessary to proceed with all vigor. Sonderkommandos have 
been charged with this mission. At one place, however, members of the armed forces participated 
in such an action in an unpleasant manner. [emphasis added] 
For the future I order: 
Only those soldiers may participate in such actions who are expressly ordered to do so. I also 
forbid all members of the troops subordinate to me any participation as spectators. 
In as much as members of the armed forces are ordered to participate in such actions, they must 
be under the command of officers. These officers are responsible that every unpleasant excess on 
the part of the troops be avoided. [emphasis added]340 
For the ‘unpleasant’ manner to which von Selmuth referred, the Tribunal noted the lenient 
punishment of a 20-day confinement for one of his staff for unauthorised participation in the 
executions.341 
Several judgments coming out of the IMTFE in Tokyo also placed an obligation on superiors 
to punish their subordinates for criminal wrongdoing and held that the failure to do so, can 
render the superior criminally responsible. In the Kimura Heitaro and Tojo Hideki judgments, 
the IMTFE made special mention of the fact that Kimura’s acquiescence in relation to the 
treatment of Allied POWs in Burma during WWII, facilitated the deaths of thousands of 
prisoners at the hands of Japanese POW guards. The Tribunal held that ‘[Kimura] took no 
disciplinary measures or other steps to prevent the commission of atrocities by the troops under 
his command’. 342  For their part for, inter alia, failing to punish those responsible and 
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preventing the needless deaths of Allied POWs hors de combat, Kimura and Tojo were 
executed in Tokyo at Sugamo Prison in 1948. 
Post-WWII, several international law statutes were enacted that have specifically addressed a 
superior’s duty to investigate and punish subordinates for certain international crimes. The 
Additional Protocol I, art 86(2) states: 
The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate 
does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if 
they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances 
at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take 
all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.343 
The Rome Statute also introduced a similar provision, in art 28(a) and (b) that, inter alia, which 
makes a military commander344 or a superior345 criminally responsible where the military 
commander or superior: 
failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress 
their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and 
prosecution.346 
Failure to Punish: A Substantial Offence or ‘Mode of Liability’? 
On that basis it follows that even if the criminal acts were not initially met with the approval 
or knowledge of the superior, a failure to punish the perpetrator once the superior becomes 
aware of the acts, renders the superior criminally responsible as he or she is deemed to have 
accepted the wrongdoing and therefore approves of the conduct of the subordinate. 347 
Investigation and punishment (if warranted) by a superior serves as evidence for the 
renouncement of those crimes and, importantly for the superior, may relieve him or her from 
criminal responsibility.348 
Sepinwall contends that the ‘failure to punish’ a subordinate can be viewed in two ways. Firstly, 
a failure to punish can be understood as constituting a dereliction of duty and can, therefore, 
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form a separate (or sui generis) offence arising from the offence(s) committed by his or her 
troops.349 A second view is that the superior can be liable for the atrocity itself.350 Sepinwall 
makes the valid point that there is some uncertainty about which is the preferred view.351 That 
is, does the law hold the superior criminally responsible for merely failing to punish the 
subordinate, or does the law implicate the superior in the underlying atrocity? The former view 
creates a separate offence of ‘failing to punish’, while the latter makes the superior a party to 
the underlying criminal act, whether it be a war crime, genocide, a breach of humanitarian law 
etc. 
Reaching a determination of the specific offence is critical, as such a determination will have 
implications for success or failure for the prosecution and for the severity of the sentence. A 
finding of dereliction of duty may not have the same punitive consequences as if the accused 
was charged with the commission of genocide or other breach of international law, for example. 
A conviction of genocide, for instance, would be understood to carry a more severe penalty 
than would a conviction for a superior being derelict in his or her duty. 
The uncertainty as to whether there is a separate offence relating to a failure to punish or 
whether the superior will be charged with offences committed by subordinates, argues 
Sepinwall, has arisen out of several judgments coming out of the ICTY.352 The problem, as he 
correctly points out, stems from the wording of art 7(3) of the ICTY Statute in so far as the 
provision fails to stipulate whether the superior would be subject to a separate offence for 
failing to punish subordinates, or whether the superior would be liable for the actual offence 
committed by the subordinate. 
Article 7(3) sets out: 
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed by 
a subordinate does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to 
know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed 
to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators 
thereof [emphasis added].353 
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In reaching an interpretation about whether the accused should be liable for the omission to 
punish an offender or whether the accused should be held liable for the actual offence(s) 
committed by subordinates, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY found that the correct interpretation 
is that criminal responsibility should rest on the failure to punish. At paragraph 54, the Chamber 
stated: 
The Trial Chamber finds that under Article 7(3) command responsibility is responsibility for an 
omission. The commander is responsible for the failure to perform an act required by 
international law. This omission is culpable because international law imposes an affirmative 
duty on superiors to prevent and punish crimes committed by their subordinates. Thus ‘for the 
acts of his subordinates’ as generally referred to in the jurisprudence of the Tribunal does not 
mean that the commander shares the same responsibility as the subordinates who committed the 
crimes, but rather that because of the crimes committed by his subordinates, the commander 
should bear responsibility for his failure to act. The imposition of responsibility upon a 
commander for breach of his duty is to be weighed against the crimes of his subordinates; a 
commander is responsible not as though he had committed the crime himself, but his 
responsibility is considered in proportion to the gravity of the offences committed.354 
In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber referred to an earlier decision in the Prosecutor v 
Hadzǐhasanovic,́ Case No. IT-01-47-T, Trial Judgment, 1777 (15 March 2006) 
(‘Hadzǐhasanovic ́case’) that made a similar finding in relation to whether art 7(3) should be 
interpreted as a substantive offence or as a mode of liability. In applying the Hadzǐhasanovic ́
case, the Chamber stated that: 
The position of the appellants seems to be influenced by their belief that Article 7(3) of the Statute 
has the effect, as they say, of making the commander ‘guilty of an offence committed by others 
even though he neither possessed the applicable mens rea nor had any involvement whatsoever 
in the actus reus.’ No doubt, arguments can be made in support of that reading of the provision, 
but I prefer to interpret the provision as making the commander guilty for failing in his 
supervisory capacity to take the necessary corrective action after he knows or has reason to know 
that his subordinate was about to commit the act or had done so.355 
E. The Existence of Superior–Subordinate Relationship 
In order for a superior to be liable for the illegal actions of a person junior in rank or seniority 
must first be shown that the individuals are in a superior–subordinate relationship.356 That 
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requirement is of primary importance because without it, the risk is that there is virtually 
unlimited scope to hold any superior criminally responsible for violations of international and 
military law by anyone inferior to them in rank. The requirement places an obligation on those 
who prosecute international law violations to adduce evidence that the accused superior was, 
at the time of the commission of the offence, in a superior–subordinate relationship with those 
who actually committed the alleged offences.357 
Whether a person was in a position of authority over another person comes down to how that 
authority was established. Within military contexts it is not difficult to establish such authority 
since clear lines of command are delineated based on rank and, accordingly, command 
responsibility can exist between superiors and subordinates at any rank.358 The relationship 
between superiors and subordinates is, in the military context, predominantly—though not 
exclusively—based on what is known as de jure authority, whereby the relationship is born out 
of military law and formalised military structures.359 
However, the existence of authority is not always immediately clear, particularly when 
questions arise involving civilians who are not governed by the same hierarchical structures 
that exist in the military. Problems with establishing authority also exists where it is not clear 
that a person—even if superior in rank—was actually exercising de jure control over 
subordinates at the time the offences were committed.360 On that basis, ‘administrative’ control 
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as opposed to ‘tactical’ control is relevant since administrative control may not attract the same 
culpability as a commander exercising ‘tactical’ responsibility on the battlefield.361 
Attempts to address such problems have been made by applying what is known as de facto 
control so that it is possible to show that for a person exercising de facto authority over another, 
such authority will be sufficient to render a superior criminally responsible. Where there is 
compelling evidence that a form of ‘constructive’ authority sufficiently exists to render another 
person criminally responsible for the acts of subordinates. 
Establishing the superior-subordinate relationship – de jure 
There is an underlying assumption that a superior–subordinate structure exists in the military 
context and this has been recognised at international law in a variety of contexts. For example, 
art 1 of Convention II, Hague Regulations 1899 annexure, states that each belligerent force 
requires to ‘be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates’.362 Convention IV of 
the Hague Regulations in 1907 likewise created command obligations for each belligerent.363 
The codification is merely the recognition of the underlying command structures inherent in 
any military institution necessary for the basis of criminal responsibility. Bantekas talks of a 
‘hierarchical model’ being ‘built on a vertical scale, which seeks to effectively filter the dictates 
of the decision-makers down to the soldier on the battlefield’.364 
A further example of de jure authority is provided by Additional Protocol I of the Geneva 
Convention which provides for the various duties that arise out of the superior–subordinate 
relationship and requires commanders to ‘control’, ‘prevent’ or ‘suppress’ breaches of the 
Conventions.365 Of importance here also is the fact that the responsibility of the commander is 
extended by AP I art 87(1) and (3) to ‘other persons under their control’. This extension of 
responsibility is meant to encompass those situations where a military commander’s 
responsibility goes beyond the military and extends to civilian entities. In the event that 
civilians (or non-combatants) are accused of violations of the laws of war (such as where such 
entities have facilitated, ordered or failed in their duties to suppress such violations), then a 
commander who has oversight of those civilian entities, may also attract criminal liability. 
Where this provision is most likely to apply is in occupied territories where military 
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commanders exercise command over civilian bureaucracies—bureaucracies which may 
involve enormous local and regional power over those who fall within their auspices.366 
Bantekas has identified four broad levels of command that are susceptible to criminal 
responsibility in the event that war crimes are committed by subordinates.367 His structure 
assumes that command ultimately begins with policy formulation from non-military entities 
and that military command cannot be viewed in isolation from the policy that comes from such 
civilian entities: 
Both the civilian and military components of every state’s machinery constitute integral defense 
structures. This hierarchical model is built upon a vertical scale, which seeks to effectively filter 
the dictates of the decision-makers down to the soldier on the battlefield.368 
From this, Bantekas identifies that the initial level of command starts with the formulation of 
policy by those charged with that function.369 The function of forming policy, at least in the 
context of liberal democracies, is given primarily to those who occupy elected positions in 
Legislature and those who are in charge of policy formulation at the cabinet level. The 
instrument that legitimates the policy formulation (and ultimately law-making powers) is 
generally provided by national constitutions.370 Although the numbers are far less than those 
who actually perpetrate war crimes, a number of tribunals have sought to indict and convict 
civilian authorities.371 
The second tier Bantekas identifies is the ‘strategic phase’ where the most senior military 
personnel devise a military plan to achieve the policy objectives expressed by the civilian 
leadership.372 The third level where criminality can occur is when the plan proceeds down the 
chain of command.373 At this level, senior and mid-ranking military personnel are subject to 
criminality in the event that they pass on manifestly unlawful orders or construe the plan in 
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such a way that they themselves formulate and issue unlawful orders to their subordinates.374At 
the fourth level, or as Bantekas describes it, ‘the end of the scale’, those who are charged with 
the responsibility of tactical command may attract criminal responsibility if they themselves 
commit unlawful acts, give unlawful orders, are derelict in their duties as superiors or, in some 
other way, are found guilty of war crimes by virtue of their position as superiors.375 
While in many instances the facts can demonstrate whether or not a superior–subordinate 
relationship existed and whether policies formulated at the civilian level were responsible for 
atrocities and other war crimes, there are instances where the links between superiors, 
subordinates and the offences committed on the battlefield are much less clear. Despite the 
existence of the superior–subordinate relationship being less clear in some instances, there have 
been times throughout history where de facto control has been found to have applied to 
superiors rendering them criminally responsible in instances where they have exercised 
‘effective’ control over subordinates, as will now be discussed. 
Establishing the superior–subordinate relationship – de facto control 
The second—and somewhat problematic—path in establishing the requisite criminal 
relationship between the superior and the subordinate perpetrator is to prove the superior had 
de facto control of the subordinate at the time of the commission of the unlawful acts. The de 
facto method of establishing responsibility of a superior would be relied upon in situations 
where the prosecution deemed it appropriate to argue that a person has ‘effective’ control over 
the criminal actions of subordinates despite the absence of clear de jure command structures, 
or other evidence placing the superior in direct authority of the subordinate at the time the 
unlawful acts were committed. 
One example of de facto control is where a civilian is prosecuted for the criminal actions of 
military personnel because the civilian authority had ‘effective’ control over troops on the 
battlefield, for example, through the formulation of policy.376 
The point was raised above that proving de facto control is somewhat problematic in the sense 
that the prosecution can put forward any evidence it wishes to establish a link between the 
superior and the unlawful conduct committed by the subordinate. It is then up to the arbiters of 
fact (whoever or whatever that happens to be in the circumstances) to determine whether there 
exists a causal link between the actions of the superior and the acts of the subordinate. The 
problem with this approach lies with the issue of remoteness in terms of the subordinate’s 
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The meaning of ‘effective control’ 
In the case of Mucic et al at the ICTY it was held that a person who holds ‘effective’ command 
with the ‘power to prevent and punish the crimes of persons who are … under their control’ 
can be criminally responsible in certain circumstances in the event that they do not fulfil this 
duty.377  The Chamber went on to state that it matters not whether the individuals are in 
positions of civilian or military authority and that criminal responsibility may result, 
under the doctrine of command responsibility on the basis of their de facto as well as their de 
jure positions as superiors. The mere absence of formal legal authority to control the actions of 
subordinates should therefore not be understood to preclude impositions of such responsibility.378 
What is clear then is that a key aspect of ‘effective control’ includes the power to prevent and 
punish those under their control. Also apparent is the fact that, for the purpose of attracting 
criminal responsibility, the superior can be a military or civilian authority379 and the absence 
of any formal structures is not an obstacle to prosecution. The term ‘effective control’ was 
given further attention in the Kordic case when the ICTY Chamber said that the notion of 
effective control included such things as the ability to issue and sign orders, the nature and 
‘substance’ of the documents signed by the superior and whether those orders were in fact acted 
upon by the subordinates.380 Even where the superior has, or is able to exercise, what can be 
described as partial control, this too, can be sufficient to render the superior liable.381 
F. The State of Knowledge that the Commander had in relation to the Unlawful Conduct 
A superior’s knowledge of specific offences carried out by subordinates is a further element in 
establishing criminal responsibility of a superior for actions of their subordinates. If it can be 
shown that a superior had the requisite guilty mind—or mens rea—then criminal responsibility 
will flow accordingly. The extent of mens rea to attract criminal responsibility can be that of a 
‘spectrum’ of knowledge ranging from complete knowledge of the actions of the perpetrators 
to ‘constructive knowledge’ where the superior may not have had specific knowledge but 
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would or ought382 have formed a reasonable assumption that crimes were being committed by 
their subordinates.383 
The path to ‘Constructive knowledge’ 
Evidence showing that the accused had actual knowledge of the offences is not problematic. 
The issue is whether an accused should face criminal sanction where there is a lack of evidence 
that they did have actual knowledge. The path to ‘constructive knowledge’, then, has been used 
in numerous notable trials over time to prevent superiors—both civilian and military—from 
escaping liability. 
One notable example is the IMTFE, where senior members of the Japanese civilian and military 
leadership were indicted for war crimes committed against POWs and civilian members of the 
Allied nations.384 
Another important example, illustrative of the way that knowledge is construed, is the case of 
General Yamashita Tomoyuki. Regarding whether Yamashita had actual knowledge of the 
crimes being committed by Japanese forces throughout the Philippines, Yamashita’s defence 
counsel went to great pains to point out that there was no evidence to support the allegation 
that he had actual knowledge of such events. The defence counsel argued that a conviction 
should not proceed without proving the all-important fault element of the offences charged. 
Colonel Clarke for the defence argued that, ‘…[i]t is the basic premise of all civilized criminal 
justice that it punishes not according to status but according to fault, and that one man is not 
held to answer for the crime of another’.385 
This point was countered by Major Kerr for the prosecution who argued that the atrocities 
committed by Japanese forces, 
[w]ere so notorious and so flagrant and so enormous, both as to the scope of their operation and 
as to inhumanity, the bestiality involved, that they must have been known to the Accused if he 
were making any effort whatever to meet the responsibilities of his command or his position; and 
that if he did not know of those acts, notorious, widespread, repeated, constant as they were, it 
was simply because he took affirmative action not to know.386 
The Judge Advocate agreed with the prosecution and stated it was inconceivable that a person 
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From all the fact and circumstances of record, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that the 
accused knew or had the means to know of the widespread commission of atrocities by members 
and units of his command; his failure to inform himself through official means available to him 
of what was common knowledge throughout his command and throughout the civilian population 
can only be considered as a criminal dereliction of duty on his part.387 
In so doing, the Military Commission construed knowledge on the part of Yamashita on the 
basis that the atrocities were so widespread it would have been difficult for him not to have 
been aware of what was occurring. This proposition is interesting given there was no evidence 
directly proving that Yamashita did know of the actions of his subordinates, particularly when 
there was actual evidence proving that communications between Yamashita’s command and 
the field had irretrievably broken down due to the effectiveness of the US’s invasion of the 
Philippines.388 
G. Whether the Commander incited subordinates into carrying out the Unlawful Conduct 
A person who incites others to commit acts of violence, although not directly taking part in the 
violence, can still be regarded as a principal in war crimes, even if that person is not present at 
the time the crime occurs. One case that illustrates how a superior can be prosecuted on the 
basis of incitement is that of Captain Erich Heyer who was convicted and sentenced to death 
by hanging for his part in the deaths of three allied airmen. 
The Trial of Erich Heyer et al (the Essen Lynching Case)389 
In 1944, three captured British airmen were handed over to the supervision and authority of 
Captain Erich Heyer. Heyer gave orders to parade the POWs in front of a crowd of townspeople 
on their way to being interrogated. Details were given to a crowd of people and by the time the 
men were marched through the streets, a crowd of angry Germans had gathered to jeer at them. 
The crowd became increasingly violent and before long the men were beaten with sticks. They 
were then thrown off a bridge, killing one. The surviving two were beaten and shot by the 
crowd. The accompanying German military personnel, instructed by Heyer, did nothing to 
quell the violence. 
After the war, Heyer went on trial for the deaths of the three men on the basis that he incited 
the crowd to carry out acts of violence. Although it was acknowledged that Heyer was not 
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present at the time, and did not actually perpetrate the acts that killed the fliers, he effectively 
‘lit the match’: 
From the moment they left those barracks, the men were doomed and the crowd knew they were 
doomed and every person in that crowd who struck a blow was both morally and criminally 
responsible for the deaths of the three men.390 
Effectively, it was held that Heyer knew of the fate of the men and, on that basis, he not only 
allowed, but facilitated an action that caused the deaths of the men. 
Given that Heyer was not present and did not give orders to kill per se the question was on 
what basis he would be found criminally responsible. Would he face trial as a secondary 
offender and not the primary offender (thereby reducing his culpability, and therefore, his 
sentence) or would he be treated as a principal offender as if he had committed the acts himself? 
The Court acknowledged that he did not strike or shoot the men. However, it also found that 
this fact was irrelevant given that Heyer took an active part in the deaths from the moment he 
relayed the men’s whereabouts to a group of German civilians outside the barracks and gave 
orders preventing the escorts from intervening should the men be ‘molested’ en route to the 
interrogation unit.391 On this point, the Court stated: 
Heyer admittedly never struck any physical blow … [but] an instigator may be regarded as a 
principal. … Although the person who incited was not present when the crime was committed.392 
On the basis that it was held that, factually, Heyer incited the crowd to kill, he was in some 
respects more guilty than the corporal who escorted the three airmen and obeyed orders not to 
intervene.393 
H. The Level of Control Exerted by the Individual Commander and whether the 
Commander failed to Control Subordinates 
The level of control a superior exerts over individuals is an important factor in determining 
criminal responsibility, because unless there is evidence that the superior exerted the requisite 
control, then criminal responsibility for the acts of subordinates should not follow. However, 
when one observes the ruling in the Yamashita trial, it becomes apparent that even when there 
is scant evidence that a superior exerted sufficient control over subordinates, the superior may 
still be criminally responsible under the doctrine of command responsibility. 
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In the Yamashita trial, General Reynolds of the Commission acknowledged that Yamashita 
did not personally take part in the acts or even order the acts to be carried out against US POWs 
and Filipino civilians: 
It is absurd to consider a commander a murderer or rapist because one of his soldiers commits a 
murder or rape. Nevertheless, where murder and rape and vicious, revengeful actions are 
widespread offenses, and there is no effective attempt by a commander to discover and control 
the criminal acts, such a commander may be held responsible … for the lawless acts of his 
troops…394 
General Reynolds added that the actions of Japanese forces against civilian and US POWs 
while Yamashita was in command of the 14th Area Army in the Philippines ‘were not sporadic 
in nature … and that [he] failed to provide effective control of [his] troops as was required by 
the circumstances’.395 
Given that the Commission held that Yamashita was in control of his troops during this time, 
and that he failed to exercise control over his troops in preventing and punishing those who 
committed crimes, the Commission sentenced him to ‘death by hanging’.396 
As the cases and the discussion above have made it clear, there were several problems with 
command responsibility between how it was applied at Manila and the various interpretations 
of the doctrine throughout history. Several issues reside in the fact that liability is sometimes 
attributed to superiors merely due to the position a superior occupied rather than specific 
evidence linking the individual to the actual crime. Quite often, to make the crime fit the 
necessary criminal elements of the offence, tribunals at Manila adopted a broad interpretation 
of the mental element mens rea. 
The following chapter examines the first of two defences that were raised at Manila—the 
defence of ‘superior orders’. As was the case with command responsibility, the US Military 




394 Cited in Lael (n 97) 95. 
395 Ibid 95. 
396 Ibid. Despite Yamashita’s legal defence team appealing to the US Supreme Court, the decision to 








HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SUPERIOR ORDERS 
I. Introduction 
This chapter examines the defence of superior orders in international law. The discussion will 
commence with a précis of the origins of the defence, its development over time, and its 
application in several major conflicts throughout history. The purpose of the chapter is to 
demonstrate the lack of agreement between scholars, lawmakers and military officials 
regarding the validity and application of superior orders. 
The defence of ‘superior orders’ has been one of the most commonly raised and controversial 
defence pleas throughout the history of international criminal law.397 A plea of superior orders 
is typically raised on the grounds that the accused committed the criminal act merely because 
they were legally obliged to follow orders, the failure of which, would render the accused liable 
to court martial by their own military. 
The question whether superior orders should be a valid defence under international criminal 
law is made difficult due to several injustices from allowing or disallowing the defence. On the 
one hand, there is a sense of injustice to the victims if those who commit acts of violence are 
able to escape criminal responsibility merely because they were following orders. On the other 
hand, some argue that injustice will also result for the accused due to the inherent power 
imbalance of military structures which operate to remove, or at least ‘muddy’ the concept of 
free will and mens rea on the part of the subordinate.398 
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The expected legal outcome of a plea of superior orders post WWII can be described as 
something that resembles the ‘middle ground’ or, in other words, a compromise. From the 
Nuremberg and Pacific trials (including the Manila trials), as far as criminal responsibility was 
concerned, the plea of superior orders did not relieve the accused from criminal responsibility 
if the orders were manifestly unlawful. Rather, the plea of superior orders might be considered 
as a plea of mitigation of the sentence. 
The law as it currently stands (the lex lata) in relation to superior orders at international law is 
not difficult to ascertain. It has been articulated in clear terms in a significant number of war 
crimes trials, particularly those in Nuremburg and also in contemporary developments in light 
of Article 33 of the Rome Statute.399 The lex ferenda question, however, is far from settled. 
The lex ferenda question relates to the normative justification for punishing a subordinate who 
is legally obliged to follows orders involving acts which would otherwise fall within the realms 
of war crimes. To put it another way, why should a person faced with fear of punishment for 
disobeying superior orders be susceptible to criminal sanction under international criminal law 
for carrying out those orders? Such is the dilemma for the subordinate—either way, punishment 
is a consequence. 
This chapter examines the jurisprudence of superior orders as it has been interpreted throughout 
various historical periods with a view to addressing the question whether the international 
community needs to reconsider the legal status of superior orders as a defence to war crimes 
(in certain circumstances) as opposed to its current status as a factor in mitigation. In addressing 
this question, the chapter begins with a discussion of the concept of superior orders and then 
moves to an analysis of the way superior orders has been addressed historically. As will be 
shown, the current law in relation to superior orders is largely constructed upon a post-WWII 
manifestation of the will of the victorious Allied nations in response to the atrocities committed 
by Germany and Japan and their Allies during WWII. This begs the question whether that an 
interpretation can be reconsidered given the amount of time that has elapsed between the events 
of WWII and now. 
II. Superior Orders and Case Law – Pre WWI 
A. Hagenbach’s Case 
One of the first international prosecutions of a person accused of war crimes was that of Peter 
von Hagenbach (Haganbach’s case) which occurred in Breisach, on the Upper Rhine in 
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1474.400 Hagenbach’s case dealt with, inter alia, the issue of superior orders as a defence.401 
Hagenbach was tried and convicted for acts that occurred under his rule after he was appointed 
by the Duke of Burgundy to serve as governor in the area.402 To subjugate the people of 
Breisach after an uprising, Hagenbach employed tactics for which he would be later charged 
with ‘murder, rape, perjury, and other crimes against the laws of God and man’.403 After the 
town was eventually liberated, Hagenbach was charged and stood trial before a tribunal 
comprising twenty-eight judges from allied states. Upon conviction of the charges, he was 
stripped of his knighthood and beheaded.404 
As part of his defence, Hagenbach argued that the orders he gave to quell the uprising were in 
direct response to the orders he received from the Duke of Burgundy and, therefore, he should 
not be punished for merely following orders. Hagenbach made the point that ‘soldiers owe 
absolute obedience to their superiors’.405 The tribunal dismissed his plea of superior orders on 
the basis that his crimes were ‘considered contrary to the laws of God and because the 
defendant’s crimes had already been established beyond doubt’.406 
Around 180 years after Hagenbach’s case, the plea of superior orders was tested yet again, this 
time involving the execution of Charles I in England.407 In Axtell’s case, the accused, Captain 
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Axtell who raised the defence of superior orders after he had killed the monarch, allegedly on 
the orders of his superior officer, claimed that as an officer he was bound to obey his superior’s 
orders or himself be put to death. On this point, the Court stated, ‘it was … no excuse, for his 
superior was a traitor … and where the command is traitorous, there the obedience to that 
command is also traitorous.’408 
B. Property Related Offences and the Plea of Superior Orders 
Little v Barreme (1804) 
The question of superior orders in relation to property offences was addressed by the US 
authorities in Little v Barreme 6 US 170 (1804) (‘Little’s case’) in 1804.409 This case involved 
the capture of a Danish vessel, the Flying Fish, by the US frigate, Boston which was 
commanded by Captain Little. The Flying Fish was intercepted in 1799 during its voyage from 
Jeremie, Haiti to St Thomas in the Caribbean and was later brought to Boston on account of an 
allegation that the vessel had violated provisions of what was then known as the 
‘nonintercourse law’. 
The nonintercourse law was a law passed by the US congress that prohibited commercial 
activities from occurring between US nationals and French territories on account of the 
hostilities that existed between the two nations at the time. The Act,410 at section 1, prohibited 
any US vessel travelling to a French territorial port, the violation of which would result in the 
forfeiture of cargo and the subsequent seizure of the vessel by US authorities. 
Section 5 of the nonintercourse law made it lawful for the President of the United States to give 
instructions to the commanders of armed ships of the United States to stop and examine any 
ship or vessel of the United States on suspicion that any US vessel was transiting to and 
engaging in commerce in French territories. Pursuant to the nonintercourse law, the President 
of the US issued the following orders to commanders of US vessels: 
Sir: herewith you will receive an act of Congress further to suspend the commercial intercourse 
between the United States and France and dependencies thereof, the whole of which requires 
your attention. But it is the command of the President that you consider particularly the fifth 
section as part of your instructions and govern yourself accordingly. 411 
The President’s directive then went to state, 
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you are to be vigilant that vessels or cargoes really American, but covered by Danish or other 
foreign papers, and bound to or from French ports do not escape you.412 
Lastly, the President gave this stern warning to his commanders: 
At the same time that you are thus attentive to fulfil the objects of the law, you are to be extremely 
careful not to harass or injure the trade of foreign nations with who we are at peace nor the fair 
trade of our own citizens.413 
On 2 December 1779, the Flying Fish and its entire cargo was seized by US authorities. The 
seizure was partly due to the fact that Samuel Goodman, the vessel’s owner, spoke English 
with an American accent and, to the authorities, appeared to be a US citizen. In reality, 
however, Samuel Goodman was Prussian born and, at the time, an inhabitant of the island of 
St Thomas. As such, his ship was not liable to capture under the nonintercourse law. Goodman 
later filed and received an order from the US District Court for the return of the vessel on the 
grounds of false capture and detention. He also filed for damages and eventually received 
$8,504 but later appealed on the basis that the quantum awarded by the Court was 
insufficient.414 
In his judgment on the appeal, Chief Justice Marshall alluded to the fact that Commander Little 
had made an error in apprehending a ‘neutral’ vessel travelling to French territories, which was 
not intended to have been apprehended under the US law. Little argued that the apprehension 
of the vessel was done in following the President’s orders. 
Marshall CJ then examined the nature of the President’s orders and in particular whether the 
defence of superior orders would apply in the circumstances. His Honour raised the question, 
‘is the officer who obeys them [orders] liable for damages sustained by this misconstruction of 
the act, or will his orders excuse him?’415 His Honour initially thought that due to the fact that 
the ‘implicit obedience which military men … pay to their superiors’ is paramount within the 
military system, Little might escape personal liability for damages. However, on closer 
consideration, he concluded that Little could not rely on the President’s instructions as they did 
not permit the capture and seizure of neutral vessels, the contravention of which, Little had 
clearly committed. His Honour succinctly stated that, ‘instructions cannot change the nature of 
the transaction to legalize an act which without those instructions would have been a plain 
trespass’.416 In other words, Little could not rely on the President’s instructions because Little’s 
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Little’s case illustrates that, from as early as the beginning of the 19th century, at least in the 
US, superior orders were limited to the extent of the lawfulness, or rather, the correctness of 
the facts that underpinned the order. 
Mitchell v Harmony (1851) 
The matter of superior orders was examined again some decades later in another case that 
involved the US military and the seizure of private property in time of war, this time between 
the US and Mexico. In the case of Mitchell v Harmony 54 US 115 (1851) (‘Mitchell’s case’),417 
the US Supreme Court considered an appeal by Harmony, a US commercial trader, whose 
goods were seized by Mitchell because Harmony was allegedly in contravention of US laws 
that prohibited trade with Mexico. Harmony had ventured into Mexican territory that was held 
at the time by the US authorities and engaged in trade with the inhabitants of that territory . He 
brought an action against the seizure on the grounds that the seizure constituted an unlawful 
trespass against him. He claimed that: 
The defendant, on 10 February 1847, at Chihuahua, in the Republic of Mexico, seized, took, 
drove, and carried away and converted to his own use the horses, mules, wagons, goods, chattels, 
and merchandise of the plaintiff and compelled the workman and servants of the plaintiff having 
charge to abandon his service and devote themselves to the defendant’s service. The property 
alleged to have been taken is averred to be of the value of $90 000, and damages $100 000.418 
Unfortunately for Mitchell, because the place where Harmony had engaged in commerce was 
already under the control the US authorities, there was no breach of US law and therefore the 
seizure of the goods was unlawful because trading in this area was in fact lawful. 
Mitchell’s defence was based in part on superior orders since he claimed that the reason 
Harmony’s goods were seized was predicated on the orders of his commander, Colonel A W 
Doniphan, who Mitchell was bound to obey. The Circuit Court had initially stated that, 
Colonel Mitchell, who executed the order, was not alone responsible; Colonel Doniphan, who 
gave the order, was also liable; they were jointly and severally responsible.419 
The Supreme Court said that this direction was in fact ‘contrary to law’ as it implied that there 
was no defence available to Mitchell—a position which the Supreme Court found difficult to 
accept in light of the possible injustice that subordinates would suffer if a superior orders 
defence could not be raised. In relation to that defence, the Supreme Court stated: 
the court is referred to the act of Congress of the 10th of April, 1806, ‘for establishing rules and 
articles for the government of the armies of the United States’, and particularly the 9th article of 
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the 1st section, which makes disobedience to the 'lawful command of his superior officer' 
punishable, at the discretion of a court-martial, with death…420 
The order was such a one as Mitchell was bound by law to obey; and it would be contradictory 
in the law to bind him to obey, and then to punish him for obeying. 
Although the case was ultimately decided on different grounds, the Court’s reference to the 
contradictory nature that accompanies unlawful orders and the lack of a defence based on those 
orders, is telling of how these matters may have been viewed by the earlier courts in the US. 
Clark v State (1866) 
The plea of superior orders was accepted as a complete defence when raised in relation to 
charges that stemmed from setting fire to a civilian’s house. The incident occurred during the 
American Civil War when a subordinate was ordered to burn down the house by his superior 
officer as part of military operations. When Clark raised the defence of superior orders, the 
Court recognised that the instruction to carry out the burning of the house was issued by his 
superior officer and the imperative that accompanies orders made it essential, as a matter of 
law, that the order be fulfilled. 
The Court provided interesting commentary on why justice would not be served if the private 
who carried out the burning of the house was guilty for following an order which he was 
obliged to obey. It emphasised the role that coercion plays in such transactions. The Court 
stated: 
The act was ordered by an officer in command, and the private could not but obey. What also did 
he dare do? He cannot stop to question the authority of his superior. Obedience or death are the 
alternatives in military government in such cases. Military government is but another name for 
an absolute despotism; the subordinate almost always acts under coercion; his acts are the acts of 
others, for which in the clear light of common sense he cannot be held answerable.421 
C. Plea of Superior Orders not available for all Offences 
United States v Bright (1809) 
Some courts have focussed on the type and nature of the offence when determining the 
availability of the plea of superior orders: the greater the severity or consequences that would 
result from executing the order, the less likely that superior orders would be available as a 
defence to such offences. One example of this reasoning can be found in the US case of United 
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subordinates should have a degree of latitude regarding individual criminal responsibility when 
acting under orders in time of war. The Court stated: 
In a state of war … great indulgence must necessarily be extended to the acts of subordinate 
officers done in obedience to their superiors. But even there the order of a superior to take the 
life of a citizen, or to invade the sanctity of his house and to deprive him of his property, would 
not shield the inferior against a charge of murder or trespass … It may … be observed that, had 
the defendants refused obedience, and had been prosecuted … they ought to have been acquitted 
upon the ground that the orders themselves had been unlawful and void.422 
Here the Court appears to be offering a distinction between the types of offences committed 
and the availability of a plea of superior orders. For offences involving murder and trespass it 
appears as though the defence of superior orders would not be available to relieve criminal 
responsibility. For other offences—left unstated—the Court mentioned that ‘great indulgence’ 
should be offered to subordinates in execution of superior orders, but such indulgence is limited 
when such orders involve murder or trespass. In these instances, the Court argued, the 
subordinate would have no protection if the order was unlawful and the order executed. 
However, the Court also indicated that, if the subordinate refused to execute the unlawful order, 
then, for reasons not entirely apparent in the judgment, such conduct should be sufficient to 
allow the subordinate to be acquitted of charges stemming from disobedience. This normative 
assertion regarding the acceptability of the subordinate to disobeying unlawful orders espoused 
by the Court is not unlike the position adopted later for military codes and other domestic 
legislation that restricts the accused from raising the plea of superior orders.423 Removing, or 
greatly limiting the ability of the accused to plead superior orders, in essence, places the 
emphasis squarely on the subordinate to question their orders in a judicious manner that, in 
effect, alters the superior–subordinate relationship—the subordinate is forced to act more as a 
lawyer than as a soldier. 
That difficulty was illustrated in the case of Riggs v State 43 Tenn. (3 Cold) 85, 91 Am. Dec. 
272 (1866) (‘Riggs’).424 In Riggs, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reiterated the long-held 
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proposition that subordinates are required to obey all orders of superior officers and that such 
orders shall not constitute a defence to any illegality committed by the subordinate in 
furtherance of those orders. It stated: 
A soldier … is bound to obey all lawful orders of his superior officers, or officers over him, and 
all he may do in obeying such lawful orders constitutes no offence as to him. But an order illegal 
in itself and not justified by the rules and usages of War, or in its substance clearly illegal, so that 
a man of ordinary sense and understanding would know as soon as he heard the order read or 
given that such order was illegal, would afford a private no protection for a crime committed 
under such order … 425 
However, the Court drew a distinction between orders that are clearly unlawful and orders that 
were less so or which were ambiguous or make it more difficult for the subordinate to 
determine the legality of the order. It stated: 
Any order given by an officer to his private, which does not expressly and clearly show in its 
face or in the body thereof its own illegality, the soldier would be bound to obey, and such order 
would be a protection to him.426 
Here the Court saw it necessary to include an assessment of the degree of clarity of the orders 
in determining whether a plea of superior orders is available. If the order was not, prima facie 
unlawful but turns out later to be so, then, according to Riggs, the subordinate should be able 
to raise the plea of superior orders as a defence to a criminal charge. 
D. Superior Orders and Case Law – WWI 
To a large degree, World War I marked a turning point in the jurisprudence surrounding 
superior orders. The plea was raised a number of times after the War and, although the rulings 
that came from each of the cases were not widely different from the decisions of previous 
decades, WWI was significant because it was one of the first occasions in which the plea of 
superior orders was addressed at international law. Up until that time, most of the questions 
involving a plea of superior orders fell within the jurisdiction of domestic courts.427 
Llandovery Castle Case 
A number of cases arising out of World War I are worthy of mention, such as those conducted 
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Reichsgericht) in 1921.428 One of the more infamous trials was the Llandovery Castle case429 
which involved a British hospital ship deliberately sunk by a German U-Boat with full 
knowledge of the status of the ship. In 1916, as part of Britain’s war with Germany, the 
Llandovery Castle was a steamship that was commissioned to carry sick and wounded—mostly 
Canadian soldiers430—from the battlefields of Europe to the safety of the British Isles. 
On 27 June 1918, the vessel was on its way back to England transporting 164 wounded, 80 
medical officers and 14 nurses. No active combatants or munitions were on board. Late on the 
evening of 27 June, the ship was struck by a German U-Boat torpedo causing it to sink in the 
Atlantic Ocean. Twenty-four people survived the attack and made it to the relative safety of 
lifeboats before the stricken vessel sank below the surface of the ocean. 
The Commander of the German U-Boat, First-Lieutenant Patzig, gave the initial order to fire 
on the Llandovery Castle even though evidence was given that he knew that to do so would be 
a violation of international law by way of the tenth Hague Convention.431 He believed, based 
on unverified evidence, that the ship was in fact carrying military personnel in the guise of a 
hospital ship and, on that basis, deemed it appropriate to breach international law and attack 
the vessel. He, therefore, knew that he would be violating international law but believed that 
such an act was consistent with his requirements in engaging enemy ships. 
Sometime after the initial attack, Patzig also ordered subordinates Dithmar and Boldt to fire on 
the survivors who had managed to climb aboard the lifeboats. Evidence adduced in Court 
pointed to Patzig going to some lengths to conceal not only the sinking of the Llandovery Castle 
but also the killing of the survivors. 
After the war, Patzig could not be found, however Dithmar and Boldt were arrested and tried 
for killing survivors in the lifeboats. In their defence, they attempted to raise superior orders as 
a justification for their part in the killings. Boldt argued that: 
Whatever part he took in the events in question, he was always under the orders of his 
commander. He says that it was not known to him that these orders contained anything for which 
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punishment would be inflicted, or that by carrying them out he rendered himself liable to 
punishment.432 
However, despite the Court finding that ‘Patzig gave the decisive order, which was carried out 
without demur in virtue of his position as commander’ and that what occurred in terms of the 
unlawful killings was indeed ‘in accordance with his orders’,433 the two accused were held 
guilty for their part in the killings. 
The Court held that there was no evidence to suggest the Llandovery Castle was engaged in 
anything other than medical activities and, therefore, was not in contravention of clause 10 of 
the Hague Conventions.434 As such, the decision to attack the vessel and later kill most of the 
survivors constituted a breach of international law. Anyone involved in such activities would 
also be in breach and subject to punishment. 
However, the Court determined that Dithmar and Boldt were guilty only as accessories since 
there was no evidence they did form an intention to kill, but acted solely on the basis they were 
following Patzig’s orders.435 It held that Patzig’s orders did not absolve them from criminal 
responsibility, even under the German Military Code.436 The Court held that knowledge that 
the accused possessed regarding the illegality associated with killing of defenceless people in 
lifeboats was such that Dithmar and Boldt not only should have questioned their orders, but 
did have an obligation to do so and ultimately ‘should have refused to obey’ the orders to fire 
upon the survivors.437 
The Court regarded superior orders to be relevant not on the matter of criminal responsibility 
but more in relation to the issue of the quantum and severity of sentencing. In relation to issue 
of punishment, the Court stated at 723 that: 
They should have certainly have refused to obey the order. This would have required a specially 
high degree of resolution. A refusal to obey the commander on a submarine would have been 
something so unusual, that it is humanly possible to understand that the accused could not bring 
themselves to disobey. That certainly does not make them innocent, as has been stated above. 
They had acquired the habit of obedience to military authority and could not rid themselves of it. 
This justifies the recognition of mitigating circumstances.438 
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The Court then sentenced the pair to be dismissed from the Navy and to imprisonment for a 
period of four years. That the Court saw fit to recognise the dilemma faced by the subordinates 
in questioning superior orders yet still be held criminally liable for the act, was consistent with 
earlier decisions across a range of legal jurisdictions. 439 Although consistent with the strict 
liability approach adopted after WWI, it was interesting that the decision was contrary to 
Oppenheim’s theory of respondeat superior liability which would have rendered both Dithmar 
and Boldt free of criminal responsibility had that rationale been applied. The respondeat 
superior theory of responsibility in relation to superior orders underwent a theoretical shift and 
as such, the decision in the Llandovery Castle case appears to be the turning point in the 
reconceptualisation of liability in regard to superior orders.440 
The Dover Castle Case 
Another case involving a plea of superior orders at the Leipzig trials was what is commonly 
known as the Dover Castle case.441 Similar to the Llandovery Castle case, the Dover Castle 
case was another incident that involved the unlawful sinking of an Allied hospital ship by a 
German U-Boat. One of the questions for the Court on whether a plea of superior orders was 
open to First Lieutenant Karl Neumann, the commander of the U-Boat who was charged with 
unlawfully killing in violation of international law.442 Specifically, Neumann was charged with 
sinking the hospital ship ‘without warning and with having sunk her with exceptional 
brutality’.443 
On 26 May 1917, Neumann spotted two British destroyers that were accompanying two 
steamers which clearly displayed the distinctive markings of military hospital ships pursuant 
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to the Hague Convention number 10.444 Neumann never disputed the fact he knew the Dover 
Castle was, or at least purported to be, a hospital ship. 
Without warning to the enemy ships, Neumann gave the order to fire a torpedo which struck 
the Dover Castle which neither sank the vessel nor caused any deaths at that time. For 
approximately one-and-a half hours the sick and the wounded were transported off the ship to 
one the destroyers that had come up alongside it. Neumann then ordered a second torpedo be 
fired at the Dover Castle which did finally sink the ship and cause the deaths of six British 
crew. 
In his defence, Neumann claimed that in firing at the ship, he was merely following orders and, 
on that basis, he should escape criminal responsibility. Neumann referred to orders that came 
from the German Admiralty that made it lawful to fire upon enemy hospital ships in certain 
circumstances. The German Admiralty believed that Britain was violating the Hague 
Conventions by transporting crew and armaments for military purposes. It stated in a 
memorandum that, 
Only such hospital ships will be protected, which fulfilled certain conditions. The hospital ships 
had to be reported at least six weeks previously and were to keep to a given course …445 
Any hospital ships that were not reported during the six week grace period were to be ‘attacked 
forthwith, excepting such only as have been expressly notified from here’.446 
Turning to the plea of superior orders, the Court reached the conclusion that the orders issued 
by the German Admiralty were lawful under international law and as such, Neumann as a 
member of the military was obliged to obey them because ‘it is a military principle that the 
subordinate is bound to obey the orders of his superiors’.447 The Court deemed it necessary to 
examine in some detail the requirements of subordinates of the German army to obey superior 
orders, but also mentioned the corresponding duty in the English army. 
It stated at 707: 
This duty of obedience is of considerable importance from the point of view of the criminal law. 
Its consequences is that, when the execution of a service order involves an offence against the 
criminal law, the superior giving the order is alone responsible. This is in accordance with the 
terms of the German law s 47, para 1 of the Military Penal Code. It also accords with the legal 
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principles of all other civilized states (see, for example, as regards England, the Manual of 
Military Law (1914), chapter XIV, Art. 443 …448 
The Court found that Neumann was obliged to follow the lawful orders of the Admiralty and, 
on that basis, he should not be subject to criminal responsibility for the sinking and killing. It 
said that Neumann could only be held accountable for the act if he went beyond his orders or 
if the orders themselves were manifestly unlawful. Given that the German Admiralty had 
provided six weeks grace until the policy would take effect, and also that Neumann himself 
waited one-and-a-half hours before firing the second torpedo, he was not guilty of the 
charges.449 
The Llandovery Castle case and the Dover Castle case show that the German Courts450 were 
willing to assess the legality and nature of the orders and make a determination of their 
lawfulness. 
III. Superior Orders under the United States and British Military Codes: 
WWI and WWII 
Prior to the commencement of WWI, the position of some nations regarding the issue of 
superior orders was very different to the position they adopted after WWII, as the next section 
explores.451 
A. United States Army – 1914 Rules of Land Warfare (RLW) 
In 1914, under the chapter Offences Committed by Armed Forces,452 the US Army’s RLW 
contained the following statement in relation to superior orders: 
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Individuals of the armed forces will not be punished for these offences in case they are committed 
under the orders or sanction of their government or commanders. The commanders ordering the 
commission of such acts, or under whose authority they are committed by their troops, may be 
punished by the belligerent into whose hands they may fall. 453 
The US position was clearly representative of the immunity that was to be afforded to soldiers 
from criminal responsibility so long as there was some evidence that the acts were committed 
pursuant to ‘orders or sanction of their government or commanders’. This position was in line 
with Oppenheim’s earlier position in 1906 that provided for a complete defence to what would 
otherwise have been criminal conduct if one was acting under obedience to superior orders.454 
Furthermore, this rule not only provided the defence of superior orders, and thereby absolving 
of liability the subordinate, it operated to punish those who issued the orders in the first 
instance. Nowhere in this rule is the issue of mens rea addressed and it is unclear whether the 
court would need to assess whether the accused in fact believed or knew the orders were lawful. 
The rule contains no requirement that the order must be unlawful for a plea of superior orders 
to apply. All that appears necessary is that the accused committed the offending acts under the 
‘orders or sanction of their government or commanders’. 
B. United Kingdom – 1914 Manual of Military Law (MML) 
At the same time, Britain adopted an interpretation not unlike the US position in relation to 
superior orders. Chapter XIV of the British MML deals with the Laws and Usages of War on 
Land. In relation to superior orders, it states: 
members of the armed forces who commit such violations of the recognised rules of warfare as 
are ordered by their Government or by their commander are not war criminals and cannot 
therefore be punished by the enemy. He may punish the officials or commanders responsible for 
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such order if they fall into his hands, but otherwise he many only resort to other means of redress 
which are dealt with in this chapter.455 
Although differing slightly from the US position, the overall intent of paragraph 443 of the 
British MML is almost identical to that of the US RLW. The plea of superior orders is provided 
for in the sense that there was prima facie an assumption that the person was ‘not a war 
criminal’ and could not ‘be punished by the enemy’ so long as the orders were given by the 
person’s government or commander. 
Similar to the US position, liability rested with those who issued the orders. No mention of 
mens rea is given in this provision and there was no requirement that the person either knew 
or understood that the orders were lawful. 
C. Superior Orders – US and British Military Codes between the Wars 
Towards the conclusion of WWII, the position that individual states adopted in relation to 
superior orders was markedly different to that taken by the US and Britain at the time of 
WWI.456 By the end of WWII, both the US and Britain had changed their position on the matter 
of superior orders and those changes were represented in amendments to their respective 
military codes. The UNWCC stated that the main impetus for change was because earlier 
versions of the codes in relation to superior orders were now at odds with both ‘the principle 
proclaimed by the 1919 Commission on Responsibilities and with the corresponding principles 
of English and Constitutional Law’.457 No doubt there was a different view of superior orders 
after WWI than there had been at the time the US and British Codes were drafted, due to the 
fact that maintaining the same position as promulgated in 1914 would allow many Germans to 
escape liability for possible war crimes committed against British and Allied forces. 
In light of that perception, the British MML was comprehensively amended in 1944. At 
paragraph 443, it stated: 
The fact that a rule of warfare has been violated in pursuance of an order of the belligerent 
Government or of an individual belligerent commander does not deprive the act in question of 
its character as a war crime; neither does it in principle, confer upon the perpetrator immunity 
from punishment by the injured belligerent. Undoubtedly, a court confronted with the plea of 
superior orders adduced in justification of a war crime is bound to take into consideration the fact 
that the obedience to military orders, not obviously unlawful, is the duty of every member of the 
armed forces, and that the latter cannot, in conditions of war discipline, be expected to weigh 
scrupulously the legal merits of the order received. The question, however, is governed by the 
major principle that members of the armed forces are bound to obey lawful orders only and that 
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they cannot therefore escape liability if, in obedience to a command, they commit acts which 
both violate unchallenged rules of warfare and outrage the general sentiment of humanity.458 
Also reflecting changed perceptions of superior orders, the amended US RLW stated the rule 
more succinctly: 
Individuals and organisations who violate the accepted laws and customs of war may be punished 
therefore. However, the fact that the acts complained of were done pursuant to order of a superior 
or government sanction may be taken into consideration in determining culpability, either by way 
of defence or in mitigation of punishment. The person giving such orders may also be 
punished.459 
Both Codes, as amended at the end of WWII, represent a significant departure from the earlier 
Codes in relation to a plea of superior orders. The UNWCC stated that one significant point of 
difference between the 1914 British MML and the 1944 amended version, is the addition of the 
phrase, ‘cannot be expected to weigh scrupulously the legal merits of the order received’. The 
argument made by the UNWCC is that the wording of that provision gives rise to the 
emergence of the mens rea, or subjective element.460 It is not entirely clear how this addition 
creates a subjective element and the UNWCC failed to clearly articulate its position on this 
point. In fact, a different interpretation of that passage could actually indicate the absence of 
any need to consider the subjective beliefs of the accused in committing the act, as the statement 
appears to reduce the need of the accused to consider the orders at all. 
On the other hand, in support of the UNWCC’s assertion, if ‘weigh scrupulously’ connotes the 
degree or the extent to which a soldier must assess the order before the order is carried out, 
then such an interpretation could lend some support to the UNWCC’s analysis. In other words, 
a court would need to make a determination of the extent to which the accused weighed 
‘scrupulously’ the lawfulness of those orders before carrying them out. 
The phrase contained in paragraph 443 of the British MML that does not appear to give any 
support to the existence of mens rea can be found in the last sentence of that paragraph which 
creates liability for an accused who, ‘in obedience to a command, they commit acts which both 
violate unchallenged rules of warfare and outrage the general sentiment of humanity’.461 All 
that appears necessary to dismiss the applicability of the plea of superior orders is an objective 
assessment as to the physical nature of the offence. Once it is established that the acts for which 
the accused seeks to raise a plea of superior orders were in contravention of ‘the general 
sentiment of humanity’, nothing is required to establish the subjective attributes of the accused 
in committing those acts. 
 
 







IV. Other Domestic Laws/ Regulations 
As the UNWCC points out, the stance in relation to superior orders adopted by both the British 
and the US, appears to a large extent mirrored in the military codes and other regulations of 
numerous Allied nations in Europe and around the world, albeit with some interesting 
exceptions.462 For example, nations such as Canada, France, Norway, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
the Netherlands and Australia each had adopted similar provisions that operated to restrict the 
plea of superior orders so that such regulations would mitigate the harshness of the sentence as 
opposed to offering complete relief from criminal responsibility. This common theme, 
however, was not entirely adopted throughout and there were some exceptions, such as 
Norway, that seemed to allow greater flexibility—to the extent of providing relief from 
criminal responsibility. Examples of some of the various domestic provisions dealing with a 
plea of superior orders will now be discussed.463 
(a) Canada – Canadian War Crimes Regulations 1945 (‘CWCR’) 
[15] The fact that an accused acted pursuant to the order of a superior or of his Government shall 
not constitute an absolute defence to any charge under these Regulations; it may, however, be 
considered either as a defence or in mitigation of punishment if the military court before which 
the charge is tried determines that justice so requires. 
While not a complete defence, the Canadian provision arguably left open the possibility for an 
accused to seek—in addition to mitigation of sentence—to have the charges downgraded to a 
lesser charge, or alternatively, some other reduction in punishment. This possibility arose due 
to the fact the provision excluded an ‘absolute defence’ which signalled the possibility of a 
defence that was less than ‘absolute’; that is, some form of a partial defence. Therefore, one 
could argue that while the plea of superior orders was insufficient to remove liability from the 
accused completely, there was the possibility that superior orders would lead to a different 
charge, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case. 
A second reason why the drafting of this provision might have provided something in addition 
to mitigation of sentence, is the inclusion of conjunctive terms ‘either’ and ‘or’ which have the 
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effect of offering possibilities in relation to punishment. For instance, consider the two 
sentences: 
(a) ‘(superior orders) shall not constitute an absolute defence’; and 
(b) ‘it (superior orders) may be considered either as a defence or mitigation of punishment’. 
That the drafters sought to include these terms in this form, strongly suggests the Canadians 
wanted to give their courts the opportunity to consider handing down some alternative sentence 
or to have a degree of flexibility in addition to a reduced sentence. Whether this was an error 
in drafting or whether the intention was to allow the accused to have some other defence, it is 
arguable from a statutory interpretation perspective, that those who were charged pursuant to 
the CWCR would have had in their defence, slightly better prospects than those charged under 
the regulations of various other countries. 
A further point is that the Canadian provision makes it clear that the decision to recognise, or 
not, the influence of superior orders in the commission of the crime, is determined by the 
relevant military court, and the test to be used when deciding whether to allow superior orders 
to influence the court’s final decision is if ‘justice so requires’. In other words, it is up to the 
individual court to make a subjective assessment of the circumstances surrounding the charge 
and the relevance of superior orders within that context. In determining if ‘justice so requires’, 
presumably, consideration would be given to a range of factors, such as: the nature of the order 
and whether the order was clearly unlawful; the nature and severity of the offence; the 
individual circumstances of the accused; and the origins of the order, among others. The 
subjective nature of making this assessment, however, could have led to an inconsistent 
application of these principles across the various courts, and would have, no doubt, been a 
cause for some concern on the part of the defence. 
(b) France – Ordinance of the Suppression of War Crimes 1944 (‘OSWC’) 
Article 3: Laws, decrees or regulations issued by the enemy authorities, orders or permits issued 
by these authorities, or by authorities which are or have been subordinated to them, cannot be 
pleaded as justification within the meaning of Article 3327 of the penal code, but can only, in 
certain circumstances, be admitted as extenuating or exculpating circumstances. 
Article 4: Where a subordinate is prosecuted as the actual perpetrator of a war crime, and his 
superiors cannot be indicted as accomplices, they shall be considered as accessories in so far as 
they have organised or tolerated the criminal acts of their subordinates. 
Article 3 of the OSWC makes it clear that orders of ‘enemy authorities’ cannot be used to justify 
criminal conduct but can only, ‘in certain circumstances’ be used as ‘extenuating or exculpating 
circumstances’. The wording of Article 3 raises several questions and perhaps, some concerns. 
First, the use of ambiguous language with the phrase, ‘in certain circumstances’, leaves open 
the possibility of inconsistent application of superior orders. Some courts may be more inclined 




A second question relates to whether the court’s acceptance of superior orders in relation to the 
criminal conduct, could result in a full acquittal, given the use of the word, ‘exculpating’, which 
itself implies some alleviation of guilt. Whether this would mean full exculpation is doubtful. 
(c) Norway – Law on the Punishment of Foreign War Criminals 1946 (‘LPFWC’) 
[5] Necessity and superior order cannot be pleaded in exculpation of any crime referred to in 
para. 1 of the present law. The court may, however, take the circumstances into account and may 
impose a sentence less than the minimum laid down for the crime in question or may impose a 
milder form of punishment. In particularly extenuating circumstances the punishment may be 
entirely remitted. 
Interestingly, ‘necessity’ and ‘superior orders’ under the Norwegian provision were grouped 
together in the same section so that the rationale that applied to superior orders, applied equally 
to necessity. Similar to the French and Canadian provisions, there is some ambiguity associated 
with what punishment the Norwegian courts could actually have handed down. This ambiguity 
relates to the fact that the court, ‘may impose a sentence less than the minimum … for the 
crime or may impose a milder form of punishment’. 
Additionally, however, in going further than any of the previous examples, the Norwegian 
provision clearly indicated that superior orders (and necessity) could lead to a sentence where 
the ‘punishment is entirely remitted’ which would enable the accused to escape punishment 
altogether. Such a provision, while not entirely exonerating the accused from criminal 
responsibility, indicates Norway’s view of superior orders was similar to the earlier positions 
of the US and Britain prior to WWI. 
(d) Czechoslovakia – Law Concerning the Punishment of Nazi Criminals, Traitors and 
their Accomplices 1946 (‘LCP’) 
 
 Article 13: 
(1) Actions punishable under this law are not justified by the fact that they were ordered or 
permitted by the provision of any law other than Czechoslovak law or by organs set up 
by any state authority … 
(2) Nor is the guilty person justified by the fact that he was carrying out his prescribed duty 
if he behaved with especial zeal, … 
(3) The irresistible compulsion of an order from his superior does not release any person 
from guilt who voluntarily became a member of an organisation whose members 
undertook to carry out all, even some criminal orders. 
The Norwegian stance on the use of superior orders as a defence to war crimes was in stark 
contrast to that of Czechoslovakia. Unambiguous language indicated there would be no 
justification of war crimes on the basis of superior orders. 
The Czechoslovakian provision at Article 13(3) removed, without doubt, the use of superior 




carried out criminal orders. Given the title of the regulations, presumably the organisation most 
at the forefront of drafters’ minds was the German Armed Forces. 
(e) Poland – Decree Concerning the Punishment of Fascist-Hitlerite Criminals Guilty of 
Murder and Ill-treatment of the Civilian Population and of Prisoners of War, and the 
Punishment of Traitors to the Polish Nation 1946 
Article 5: 
(1) The fact that an act or omission was caused by a threat, order or command does not 
exempt from criminal responsibility. 
(2) In such a case the court may mitigate the sentence taking into consideration the 
circumstances of the perpetrator and the deed. 
Poland was another nation that made its position quite clear in relation to superior orders. 
According to the Polish provisions contained in Article 5, superior orders would not absolve 
criminal responsibility but in certain circumstances may be used to ‘mitigate the sentence’. 
Similar to the provisions contained in the rules of other nations, there is no indication as to 
what ‘circumstances’ a court could or should apply when making an assessment of the 
suitability of superior orders, other than ‘consideration of the circumstances of the perpetrator 
and the deed’. The emphasis was placed on the accused and the act which attracted the criminal 
charge. 
(f) Austria – Constitutional Law 1945 (War Crimes and other National Socialist Misdeeds) 
(‘WCNSM’) 
Article 1: The fact that the same act was committed in obedience to an order shall not constitute 
a defence. 
Austria adopted an even more strict approach to superior orders in that it not only prohibited 
the plea of superior orders being raised to a charge of war crimes, it also prohibited the plea as 
a means to mitigate the sentence. 
(g) The Netherlands – Penal Law Decree 1947 (‘PLD’) 
1. He who during the time of the present war and while in the forces or service of the enemy 
State is guilty of a war crime or any crime against humanity as defined in Article 6 under 
(b) or (c) of the Charter belonging to the London Agreement of 8th August 1945 … shall, 
if such crime contains at the same time the elements of a punishable act according to 
Netherlands law, receive the punishment laid down for such act. 
To be read in conjunction with: 
Dutch Penal Code 1943 (‘DPC’) 
Article 43: Not punishable is he who commits an act in the execution of an official 




An official order given without competent [sic] thereto does not remove the liability to 
punishment unless it was regarded by the subordinate in all good faith as having been 
competently [sic] and obeying it came within his province as a subordinate. 
The Netherlands regulated superior orders under its own penal system. This is because it did 
not wish to depart from what it regarded as the efficiency and functionality of the existing 
Dutch legal system.464 The Dutch, therefore, tied war crimes and any defences to those crimes 
to the established laws of the Netherlands. At the time, the existing laws of the Netherlands in 
relation to superior orders were similar to the positions taken by the US and Britain prior to 
WWI and as such, a subordinate could escape criminal liability on a plea of superior orders.465 
This was tempered, however, by the fact that the order which led to the commission of the 
offence by the subordinate, was ‘given [to] him by the competent authority’ pursuant to Article 
43 of the DPC. On that basis, the plea of superior orders could have been greatly restricted had 
the orders been issued by an authority not acting with proper authority. 
(h) Australia – War Crimes Act 1945 (Cth) (‘WCA’) 
Section 16: Subject to subsections 6(2) and 13(2), the fact that, in doing an act alleged to be an 
offence against this Act, a person acted under orders of his or her government or of a superior is 
not a defence in a proceeding for the offence, but may, if the person is convicted of the offence, 
be taken into account in determining the proper sentence. 
In response to war crimes committed against Australian forces operating in various theatres 
of war against Germany and its Allies, Australia took a similar approach to other countries 
under which the plea of superior orders could not absolve criminal responsibility 
completely, but could be used as a mitigating factor in determining the proper sentence. No 
further guidance is offered as to what is a ‘proper’ sentence and it can only be presumed 
that the individual court would have had overall discretion in reaching a determination of 
what was ‘proper’. 
V. United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Plea of 
Superior Orders – A Manifestation of the Will of the Victorious Allies 
At the conclusion of WWII, the UNWCC published its seminal works on the history of the 
Commission and the development of the laws of war.466 Chapter X of the UNWCC’s report, 
inter alia, details the difficult issues that had hitherto arisen from a plea of superior orders.467 
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The UNWCC acknowledged that prior to WWII, there was not a clear understanding and 
application of the plea of superior orders, and quite often, 
[superior orders] has been given differing legal solutions from one country to another, and until 
recently there were in the matter no fixed or precise rulings of principle in international law. In 
legal systems of certain countries there were even reversals of provisions dealing with the issue 
in the course of a comparatively brief period of time.468 
Such confusion, as Dinstein points out, is reflected in the conceptual evolution of the various 
positions regarding the legitimacy of superior orders espoused by two eminent legal theorists—
Lassa Oppenheim in 1906 and Hersch Lauterpacht in 1944 (and later further revised in 
1952).469 The UNWCC was acutely aware of the differing positions held by member states 
regarding the application of superior orders. The Commission was especially cognisant of the 
dilemma that might have arisen if immunity from prosecution for ‘state administrators’ and a 
corresponding immunity for subordinates was granted—an outcome that, perversely, would 
have operated to ensure no one was accountable for crimes committed in war.470 This would 
have been a most unpalatable outcome for the victorious Allies given so many lives had been 
lost and so much had been invested to defeat Germany and Japan, and their Allies. This 
undesirable consequence was presented by Robert H Jackson, US Chief Prosecutor at 
Nuremberg as ‘an area of official irresponsibility’.471 
The Czechoslovakian representative to the UNWCC in January 1944 (Dr Ecer) identified that 
superior orders deserved ‘early attention’ by the Commission to provide clarity in future war 
crimes trials.472 In response, the Commission established the Legal Committee and later a sub-
committee that attempted to articulate the Commission’s position on the plea of superior orders, 
thereby ‘insuring the application of the same rule by all courts charged with the trial of war 
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criminals’.473 In working towards providing a clear position on superior orders, the United 
States provided a draft submission and recommended, pursuant to Article 30 of the draft: 
1. The plea of superior orders shall not constitute a defence … if the order was so manifestly 
contrary to the laws of war that a person of ordinary sense and understanding would 
know or should know, given his rank or position and the circumstances of the case, that 
such an order was illegal. 
2. It shall be for the Tribunal and its Divisions to consider to what extent irresistible 
compulsion shall be a ground for mitigation of the penalty or for acquittal.474 
Despite what the draft aimed to achieve, the UNWCC later agreed with a separate report by Dr 
Yien-Li Liang (legal scholar and the Chinese representative), that, in the face of the complexity 
and diversity of domestic laws, it would be ‘futile to attempt to formulate, by means of an 
agreement among the United Nations, an absolute rule in regard to the plea of superior 
orders’.475 To overcome this hurdle, Liang suggested the Commission ‘could recommend some 
guiding principle which, without trying to reconcile the divergent national practices and to 
formulate an absolute rule, would represent the consensus of opinion among the United 
Nations’.476 Given that pretext, the Legal Committee then submitted a report that made the 
following recommendation in regard to superior orders: 
The Commission is satisfied that the following rule is in accordance with general international 
practice and is consistent with international law: 
The Defence of obedience to superior orders shall not constitute a justification for the 
commission of an offence against the laws and customs of war, if the order was so manifestly 
contrary to those laws or customs that, taking into account his rank or position and the 
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, an individual or ordinary 
understanding should have known that such an order was illegal.477 
The draft submission on the principles of superior orders, while acknowledging that there 
should be no justification for the commission of an offence merely for obeying orders, 
recognised that courts could consider the nature of the order, and importantly, also take into 
consideration the rank or position of the individual and the circumstances in which the offence 
occurred. Whether the individual would have known that the ‘order was so manifestly contrary’ 
to laws or customs, should be determined objectively on the basis of an individual of ‘ordinary 
understanding’. The outcome of this principle, if adopted, could in theory allow a lower ranking 
member of the military to argue that, when assessed objectively, were they not in a position to 
know that certain orders were illegal or ‘manifestly contrary’ to laws or customs. The level of 




474 Draft Convention on the Trial and Punishment of War Criminals, cited in UNWCC History, 278. 
475 Yien-Li Liang, Report on the Plea of Superior Orders, cited in UNWCC History 278–9. 
476 Ibid 278. 




that basis, many of the perpetrators of war crimes might escape criminal sanction. These 
concerns were raised by the Czechoslovakian representative on the basis that the strength of 
existing laws in some Allied nations was stronger than the proposed recommendation, and 
furthermore, if the recommendation was adopted, individuals belonging to the SS or Gestapo 
would be in a more favourable position than they would have been had they been subjected to 
the domestic law of some Allied nations.478 
As a result of this concern, an alternative proposition was submitted that excluded members of 
‘an organisation [the membership of] which implied the execution of criminal orders’,479 
thereby quelling the possibility of individuals from organisations such as the SS or Gestapo 
escaping liability. Despite the inclusion of this provision, the submission was ultimately 
rejected. Instead, the Commission opted for a declaration stating that, 
it is better to leave it to the court itself in each case to decide what weight should be attached to 
a plea of superior orders. But the Commission wants to make it clear that its members 
unanimously agree that in principle this plea does not of itself exonerate the offenders.480 
This was not the ideal outcome the Commission had hoped for, and in substance, it did nothing 
to address the inconsistent application of superior orders by member states that the Commission 
originally aimed to rectify. After the Czech and French representatives attempted to reopen the 
question in March 1945, the Commission confirmed its position in a report. In that report, the 
Commission stated: 
Having regard to the fact that many, if not most, of the member States have legal rules on the 
subject, some of which have been adopted very recently, and that in most cases these rules differ 
from one another, and to the further consideration that the question how far obedience to the 
orders of a superior exonerates an offender or mitigates the punishment must depend on the 
circumstances of the particular case, the Commission does not consider that it can usefully 
propound any principle or rule. 
The Commission unanimously maintains the view which it expressed in connection with the 
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of a superior does not of itself relieve a person who has committed a war crime from 
responsibility.481 
Whether the Commission’s failure to reach a definitive position on the plea of superior orders 
was because member nations could not agree on a suitable form of words that would be 
acceptable to all, and therefore in accordance with their own domestic laws, or whether it was 
due to the jurisprudential complexity of issues involved with superior orders, is uncertain. The 
consequence, however, was the uncertainty about how each of the prosecuting nations would 
approach the plea of superior orders once the trials of German and Japanese individuals accused 
of war crimes commenced. The rules that each of the Allies in the prosecution adopted were 
often based on the domestic rules contained in that nation’s military rules. 
VI. Superior Orders and the Nuremberg Trials 
The Nuremberg trials set the tone for much of the subsequent treatment of the law in relation 
to superior orders not only in Nuremberg, but also for the Tokyo trials and the subsequent trials 
throughout the Pacific. Article 8 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (the 
‘Charter’) provided that: 
The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not 
free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal 
determines that justice so requires.482 
It was clear from the drafting of Article 8 that the accused would not escape criminal 
responsibility but could, providing they satisfy the necessary evidentiary burden, use the plea 
of superior orders as a factor in mitigation.483 
One interesting fact that Dinstein points out is that, prior to the promulgation of the Nuremberg 
Charter, Robert H Jackson, the Chief Prosecutor for United States, had previously expressed 
in a report to the US President, ‘that a soldier in a firing-squad is entitled to impunity’.484 
Jackson expressed a similar sentiment in his opening speech when he hinted that the effect of 
the Charter in relation to the obedience of superior orders did not operate to completely 
disregard the presence of superior orders. He said, 
Of course, we do not argue that the circumstances under which one commits an act should be 
disregarded in judging its legal effect. A conscripted private on a firing squad cannot expect to 
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hold an inquest on the validity of the execution. The Charter implies common sense limits to 
liability just as it places common sense limits upon impunity.485 
The implication of Jackson’s statement was that under certain circumstances ‘common sense’ 
would dictate that an accused who acted under the obedience of superior orders could escape 
criminal liability. This sentiment was not accepted by other senior Allied prosecution figures 
in the trials and Jackson himself seemed to depart from his earlier remarks in his closing speech 
when he dismissed the applicability of superior orders on the basis that, despite Hitler being 
the ‘chief villain’, those below him were not acting completely under superior orders, but were 
in positions themselves to control the information on which Hitler based many of his policies 
and orders. As Jackson pointed out, Hitler was ‘always in their hands’.486 
Other senior Allied prosecution figures were more equivocal in their disregard for the 
obedience to superior orders. For instance, Sir Hartley Shawcross, chief prosecutor for the 
United Kingdom, made it very clear in his closing address that there was no rule under 
international law that provided immunity for those who obey orders which are ‘manifestly 
contrary to the very law of nature from which international law has grown’.487 Similarly, the 
French chief prosecutor, M De Menthon followed suit when he stated that ‘orders from a 
superior do not exonerate the agent of a manifest crime from responsibility’.488 A very similar 
sentiment was expressed by the Soviet chief prosecutor, General Rudenko, when he said that 
the authors of the Charter were very aware that many defendants ‘would hide behind Hitler’s 
orders’ and this was the reason the Allies specifically included in the Charter a ‘special proviso 
to the effect that the execution of an obviously criminal order does not exonerate one from 
criminal responsibility’. 489  Dinstein asserts that such sentiments were a reflection of the 
manifest illegality principle.490 
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VII. Superior Orders and the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East 
By the time superior orders started being claimed by the defence at the IMTFE, the legal status 
of the doctrine of superior orders appeared relatively settled. Consequently, although superior 
orders was raised on several occasions throughout the trial, it was clear the Tribunal had little 
time for the plea as an excuse to criminal responsibility. 
An enduring problem that most of the accused experienced in raising the plea of superior 
orders, was the fact there were very few (if any) superiors above them whom they could 
attribute responsibility.491 Most of the accused had attained the highest positions within the 
government and military which made it extremely difficult to attribute responsibility to 
superiors. As Boister and Cryer correctly point out, if the accused wished to raise the plea of 
superior orders then it would have been made in relation to the Emperor 492 —no doubt 
something that would not have been seriously contemplated, even though they were on trial for 
their lives. 
In any event, Article 6 of the IMTFE Charter was drafted in such a way that it removed the 
possibility of raising the defence of superior orders, so any hope of attributing responsibility to 
a superior was unlikely. In relation to the ‘responsibility of the accused’, Article 6 stated, 
Neither the official position, at any time, of an accused, nor the fact that an accused acted pursuant 
to order of his government or of a superior shall, of itself, be sufficient to free such accused from 
responsibility for any crime with which he is charged, but such circumstances may be considered 
in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.493 
Article 6 was drafted in much the same way as Article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter, however, 
some have criticised its narrow application.494 Boister and Cryer cite, and appear to agree with, 
Dinstein’s argument, that the Tokyo Charter provided a greater degree of flexibility than did 
the Nuremberg Charter, because the wording of the latter expressly stated that ‘orders “shall 
not free … [a defendant] … from responsibility”’.495 The Tokyo Charter did not contain these 
words and, arguably, could allow an accused to escape criminal liability altogether by raising 
a defence of superior orders. Given that the decisions from Nuremberg did not allow the 
obedience to superior orders as a factor to escape criminal responsibility, it is hardly surprising 
that the Tokyo Tribunal followed suit. 
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Whatever flexibility was available to the Tribunal in this regard was neither recognised nor 
accepted by those who sat on the Tribunal and consequently, the plea of superior orders at the 






SUPERIOR ORDERS AND THE US ARMY TRIALS, MANILA 
I. Introduction 
Notably absent from much of the literature dealing with superior orders is scholarship relating 
to the Asia–Pacific trials of Japanese war criminals that were conducted in the aftermath of the 
Pacific War.496  As Solis points out, given that the defence of superior orders was raised 
repeatedly throughout the war crimes trials in the Asia–Pacific, it is curious that so little has 
been written on the topic.497 Had scholars delved more deeply into the US trial records, there 
would undoubtedly be some remarkable insights into the jurisprudence regarding the plea of 
superior orders. The aim of this chapter is to fill this void by providing a window into the US 
trials conducted in Manila. 
How US tribunals were to deal with the issue of superior orders if it was raised as a defence 
was addressed by the Supreme Commander for the Allies in the Pacific (‘SCAP’) by way of 
regulations introduced on 5 December 1945. 498  Although SCAP’s directions as to how 
tribunals should approach the superior orders plea seemed clear enough, the directions seemed 
to be at odds with various other legal interpretations that existed at the time. As Robert L Ward 
pointed out in 1946, there was strong legal argument to suggest the jurisprudence of superior 
orders, as understood at the time, was in fact good law for a complete defence to criminal 
responsibility under certain conditions.499 
As evidenced by the various legal interpretations prior to WWII, the plea might have been 
applied as a complete defence and not, as SCAP determined later, a factor in mitigating the 
sentence. Had SCAP not intervened by adopting such a stern position, the present 
understanding of superior orders may have been different. 
If one single pattern emerged from the cases surveyed in this thesis, it would be that superior 
orders was generally less accepted in mitigation in those trials in which the victims were US 
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military personnel, as opposed to Filipino civilians. However, this was not always the case and, 
as shown in the trials of 2nd Lieutenant Otsuka, First Lieutenant Toyota and the joint trials of 
1st Class Petty Officer Hayashi and 2nd Class Petty Officer Tanaka, for example, the plea of 
superior orders was accepted where clear evidence showed that the accused either: unwillingly 
participated in the unlawful killing; derived no pleasure from performing the unlawful orders; 
or it was clear that the orders to kill came from senior officers and were not prima facie 
unlawful. 
In other cases, the plea of superior orders was successful in a number of clemency cases which 
commuted the death penalty to a sentence of incarceration, as was the case in the trial of Petty 
Officer Suguwara Isaburo in which it was accepted that the accused, inter alia: acted under 
obedience to superior officers; had little contact with the victims prior to the execution; had no 
command discretion; had no knowledge of the rules of war; and had no ill will towards the 
victims.500 
These cases were, however, the exception rather than the norm. More often than not, tribunals 
were reluctant to accept the plea of superior orders even in mitigation of sentence. A common 
example of this was if the accused was a member of the Kenpeitai and/ or was alleged to have 
committed acts of cruelty against prisoners of war, as in the case of Warrant Officer Shin 
Fusataro of the Kenpeitai. 
With reference to relevant cases and other sources that touched on the issue of superior orders 
in the Philippine trials, this chapter provides a portal into the way various trials tackled difficult 
questions that arose when an accused sought to use superior orders as a defence to charges of 
war crimes. The primary question this seeks to answer is, how did the US trials in the 
Philippines grapple with the ethical dilemma associated with maintaining a fair trial on the one 
hand, while ensuring those who were responsible for committing cruel and inhumane acts 
against US servicemen and Philippine civilians were adequately punished? 
II. SCAP’s Interpretation of Superior Orders 
Not long after the US commenced the trials in the Philippines, it became clear the prosecution 
was extremely reluctant to accept the validity of the plea of superior orders at international 
law.501 However, ruling the plea was invalid was not as straightforward as the prosecution 
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perhaps would have liked and it was clear the issue was troubling senior US prosecutors in the 
lead-up to the trials. In response to this, in December 1945, General Douglas MacArthur 
introduced an amendment into the US Field Manual that had the effect of altering the 
availability and effect of the defence of superior orders. SCAP amended the US Field Manual 
by inserting Paragraph 5d(6) that stated: 
The official position of the accused shall not absolve him from responsibility, nor be considered 
in mitigation of punishment. Further, action pursuant to order of the accused’s superior, or of his 
government, shall not constitute a defense, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if 
the commission determines that justice so requires.502 
In one series of exchanges between November 1946 and January 1947 involving the Chief of 
the SCAP Legal Section, Colonel Alva Carpenter, and US Defense Counsel, Robert L Ward, 
the matter was finally referred to General Douglas MacArthur’s office for clarification.503 
Prior to that, Defense Counsel Ward, by way of a Motion during the trial of an accused Japanese 
war criminal, Nanjo Masao, whom he was defending,504 submitted that the plea of superior 
orders was good law and, therefore, should be a complete defence at international law. This 
was contrary to the views of the US Legal Section which took the line that superior orders 
could only mitigate the sentence and have no effect on criminal responsibility. 505  Ward 
nonetheless cited a range of sources as authority for his argument. According to Ward, that 
argument was premised on strong legal grounds, such as: the US Rules of Land Warfare Basic 
Field Manual (FM27-10, paragraph 345.1); the writings of reputable publicists Oppenheim and 
Wheaton; a report by Robert Jackson to the US President; a statement by President Roosevelt; 
and several leading cases that upheld the view that obedience to superior orders constituted a 
defense under both US and international law.506 Several of these authorities are worthy of 
closer consideration to assess the strength of his argument. 
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A. US Basic Field Manual 27-10 ‘Rules of Law Warfare’ paragraph 345.1 
Ward cited the Basic Field Manual 27-10 of the US War Department entitled, Rules of Land 
Warfare (RLW) as amended 1 November 1944. According to Ward, the RLW made it 
‘mandatory that superior orders be considered a complete defense’.507 Paragraph 345.1 of the 
RLW stated: 
Individuals and organizations who violate the accepted laws and customs of war may be punished 
therefore. However, the fact that the acts complained of were done pursuant to order of a superior 
or government sanction may be taken into consideration in determining culpability, either by way 
of defense or in mitigation of punishment. The person giving such orders may also be punished.508 
Ward asserted that SCAP’s rule ‘governing the trial of war criminals’ dated 5 December 1945 
contradicted superior orders as contained in FM27-10 paragraph 345.1. By way of objection, 
Ward challenged SCAP’s assertion in the 5 December regulations that orders of an accused’s 
superior, or of his government ‘shall not constitute a defense, but may be considered in 
mitigation in punishment’.509 Ward contended that this position was illegal and contrary to the 
laws and customs of war and asserted that the correct position, at law, to the obedience of 
superior orders was, 
a defence unless the accused knew the order to be illegal, or, if the order was in fact unlawful, he 
had reasonable grounds to believe that it violated the laws and customs of war, or the principles 
of criminal law generally prevailing in civilized nations.510 
According to Ward, there could be little doubt that he was on strong legal grounds in relation 
to the existence of superior orders at US military law and at international law. In support of his 
position, he offered several case authorities and the published works of international 
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allegedly supported superior orders as a complete defence ‘or’ mitigation of sentence, the fact 
that the Legal Section continued to deny the existence of the defence is perhaps telling about 
the way legal questions such as these were addressed throughout the trials. Some might even 
reach the conclusion that the prosecution were operating so as to appear wilfully blind to the 
existence of legal authority that would have required them to consider the extent of criminal 
responsibility of an accused. 
For its part, the Legal Section disregarded Ward’s legal interpretation and reiterated that its 
position in relation to the status of superior orders was in accordance with the regulation of 5 
December 1946 promulgated by General Douglas MacArthur. Internally, however, the Legal 
Section was far from satisfied in regard to the legality of its position in light of the clear and 
unambiguous language expressed in FM27-10, paragraph 345.1. That confusion was borne out 
in an internal memo dated 19 December 1946 from J Bassin of the Law Division to Colonel 
Carpenter of SCAP Legal. Bassin shared with Carpenter an extraordinary admission in regard 
to the possible error of SCAP’s rule with respect to the plea of superior orders.512 Bassin clearly 
declared in the memo that, 
my problem at the time was to justify the denial of a new trial to Ward’s client, as well as justify 
to you the recommendation of the present rules to conform with paragraph 345.1. This I have not 
been able to do to my satisfaction. [It] is true that paragraph 345.1 can be interpreted to mean 
that the War Department instructed MacArthur to provide both the defense of superior orders and 
to provide that it be considered a mitigation of punishment.513 
Bassin went on to state that, ‘[i]n brief, this is my problem; How can we recommend that 
Ward’s client not be given a new trial … and still recommend that paragraph 345.1 be adopted 
in to the rules’.514 The admission that SCAP’s rule of 5 December 1946 contradicted FM27-10 
was prejudicial against any accused who raised superior orders as a defence to war crimes. 
Bassin was clearly troubled by this unfortunate legal dilemma—not so much it seems for 
reasons of injustice against an accused, but because of the possible embarrassment for the Legal 
Section and SCAP if word got out amongst defence teams that incorrect law had applied 
throughout the US trials. By this time, the US and Allied trials were well underway and an 
admission by the US in relation to the wrongful denial of a defence could lead to an inordinate 
number of retrials, and potentially completely alter the direction of the entire US and Allied 
proceedings. The ramifications of such an outcome would be unthinkable, particularly since 
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The sensitivity regarding the quandary in which the Legal Section found itself was no small 
matter. Potentially, the wrongful denial of the existence of superior orders at such a pivotal 
juncture in the formation of international law could have had lasting consequences for the 
validity of the trials in terms of their legitimacy. This dilemma was not lost on Bassin which is 
no doubt why he opted to appraise his superior in the first instance rather than burden General 
MacArthur with such a dilemma. Bassin, not surprisingly, handed the unenviable responsibility 
of informing MacArthur of the issue to Carpenter when he concluded his memo by stating: 
I have not incorporated these views of mine in the memorandum to MacArthur, although we may 
attach them as your memo for the record, in proper form if you so desire, and submit them as an 
annex to the memorandum for the C. in C.515 
Noting the importance of the legal advice he received from Bassin, Carpenter in his memo to 
MacArthur devised a solution to SCAP’s seemingly embarrassing problem that could be both 
an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the plea of superior orders, but also a clarification of 
the legal effect for an accused who successfully raised the plea. Carpenter provided MacArthur 
with a logical compromise when he advised a course of action that acknowledged superior 
orders as a valid defence but, at the same time, would not absolve the accused from complete 
criminal responsibility. With reference to a variety of legal authority and his own interpretation 
of FM27-10, Carpenter advised MacArthur that the effect of a successful plea of superior 
orders should do no more than mitigate the sentence, thereby providing the legal basis of the 
Legal Section’s original position.516 
The main thrust of Carpenter’s argument appears to be based on the question as to whether 
superior orders, as covered in paragraph 345.1 of FM27-10 were ‘mandatory or 
discretionary’.517 In other words, he questioned whether the wording of FM27-10 made it 
mandatory for US tribunals to consider and accept a plea of superior orders or whether they 
had the discretion to do so where evidence was clear that the accused was acting in obedience 
to superior orders. Carpenter framed the issue with reference to the position of the ‘common 
law’ of wars and customs of war.518 Specifically, he made an assessment as to whether under 
the ‘common law’ an ‘accused war criminal is entitled to the defense of superior orders as a 
matter of ‘inherent right’. Accordingly, Carpenter went on to say, 
if the defense is not inherent, then FM27-10, paragraph 345.1 is not mandatory, and its alternative 
provision that a superior order may be considered as a mitigating circumstance is valid, and 
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Conveniently, Carpenter answered the question by asserting that any recourse to the defence 
of superior orders was purely discretionary and thereby removed the potential for any 
embarrassing acknowledgment of errors in relation to the misinterpretation of law. Carpenter 
did acknowledge that several leading authorities520 ‘are essentially in favor of the plea of 
superior orders’, however, the ‘Anglo-Saxon doctrine and practice are opposed to the excusing 
of war crimes on the plea of superior orders’.521 Carpenter concluded his advice to MacArthur 
by stating that, 
the entire question of ‘defense of superior orders’ is one which is not definitely settled, not clearly 
crystallized, and dependent upon the circumstances, the facts, and the times. The international 
law on the subject compels one to conclude that the ‘defense of superior orders’ is not inherent 
in the rights of an accused war criminal, nor has it been universally accepted by the civilized 
countries as providing complete immunity.522 
According to Colonel Carpenter, the decision whether the plea of superior orders was available 
to US commissions was ‘a matter of policy and views’ and since FM27-10 paragraph 345.1 is 
discretionary, it was for General MacArthur to decide whether to accept superior orders as a 
defence or in mitigation of punishment.523 
Despite the prosecution’s assertions that superior orders was not a complete defence at 
international law, Ward swiftly sought to refute their position. 524  He questioned, on 
jurisdictional grounds, General MacArthur’s authority to make regulations regarding superior 
orders that, prima facie, contradicted FM27-10 paragraph 345.1. He argued that since US 
FM27-10 was sanctioned and approved by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War, whose 
authority was above that of General MacArthur, any directive promulgated by General 
MacArthur would be subordinate to the Chief of Staff, US Army. In the event a direction of 
law, promulgated by General MacArthur, expressly or impliedly, conflicted with any directive 
given by the Chief of Staff, MacArthur’s directive would be void due to jurisdictional error 
because it was ultra vires to the original enactment. 
On a further point of jurisdictional error, Ward boldly questioned General MacArthur’s 
authority to make regulations. Ward contended that General MacArthur’s position as the 
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Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in the Pacific was administrative in nature rather 
than legislative and as such, MacArthur did not have the power to ‘alter or disregard established 
rules and customs of war, which are part of international law’.525 Such bold assertions in 
relation to the apparent contradiction between MacArthur’s regulation of 5 December and 
FM27-10 gained little traction in view of the legal interpretation offered by Colonel Carpenter. 
Defence Attorney Robert Ward then offered further argument to substantiate his assertions that 
the defence of superior orders was valid at international law. This argument centred on a report 
by Robert H Jackson to President Roosevelt that seemed to imply that it was superior officers 
who should bear the brunt of criminal responsibility for acts committed by subordinates who 
were acting under orders. 
B. Report of Robert H Jackson – ‘Trial of War Criminals’ 
In his ongoing argument with the Legal Section, Ward cited a report by Robert Jackson who at 
the time was the US Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials. 526  Jackson’s report was 
commissioned by President Roosevelt and released on 7 June 1945. If the literal interpretation 
of Jackson’s report is to be accepted, then, prior to the conclusion of the Pacific War, superior 
orders was intended to be a defence under certain circumstances. Paragraph 2 of Jackson’s 
report states: 
There is doubtless a sphere in which the defense of obedience to superior orders should prevail. 
If a conscripted or enlisted soldier is put on a firing squad, he should not be held responsible for 
the validity of the sentence he carries out. But the case may be greatly altered where one has 
discretion because of the rank or the latitude of his orders.527 
Ward highlights three points from this excerpt from Jackson’s report that may provide evidence 
that at the time of the commencement of the Nuremberg trials, the US prosecution believed 
that there was, at least in part, legal validity in relation to the plea of superior orders. The first 
part of Jackson’s assertion relates to an explicit acknowledgement that Jackson himself 
believed that the defence of superior orders was indeed available to an accused. The second 
point relates to a specific circumstance—but with the obvious intention of general 
application—in which a person should escape liability if he had no part in forming an unlawful 
sentence other than his part in carrying it out. The third point in relation to Jackson’s seemingly 
favourable position in regard to the plea of superior orders, relates to the lack of discretion 
afforded to a person due to his ‘rank or the latitude of his orders’.528 By this, Jackson appears 
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particularly pertinent to those who are junior in rank and who would have little, if any, 
‘discretion’ or ‘latitude’ as to whether or not to lawfully disobey orders they suspected were 
unlawful. 
Why the US and Allied position hardened against accepting the defence of superior orders to 
relieve criminal responsibility is hardly surprising given the unpalatable prospect of Japanese 
soldiers escaping liability for their part in committing cruel and inhumane acts against US 
soldiers and civilians merely because they could prove they were following superior orders. 
Such an outcome was no doubt politically untenable and would attract the ire of a war-weary 
US population if these perpetrators were able to escape punishment. 
How then, did the US trials in the Philippines approach the underlying dilemma associated 
with possible injustices that might result from punishing a junior-ranking soldier who was 
clearly following the orders of his superior, against a basal, psychological need to punish those 
who committed acts against US service personnel and Philippine civilians? What is clear from 
many of the cases is that those trials where the tribunals were forced to examine the possibility 
of superior orders playing a real part in the commission of the offence, pleas of superior orders 
were met with varying degrees of apprehension and confusion on the part of the defence and 
prosecution teams. The apparent trend in most trials where superior orders were raised was to 
disallow the plea as a defence and, in circumstances where the evidence of orders were clear 
and those orders were not manifestly illegal, to take into account those orders as a plea in 
mitigation in sentencing. However, the application of superior orders was far from uniform 
and, as the following section highlights, inconsistencies emerged with the application of 
superior orders. 
III. The Application of Superior Orders at the US Philippine Trials 
The following section examines a number of cases in which superior orders was raised by the 
accused as part of their defence. In doing so, it provides an overview of the types of 
circumstances where the plea arose in the US war crimes trials in the Philippines and goes 
some way to articulate a general theory on how the plea was applied throughout those trials. 
Cases in this section were selected using a range of criteria. An important—but not sole—
criterion for selecting a case for inclusion was a requirement that there be some express 
reference in the case documents to the plea of superior orders. Once this hurdle was met, and 
there was clear evidence the case was connected to the plea of superior orders, other criteria 
were applied to narrow the plethora of cases to be used for detailed examination.529 To examine 
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a broad cross section of the cases that went before US military tribunals, those that appeared 
to be representative of various types of classes of cases that emerged during the research were 
selected. For instance, it quickly became apparent there were commonalities in the 
circumstances of the accused. The groups that were evident included, for example, cases 
involving junior to mid-level ranking POW camp commanders. A number of cases involving 
camp commanders as well as junior ranking personnel in those camps were examined to 
determine how the tribunals assessed the validity of the defence of superior orders when US 
and Allied prisoners of war were killed while being held captive. 
A. Trial of 2nd Lieutenant Otsuka Noriyuki, Imperial Japanese Army, 
Manila, 6 July 1946 
The trial and subsequent review of the conviction for Second Lieutenant Otsuka Noriyuki530 
was typical of the trials involving the plea of superior orders in the US Army trials in the sense 
that little regard was given to the defence of superior orders despite there being reasonable 
evidence that a subordinate was acting on the direct orders of an immediate superior. 
Offences involved mass murder of, and brutality against, non-combatants 
Otsuka was convicted and sentenced to death by a US Military Commission in the Philippines 
for his part in the unlawful killing, torture, and mistreatment of several hundred Filipino 
civilians on various islands in the Philippines during 1943.531 The trial occurred at the High 
Commissioner’s Residence in Manila from 1–6 July 1946. A review of the trial was handed 
down by Colonel Franklin P Shaw, Judge Advocate General on 17 February 1947. 
Specifications of criminal conduct 1–6 were based on activities that occurred during the Sara-
Ajuy expedition and further charges 9–13 were laid in relation to his conduct during Japan’s 
infamous Bataan expedition. The charges covered various acts that Otsuka was later found to 
have committed whilst passing through numerous towns in the Iloilo Province of Panay.532 
Such acts included the rounding up of non-combatants (including men, women and children) 
for the purpose of ascertaining the whereabouts and activities of guerrillas in the area. On 
written and oral testimony, the tribunal concluded that many of these non-combatants were 
later executed without trial or any evidence that they were involved in guerrilla activities. 
Eyewitness testimony indicated that the number of deaths was well in excess of 200. Although 
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it was unspecified, the prosecution alleged—with little dispute by the accused—that Otsuka 
personally took an active part in the killings, mostly by beheading his victims via a ‘samurai 
sword’.533 
Eyewitness testimony and personal admissions made by Otsuka placed him firmly at the scenes 
of the civilian massacres for which he was charged. This part of the case was uncontroversial 
and the accused and his defence team did not contest evidence in relation to the number of 
civilians killed or the methods used in the killings. What was contested, however, were the 
circumstances that lead to the accused’s conduct in relation to the killings. As pointed out by 
his US defence counsel, Otsuka claimed he was operating under the direct command of Captain 
Watanabe who accompanied Otsuka’s expeditionary force. The defence also contended that 
Captain Watanabe was following a direction from Colonel Tozuka to ‘destroy everything – 
inhabitants, food, animals and buildings’.534 The thrust of Otsuka’s defence was predicated on 
the basis that he and his subordinates were following orders from their immediate and higher 
authorities. 
Defence’s argument – Compulsion of Japanese Law to Obey Superior Orders 
There were three main points to Otsuka’s defence. The first argument was that he and his troops 
did not kill anyone on their own initiative, as they believed they were acting under direct orders 
at all times from Captain Watanabe who was most likely acting under the orders of Colonel 
Tozuka. Otsuka’s second argument focused on the fact that under Japanese military law, 
company commanders in the field had lawful authority to carry out executions; and thirdly, 
failure to adhere to or refusal to obey superior orders (including those of Captain Watanabe) 
would result in the court-martial and execution of anyone who disobeyed a superior order.535 
On review, Colonel Shaw considered the evidence of Otsuka’s part in the killings and rejected 
clemency. He upheld the Military Commission’s finding that Otsuka was a direct ‘participant 
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obscene way, Otsuka alleged as part of his defence, that he did not kill children because they ‘cannot 
be cut by a sword because their neck is too short’ – see GHQ Far East Command Office of the Judge 
Advocate, Otsuka Noriyuki Review of the Record of Trial by a Military Commission of Second 





in the repeated brutal mistreatment and mass execution without trial of numerous, helpless 
prisoners’.536 Regarding the defence of superior orders, he stated that the defence had failed to 
present sufficient evidence of the defence of superior orders. Colonel Shaw made a point of 
stating that the only reason Otsuka raised superior orders was due to his ‘fear of the 
consequences to him of disobedience of those orders’.537 Shaw made it perfectly clear that 
Otsuka’s conduct was ‘fully approved by his superiors’; however, he doubted whether Otsuka’s 
actions on all occasions were limited to those specifically directed by his superiors. The 
implication was that Otsuka was a willing participant in the killings and went beyond what was 
actually ordered. 
Importantly for the outcome of the case, Colonel Shaw went on to state that the defence counsel 
had failed to establish the ‘requisite circumstances constituting a defense, either under the rules 
governing such cases as this, or under international law as understood prior to the promulgation 
of such rules’.538 
Is the Defence of Superior Orders a Valid Defence? 
The rules to which Shaw referred were those contained in MacArthur’s regulation of 5 
December 1945. Shaw indicated that superior orders may well have constituted a defence had 
there been sufficient evidence. That Shaw would make such a statement implying that superior 
orders could well have been a defence under the right conditions is curious given SCAP’s clear 
position that superior orders was not a defence, but was to be used only to mitigate the sentence. 
In relation to the defence counsel’s assertion regarding the applicability of the death penalty 
for disobeying an unlawful order, Colonel Shaw examined an extract from the Military Laws 
of Japan. He reached the same conclusion as the Military Commission which was that the death 
penalty for disobeying an order, in the context of the accused, was contrary to Japanese military 
law. According to Chapter 4, Article 57 of the Military Laws of Japan: 
Anyone who objects to and disobeys orders of superiors is to be punished as follows: 
(1) In cases before an enemy – he shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life or 
over ten years. 
(2) In cases of military operations or in territories under martial rule – he shall be punished 
by an imprisonment between one and seven years. 
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Colonel Shaw stated that ‘the assertions of the accused as to his liability to the death penalty 
for willful [sic] disobedience are … without merit’.540 From what he and the original military 
commission could ascertain from Japanese military law, the maximum penalty to which Otsuka 
would have been liable for disobeying orders for killing non-combatants under Japanese 
military law were contained in paragraph (2) or possibly (3), which would be a penalty between 
one to seven years imprisonment, but not death. The fact that Shaw did not consider that 
paragraph (1) was applicable presumably due to the fact that the orders were not related to ‘an 
enemy’ but were made in relation to non-combatants. 
Shaw did not believe that any defence of superior orders would be available to mitigate the 
original death sentence even if Otsuka was acting under orders. The reason was seemingly that 
he believed that Otsuka could and should have disobeyed any unlawful order given to him. 
However, the reality of disobeying orders from a superior would have been unimaginable to 
many in the IJA at the time. 
B. Trial of Warrant Officer Shin Fusataro Imperial Japanese Army (Kenpeitai), Manila, 
16–18 July 1946 (the ‘civilian massacre’ case) 
Shin Fusataro was a warrant officer in the Kenpeitai. The crimes with which he was charged 
were indicative of the cruelty meted out by the Imperial Japanese Army as it swept across the 
Philippine islands.541 This trial, like many others, represents a chapter in Japanese history 
where eyewitness testimony revealed the sorts of acts that Japanese troops perpetrated against 
unarmed non-combatants during this tumultuous period.542 As tragic as the case is for the 
innocent victims of Japanese military expansionism, Shin’s case, and others like it, sheds some 
light on the way the US tribunals dealt with the plea of superior orders when the plea was raised 
in the context of civilian massacres committed by members of the Kenpeitai. That is, there 
seemed to be an unwillingness on the part of military commission to accept the plea where the 
accused was Kenpeitai, which illustrates an inconsistent application of the doctrine in places. 
The outcome of the Law was Contingent on the Nature of the Accused and the Victim – 
emergence of subjective bias due to the status of the defendant 
The Commission did not look favourably on the plea of superior orders in Shin’s case. The 




541 Unless indicated otherwise, archival material in relation to the trial and review of Shin Fusataro is 
located in RG331 UD1321 290/12/12/1 Box 1566 Vol I–III, folder 82. 
542 I note that the Japanese are in no way the sole perpetrators of cruel treatment meted out to non-
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was due to the nature of the perpetrator (ie Kenpeitai). The nature of the victim(s), too, is 
relevant here given that the tribunal was dealing with mass killings of civilian non-combatants. 
No Consideration Given to Japanese Broader Policy to Form the Basis of Military Operations 
– Commission’s Attempt to Deny Defence of Superior Orders 
The Commission chose to ignore Shin’s possible defence of military necessity even though 
strong evidence existed that the military objective of the Kenpeitai was to deter the actions of 
guerrilla resistance. This case can be framed in the context that the killings were part of a 
broader military objective by Japanese forces in the area to suppress an aggressive, and at times 
extremely effective, guerrilla insurgency against the occupying Japanese forces. One might 
argue, as indeed the Japanese did, that stopping the guerrilla insurgency was necessary for 
Japan to achieve its strategic position throughout the Philippines against US and Allied 
forces.543 The orders to stop guerrillas and other pockets of resistance could, therefore, be 
viewed as a broader policy objective coming from much higher up the military chain of 
command in Tokyo. If the Commission saw Shin’s actions as falling within the ambit of 
superior orders emanating from higher command, then he would have a greater chance of 
arguing the defence of superior orders. No such consideration of superior orders was 
entertained, and it is clear the Commission went to significant lengths to deny the operation of 
superior orders at his trial, even as a means to mitigate the harshness of the sentence.544 
According to the indictment, Shin Fusataro was charged with numerous offences each 
involving the unlawful killing of unarmed Filipino non-combatants in various locations 
throughout the Iloilo province on the Philippine island of Panay.545 The first specification states 
that Shin, during September 1943, killed five members of the Yap family at Jimomoa, Iloila in 
the Philippines without lawful justification. Specifications 2, 3, and 4 each alleged he 
participated in the killing of approximately 50, 100, and 30 unarmed non-combatants in various 
locations throughout the same province from August to September 1943.546 Shin pleaded not 
 
 
543 See discussion on military necessity at pp 33–36 above. Military necessity is premised on the 
notion that in order to advance one’s military objective, certain acts that would otherwise be deemed 
unlawful could be considered necessary so as to bring about a more hasty conclusion to the conflict, 
which would in turn have other positive results such as reducing the number of casualties and the 
destruction of civilian and military infrastructure. 
544 See, eg, the Trial of Suguwara Isaburo (RG331 UD1321 290/12/12/1) where superior orders was 
accepted upon a recommendation of the Judge Advocate for clemency which reduced the death 
sentence to fifteen years imprisonment, on the basis the accused Suguwara was regarded more as a 
hapless executioner than a willing participant in the unlawful killing of three US fliers. 
545 See United States of America Vs Fusataro Shin, Summary of charges, ‘Military Commission, 
Orders No. 1’, APO 500, 10 January 1947. 
546 Shin was also charged with unlawfully permitting soldiers under his command to kill eight 
unarmed non-combatants in various locations throughout Iloilo province. The charges relate to 
command responsibility and are the subject of discussion in the section that deals with US trials 





guilty to each of the charges. After a trial lasting several days, on 18 July 1946, the tribunal 
found the accused guilty on all specifications, albeit amending the initial specifications by 
revising down the number of victims due to lack of evidence.547 The sentence handed down 
the same day, was ‘death by hanging’.548 
Throughout the trial, Shin professed his innocence of all charges and maintained that he did 
not at any time take part in the killings, even stating that on some occasions he was not in the 
vicinity of where they took place. The facts of the case were strongly contested by the accused 
and after the trial, while his pending execution loomed ever closer, Shin petitioned the 
commander of the AFWESPAC—unsuccessfully—for a retrial so that he could ‘ascertai[n] the 
true facts of the case’.549 
The Strength of the Prosecution’s Evidence 
After the initial trial, evidentiary aspects of the case were re-examined by the reviewing 
authority, headed up by Dayton M Harrington, a civilian attorney assigned to assist the Staff 
Judge Advocate, Colonel Ashton M Haynes JA.550 The evidence relied upon by the prosecution 
consisted of testimony from two Filipino eyewitnesses who claimed to have seen Shin at the 
various scenes of the alleged killings. 
In addition to the testimony of eyewitnesses, the prosecution also relied on sections of written 
testimony taken from a convicted Japanese war criminal, Lieutenant-General Kono Takeshi at 
Shin’s trial.551 According to details outlined in the review documents, evidence from the Kono 
trial revealed that Kenpeitai were not in the habit of conducting trials of guerrilla suspects on 
Panay Island because there was no authority to try them. Instead, the policy of the Japanese 
Army, according to Kono’s testimony, was to transport guerrilla suspects to Manila for 
interrogation and trial.552 
The evidence from Kono’s trial in relation to the policy of dealing with guerrilla suspects in 
Manila, rather than in the field, made it clear that Shin’s activities were contrary to higher 
orders that required captives to be afforded a proper trial and not be summarily dealt with in 
 
 
out the killings based on command responsibility, he was found not guilty. 
547 Specification 1: guilty of killing four people; Specification 2: guilty of killing 5; Specification 3: 
guilty of killing 6; Specification 4: guilty of killing 3. See Folder 82, pages 1–2. 
548 Folder 82, ‘Pleas, Findings, and Sentence’, page 2. 
549 Petition to the Commanding Officer AFWESPAC, from Shin Fusataro WO 517-40895, 3 January 
1947. 
550 Review, United States of America v Fusataro Shin, Headquarters, United States Army Forces 
Western Pacific, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Manila, 15 November 1946. (Folder 82). 
551 Ibid 3–4. 




the field. Such a practice seemed to accord with the testimony of eyewitnesses who testified 
against Shin.553 The significance of this point was taken as proof of Shin’s guilt at trial. 
The Testimony of Monito Tubungbanwa and the Yap Family Killings 
The prosecution relied upon the testimony of Monito Tubungbanwa, a Filipino resident of 
Panay Island who was taken prisoner, interrogated by the Kenpeitai, and later made to work as 
a baggage carrier. Tubungbanwa claimed to have encountered Shin at the Kenpeitai jail at Iloilo 
city and later to have travelled with him and others on an expedition from Iloilo to various 
locations during which time the Japanese captured, interrogated, and summarily executed large 
numbers of Filipino civilians. 
On one such encounter, Tubungbanwa testified that he witnessed Shin and his interpreter 
question five members of the Yap family in Jimomoa. According to Tubungbanwa, the entire 
Yap family—two parents and three children aged eight to thirteen years of age—were 
beheaded and their bodies incinerated. Tubungbanwa made the claims that the killings were 
committed by Shin even though, as it was later revealed under cross examination, 
Tubungbanwa never actually witnessed Shin killing any members of the family or had direct 
knowledge that the family members were even executed at that time.554 
The Testimony of Norberto Padora – Civilian Massacres 
Padora, a Filipino resident of Jimomoa on Panay Island, himself captured by the Japanese on 
10 September 1943, was forced to take part as a baggage carrier on the same expedition as 
Tubungbanwa. Once the expedition reached San Rafael and Nueva Invencion, Padora claimed 
that approximately 50 unarmed civilians were arrested by the Japanese Army and, despite the 
absence of any trial, were executed the following morning. Padora testified that another 
person—a Filipino by the name of Concordio—identified Shin as one of the perpetrators of the 
killings who personally ‘severed the heads from the bodies of three men and one woman and 
stabbed a boy in the abdomen’.555 Further evidence from Padora placed Shin at Salingan and 




553 Kono’s evidence regarding policies in relation to the requirement that suspected guerrillas be sent 
to Manila could be seen as an attempt to avoid criminal responsibility on his part through command 
responsibility on the basis that, if it were proven that troops in the field broke with established orders 
by killing guerrilla suspects without trial, such actions would form the basis of a defence against an 
allegation of command responsibility. 
554 Review, United States of America v Fusataro Shin, Headquarters, United States Army Forces 
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Defence Evidence Contradicts Eyewitness Accounts 
Citing excerpts from the trials of United States v Otsuka Noriyuki and Kuwano Tadataka, 
Shin’s defence team claimed that the objective of the Panay expedition was to seek out and 
apprehend Filipino guerrillas. The Panay expedition was commanded by Lieutenant General 
Kono and the Brigade was commanded by General Kuroda, under which three battalions were 
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Tozuka. Given that Filipino insurgents were a significant 
impediment for the Japanese military occupation, it could be argued—as it was by Shin’s 
defence team—that it was common policy throughout the Japanese military to suppress 
Filipino resistance. It was commonly understood that any order to kill civilians would, on the 
face of it, would be consistent with policy and have come from the senior ranks of the Japanese 
military. On that basis, no junior ranking Japanese soldier would have questioned the 
lawfulness of an order or would have had any reason to question its legality. 
In relation to the specific allegations levelled against Shin, his defence team attempted to show 
that the orders pertaining to, and the subsequent treatment of, Filipino civilians was at the 
command of Lieutenant Nakatsukasa.556 The defence further claimed that the direct order given 
to Shin to carry out the expedition was given by Lieutenant Okura in September 1943. Defence 
counsel claimed that, during the expedition, operational orders were given by Lieutenant 
Colonel Tozuka and Captain Watanabe. Shin’s defence attempted to show a clear delineation 
of roles and responsibilities with respect to orders involving civilians tried, to establish distance 
between Shin and his superiors in relation to the orders. 
Shin admitted to being at the location during the time some of the massacres occurred, but 
adamantly denied giving the order to execute any of the victims or participating in the killings. 
He even denied seeing the executed bodies.557 In relation to the allegations concerning the Yap 
family, Shin stated there were only two children and that he had not personally questioned any 
member of the family.558 
Review Authority favours the accused’s evidence, but defence Counsel did not plea the defence 
of superior orders 
The reviewing authority expressed some concerns over parts of the prosecution’s evidence—
particularly those aspects regarding the number of members of the Yap family and other details 
of the circumstances surrounding the killings. The review authority favoured Shin on the point 
that there were four members and not five members of the family. Unfortunately for the 
accused, this was not enough to sway it regarding Shin’s assertion that he had no further 
knowledge of the killings and it accepted Tubungbanwa’s testimony regarding Shin’s 
involvement in the killings. Despite those findings in Shin’s favour, such as the review 
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authority revising down the number of Yap family members killed, Shin was found guilty of 
the killings. 
Raising Superior Orders as a defence is akin to an admission of guilt 
Shin’s defence counsel attempted to dilute his role in the killings by insisting that any actions 
he took in relation to the atrocities that occurred during the expedition were minor and, 
importantly, that any role he had in the killings was out of a legal obligation to obey orders. 
Curiously, Shin’s defence counsel stopped short of formally raising the defence of superior 
orders despite stressing the point that he was acting out of a legal obligation to obey orders. 
The Commission took this aspect of his defence as an admission that he committed at least 
some of the atrocities for which he was charged. Therein lies a fundamental flaw in the superior 
orders defence. An accused, as in Shin’s case, has a major problem with advancing the plea of 
superior orders for to do so is akin to admitting some or all of the facts surrounding the charges. 
The defendant must choose whether to deny the charges completely, or whether to risk making 
admissions while justifying the acts on the basis of superior orders. The plea of superior orders 
is incongruous in that it may involve arguing that, on the one hand, the accused did not 
participate in any unlawful acts, while at the same time arguing that he committed the acts 
because he was ordered to do so. 
Shin’s defence counsel chose not to raise the defence of superior orders, possibly to the 
detriment of the accused. If successfully argued, the plea of superior orders might have reduced 
Shin’s death sentence to a lengthy jail term, as in Toyota’s case. Instead, they chose to focus 
on evidentiary deficiencies in the prosecution’s case which, although acknowledged by the 
Commission (and subsequently by the reviewing authority) were seemingly disregarded in the 
final decision. With all appeals exhausted, Shin Fusataro was executed on 24 February 1947 
along with three other condemned Japanese war criminals at the Luzon POW camp in 
Manila.559 
C. Trial of First Lieutenant Toyota Chiyomi, Imperial Japanese Army, 
Manila, 20–31 July 1946 
Despite the severity of the charges and the fact the defence counsel did not seek to raise superior 
orders as a defence, the Commission mitigated the sentence to a period of imprisonment 
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First Lieutenant Toyota Chiyomi of the Imperial Japanese Army was charged with killing 
scores of specified and unspecified Filipino civilians during September 1943.560 The killings 
occurred in various locations throughout the Western Visayas as part of the IJA’s campaign to 
suppress Filipino guerrilla resistance. The charge consisted of four specifications detailing 
allegations against Toyota for his part in the killings.561 
Toyota received a period of imprisonment of 25 years as opposed to the death sentence. One 
reason why Toyota avoided the death penalty could be the fact that the Commission focused 
on aspects of command and control thereby enlivening the possibility that Toyota acted out of 
a legal obligation that he honestly and reasonably held. 
Order of Battle and Superior Orders 
Interestingly in this case, the plea of superior orders was not raised by the defence. However, 
despite this fact, the Commission and the reviewing authority went to unusual lengths in 
discussing the order of battle that existed when Toyota was alleged to have committed the 
crimes. The purpose in doing so was to ascertain whether Toyota’s actions were explicitly in 
accordance with IJA orders. One cannot rule out the possibility that both the Commission and 
subsequently the reviewer, were influenced by the likelihood that the harsh treatment meted 
out to civilians by the IJA during this phase of the Philippine campaign, occurred as a result of 
orders coming from the highest echelons of the IJA to suppress Filipino guerrilla resistance. 
The Commission could not ignore the possibility that killing Filipino civilians as a 
countermeasure to the insurgency was so commonplace that it would hardly have been viewed 
by Toyota and his subordinates as unlawful. 
At the time of the alleged killings, the Commission accepted that Toyota was under the direct 
supervision of Lieutenant Colonel Tozuka. It was also accepted that Tozuka and Toyota were 
both under the control of General Kono Takeshi of the 14th Japanese Army. Christiansen 
especially noted that Toyota was the only person charged for these killings despite their scale 
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and the apparent chain of command and evidence suggesting that their orders emanated from 
above.562 
Specifications Relating to the Charge 
Specifications 1 and 2 of the charge of unlawful killing stipulated that Toyota was responsible 
for directly killing, or permitting others under his command to unlawfully kill, at least 54 
‘unarmed, non-combatant civilians’. None of the victims in specification 2 were named. 
Specifications 3 and 4, however, were even less specific regarding the number of civilians 
killed and simply alleged that Toyota killed an ‘unascertained number of unarmed, non-
combatant civilians’.563 Not only were the number of civilians killed unspecified, but the 
prosecution was also unable to identify and name a single victim. 
Toyota pleaded not guilty to the charge. The Military Commission, however, found him guilty 
but only in relation to specification 1 and not of specifications 2, 3 and 4. It sentenced him to 
imprisonment for 25 years to be served at Sugamo Prison, Tokyo. The sentence was approved 
by Major General J G Christiansen, the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff, and was in-
turn approved by Colonel and Adjutant General J Gerhardt of the US Army.564 
Evidence for the Prosecution 
In relation to specification 1, the prosecution produced one eyewitness—Augustin Dasas, a 
local farmer from Gibato who was captured by the Japanese and brought to an area where he 
claimed to have witnessed Toyota ‘in the process of killing a man with a sword’. Dasas claimed 
that he did not know the two victims, however, he was sure the two persons were deceased as 
he could see their severed heads. He also claimed that in the moments after he was brought to 
the field, he too was to be executed by Toyota. He claimed he survived the attempted execution 
after Toyota ‘hacked’ at his neck and he pretended to be dead.565 No further evidence for 
specifications 2, 3, and 4 was offered by the prosecution. 
Defence’s Argument 
The main thrust of the defence’s argument against the charge was based on mistaken identity, 
as Toyota claimed he was never in the place where the killings were alleged to have been 
committed. According to the defence’s evidence, the killings were most likely to have been 
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committed by other IJA units—most likely members of the Kinoshita Unit—which he saw at 
Ticongeahoy. Specifically, Toyota claimed that the members of the Kinoshita Unit he met were 
members of the Nozaki platoon who had come from Capiz and who had told him were present 
at Gibato (the home of Dasas). 
Three individuals who were tried and convicted of war crimes substantiated aspects of Toyota’s 
testimony and this was accepted by the Commission and the reviewing authority.566 
Decision of the Review Authority 
The reviewing authority, assisted by William D Shain—civilian attorney and assistant to the 
Staff Judge Advocate—upheld the Commission’s initial findings of guilt for specification 1. 
The reviewer also agreed that the evidence for specifications 2, 3, and 4 was insufficient and, 
therefore, upheld the finding of ‘not guilty’ for those specifications. Despite there being several 
discrepancies regarding Dasas’s testimony, which was not corroborated, both the Commission 
and the reviewer believed his testimony to be sufficiently credible ‘to enable the Commission 
to find that Toyota was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt’. 567  Had it not been for the 
Commission’s willingness to consider the order of battle and the likelihood Toyota was 
following orders promulgated from above, then it is likely his sentence would not have been 
as favourable. 
It is curious, therefore, given the cases of Toyota and Shin, that the defence counsels did not 
raise the plea of superior orders. Instead, in the case of Toyota, the accused had to rely on the 
judgment of the Commission to implicitly allow superior orders into the sentence and in doing 
so, to implicitly give authority to the legitimacy of superior orders as a defence to war crimes. 
D. Trial of 2nd Class Petty Officer Tanaka and 1st Class Petty Officer Hayashi 
Imperial Japanese Navy, Manila, 8–13 January 1947 
The defence of superior orders can be considered as a means to mitigate the sentence (but not 
to absolve the accused from criminal responsibility) where certain criteria are established by 
the defendant, that is, where: (1) ambiguity exists about the lawfulness or unlawfulness of 
orders; (2) it is clear that the accused was following those orders; (3) the accused did not wish 
to follow those orders, but did so out of legal compulsion; (4) the accused derived no pleasure 
or desire and did not intend to commit such acts; and (4) disobedience of those orders would 
result in severe punishment to the accused. 
In the joint trial (and subsequent Review on 17 March 1947) of Tanaka Yukitsuna (2nd Class 
Petty Officer) and Hayashi Yoshinori (1st Class Petty Officer), superior orders was argued by 
the defence as a complete defence to criminal responsibility for their part in the execution of 
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eight US airmen.568 The Military Commission conducting the trial in the first instance rejected 
that defence. The commission did accept, however, that superior orders was relevant in 
mitigation of sentence where there was some ambiguity in relation to the lawfulness of the 
orders, and where there was no evidence of any particular desire or pleasure derived from 
killing the victims. In circumstances such as those affecting Tanaka and Hayashi, it seems as 
though some tribunals were more inclined to award a sentence of incarceration instead of the 
death penalty. 
Tanaka and Hayashi were both junior members of the IJN stationed at the jail at Tolitoli in 
1944 when they received orders to be part of a team which was to carry out the execution of 
eight US airmen. The airmen were being held captive at Tolitoli after their plane ditched into 
the sea at Boeol in September or October of that year.569 The executions took place in a small 
coconut grove about two and a half kilometres from the seaplane base at Tolitoli. Each of the 
prisoners had their hands tied and were blindfolded. The first prisoner was told to kneel in front 
of a hole that had been dug earlier that day and Hayashi was ordered to carry out the first 
execution. Tanaka claimed that he carried out the seventh execution.570 
Who gave the initial order to execute the airmen was not fully established as there were 
conflicting reports. A number of IJN personnel who were called to give evidence testified that 
they believed the order initially came from a senior officer from the 22nd Special Naval Base 
at Balikpapan.571 The person who sent the message was Lieutenant Junior Grade Igami who 
was in charge of the Dispatch Seaplane Base. Tanaka himself gave evidence that he believed 
the order came from Lieutenant Nishida who was present at the execution. Either way, there 
was clear evidence to suggest that Tanaka and Hayashi had no role in the origination of the 
order and they acted out of obedience to a superior order. Hayashi stated he did not know who 
gave the order and, because commanders of the jail changed often, he did not know who was 
in charge of the unit of which he was a member. Warrant Officer Suitsu was responsible for 
arrangements at the scene of the execution and issued instructions as to the order of the 
executioners, but it was clear that Suitsu was not the initiator of the execution order. 
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Legal Basis of the Defence’s Appeal 
Tanaka and Hayashi were both convicted of the executions and, after circumstances of 
mitigation were taken into consideration, each received a sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment. 
The defence appealed the sentences on the basis that the Military Commission had failed to 
take into account the defence of superior orders regarding criminal responsibility. The defence 
claimed that superior orders should have been available to the trial commission because the 
accused were compelled to follow all orders from a superior, failure of which would render 
them liable to receive the death penalty under Japanese Military Law.572 
The defence also attempted to argue on appeal that paragraph 345.1 of the FM 27-10 did allow 
for superior orders to be a full defence to criminal responsibility573 and that Robert Jackson’s 
report to the President of the United States574 was sufficient evidence of US executive intention 
to validate superior orders in such a way. A further argument was raised by the defence that 
related to the existence of a State Department publication of a letter from President Roosevelt 
on 21 April 1943.575 The defence team asserted that President Roosevelt’s intention was to 
differentiate officers from junior-ranking military personnel by holding only officers criminally 
liable for crimes committed against US airmen. In paraphrasing the President’s letter, the 
defence argued it was the President’s intention that, 
all officers of the Japanese Government responsible for the execution of the Doolittle fliers will 
be brought to justice. Also he warns that if there are any other violations of the rules, the officers 
of the Japanese Government responsible for the violations will answer for them.576 
The defence based their argument on the fact that liability was not attributable to junior military 
personnel due to the President’s use of the word, ‘officer’. Although the defence appeared to 
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be relying on matters of semantics, there is some merit in their argument, albeit due to an 
apparent if imprecise use of the word ‘officer’ by the President. It is more likely than not that 
the President did not intend to limit liability to military officers, but rather ‘agents’ of the 
Japanese Government, which would include any military and civilian personnel whose actions 
(or omissions) were responsible for the executions. 
Findings of the Review Panel 
The review panel rejected all of the defence’s arguments regarding the availability of superior 
orders to absolve an accused of criminal responsibility. It did so primarily because of the 
importance it attributed to SCAP’s letter of 5 December 1945 which provided that ‘action of 
an accused pursuant to superior orders may not be considered by way of defense, but may be 
considered in mitigation of punishment’.577 Such an unequivocal statement by SCAP regarding 
superior orders was too much for the panel to ignore, despite clear evidence that the deaths 
would not have occurred but for the orders from a superior authority. It chose to disregard the 
inconsistency between FM27-10 and SCAP’s 5 December letter in favour of MacArthur’s 
directive. It regarded FM27-10 to be ‘for information and guidance and not mandatory’ 
whereas SCAP’s letter, promulgated by General Douglas MacArthur, was seen as a directive 
intended for military tribunals.578 
In relation to the purported contradictory statements of President Roosevelt and Justice Jackson 
regarding the availability of superior orders as a valid defence, the review panel stated that the 
comments from the pair were, 
generalizations regarding the punishment of war criminals whereas par 5 d (4) is the enunciated 
rule specifically governing … punishment of accused war criminals standing trial at this 
headquarters.579 
The fact that commissions and review panels were more likely to favour directives from 
MacArthur, than ‘generalized’ statements by the President, is telling of the hold that MacArthur 
appeared to have in relation to the conduct and the outcome of the trials. 
Additional Mitigation of Sentence 
In deciding whether to further mitigate the original sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment, the 
review panel examined a number of facts. First, the panel acknowledged that each of the 
accused received their orders to be on the execution squad the evening before the day of 
execution and would not have otherwise harmed the victims. Secondly, the panel took the 
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extraordinary step of suggesting that the reason both accused made no protest about the legality 
of the orders was ‘due to the fact that they were so stunned at being ordered to kill a man in 
cold blood that they were unable to protest’.580 Thirdly, the panel accepted that there was no 
evidence that suggested the two accused displayed any signs of ‘gratuitous acts of cruelty’.581 
Fourthly, the panel took into account the actions of Hayashi when he ‘offered a prayer for the 
flier he had killed, and … left after the fourth execution’.582 For Tanaka’s part, the panel 
acknowledged he returned to his quarters after the execution and did not work for rest of the 
day on account of being unfit to do so.583 The panel’s inference of the emotional toll the 
executions had on Hayashi and Tanaka at the time was obvious. 
The panel accepted that the conduct of the two accused was purely on the basis of following 
orders. For that reason, Hayashi and Tanaka, as far as the panel was concerned, demonstrated 
that they did not want to kill, did not volunteer, and were not ‘gratuitous killers’.584 
In view of the evidence, the review panel recommended the original sentences of 30 years’ 
hard labour were excessive and should be reduced to 15 years’ hard labour.585 The fact that the 
panel was willing to drastically reduce the sentences by half, despite the fact that Hayashi and 
Tanaka by their own admissions participated in the killing of eight US airmen, is telling in a 
number of respects. It could be argued that the panel placed more emphasis on the effect of 
superior orders as it related to the mens rea element of the crime. In other words, given that 
some of the evidence strongly indicated a lack of willingness on the part of the two accused to 
carry out the killings, the panel was prepared to reduce the sentence. The ultimate sentence 
appears, on the face of it, to have been awarded for the actual killing (or the actus reus). Given 
that Hayashi and Tanaka received a sentence at all, indicates the panel was keeping true to 
rejecting a plea of superior orders as a full defence. 
E. Trial of Petty Officer Suguwara Isaburo, Imperial Japanese Navy, 
Manila, 8–10 February 1947 
Superior orders can operate to mitigate a death sentence under certain circumstances: (1) where 
the accused was acting in obedience to the order of a superior officer, (even if not his immediate 
commander); (b) the accused had no contact with the victims prior to their execution; (c) the 
accused had no command discretion; (d) the accused was not chargeable with knowledge of 
the rules of war; (e) in performing the task for which he was ordered, the accused manifested 
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neither spirit of vengeance nor personal ill will; and (f) the accused had no other offence alleged 
or proven against him. 
In the case of Superior Petty Officer Suguwara Isaburo, the plea of superior orders was 
successfully raised to commute the sentence of death handed down in the first instance by a 
military commission which sentenced Suguwara and two others to death by ‘musketry’.586 
Interestingly, in Suguwara’s case, the recommendation to commute his death sentence to a 
custodial sentence, came from the reviewing authority, Colonel Shaw, Judge Advocate, after 
it was determined that a number of arguments existed to accept the defence of superior orders 
as mitigation of punishment. 
Suguwara was jointly tried with two others: Lieutenant Yamaguchi Sentaro and Ensign Tasuki 
Kiyoto, both of whom were members of the Imperial Japanese Navy. The three accused were 
charged with the violations of war, specifically the unlawful executions of three captured US 
airmen whose plane crashed landed at Sanga Sanga, near Samarinda in Borneo in May 1945.587 
All three Japanese accused were found guilty by a US military commission and sentenced to 
death for their role in the executions. 
According to the review of the Record of Trial, the three US airmen were the three surviving 
crew members of a US Army airplane. They were apprehended by the IJN and taken to a wharf 
at Samarinda. The airmen endured captivity for over a month during which time they were 
subjected to irregular bouts of moderate interrogation by Japanese Keibitai (security 
personnel). After one month’s confinement, the three airmen, blindfolded with their hands tied 
behind their backs, were taken by a group of ten IJN personnel to a location and made to kneel 
beside a shallow grave where they were each beheaded by Suguwara and another man, 
Tasuki.588 
The fact that Suguwara and Tasuki performed the executions were not disputed. What was 
contentious, however, as far as the convictions was concerned, according to Suguwara’s 
defence team, was the level of culpability that should be attributed to Tasuki and Suguwara 
who performed the acts as opposed to Yamaguchi (superior to both men) who admitted to 
giving the order to carry out the executions on the day. 
Review Authority Overrules Military Commission – Death Penalty Mitigated on the basis of 
Superior Orders 
Upon review of the original case on 8 February 1947, the reviewing authority, headed by 
Colonel Shaw recommended that the death penalty for Yamaguchi and Tasuki be confirmed 
and carried out. 
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However, the authority took a rare step and recommended Suguwara’s sentence be confirmed 
but be commuted to a period of incarceration for 15 years. The recommendation to overturn 
the original decision was based on several factors. 
The authority cited ‘extenuating circumstances disclosed by the evidence in the case …, and 
which contrast it uniquely with cases submitted to the confirming authority in the past’.589 The 
extenuating circumstances to which Colonel Shaw referred were, in his view, of the nature that 
would constitute sufficient grounds to form the basis of a plea of superior orders for clemency 
in Suguwara’s case. He cited several reasons for this conclusion. First, he stated that the 
evidence presented to the reviewing authority strongly suggested that Suguwara: 
a. was acting in obedience to the order of a superior officer, his immediate commander; 
b. had no contact with the airmen prior to their execution; 
c. had no command discretion; 
d. was not chargeable with knowledge of the Rules of Land Warfare; 
e. in performing the task to which he was ordered Suguwara manifested neither spirit of 
vengeance nor personal ill will; and 
f. had no other offense alleged or proven against him.590 
Colonel Shaw argued that the evidence to substantiate the plea of superior orders in Suguwara’s 
case was stronger than other cases where superior orders was raised. In distinguishing other 
cases where superior orders had been raised and had failed, he stated that the other cases usually 
involved orders of, 
indiscriminate slaughter or were otherwise palpably illegal; that the orders were indefinite or not 
directly received; the accused was in a position of some discretion, or that the accused was a 
volunteer or eagerly obedient. None of those elements and nothing comparable thereto are present 
in Suguwara’s case.591 
Colonel Shaw contested that the facts and circumstances in relation to Suguwara’s involvement 
regarding the execution of the three US airmen were very different from other cases and, on 
that basis, the plea of superior orders to mitigate the sentence was not precluded. 
 
 
589 ‘Supplement to Review of the Record of Trial by Military Commission of Lieutenant (jg) Sentaro 
Yamaguchi, 51J-127752, Ensign Kiyoto Tasuki, 51J-127753 and Superior Petty Officer Isaburo 
Suguwara, 51J-127754, of the Imperial Japanese Navy’, to The Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers, from Colonel Franklin P Shaw, Judge Advocate, General Headquarters Far East Command 
Office of the Judge Advocate, 22 February 1947, RG331 UD1321 290/12/12/1. 
590 Ibid [3 a–f]. 




With reference to the documentary evidence cited by the initial trial commission, Colonel Shaw 
agreed there existed no reason for ‘disturbing the extreme penalty adjudged against 
Yamaguchi’.592 His reasons for agreeing with the original sentence were based on the fact that 
Yamaguchi directed the executions of the three US airmen he had knowledge of—or at least 
reason to suspect—the illegal nature of the executions as indicated by his contradictory 
statements throughout the trial. This gave the impression that he was attempting to hide behind 
the ‘protective cloak of superior orders as a defense’ by claiming that the execution order came 
from higher headquarters—despite later admitting that the order came from him and no one 
else.593 
Plea of Superior Orders Not Available to those Who Willingly, Knowingly and Unquestioningly 
Participate in Unlawful Orders 
Despite accepting that Yamaguchi was responsible for giving the initial order to execute the 
three US fliers, Shaw JA did not accept that the co-accused Tasuki, unlike Suguwara, was in a 
position to plead obedience to superior orders. He agreed with the confirming authority that 
Tasuki’s sentence should not be disturbed. 
According to Colonel Shaw, the reason for taking this position in relation to Tasuki was not 
due to the fact that Tasuki was the officer in charge of the execution party. Rather, it was 
because Tasuki was shown to have had greater responsibility than Suguwara in the days and 
weeks that preceded the executions. The evidence clearly showed that he was in charge of 
interrogating the airmen and took part in beating the three prisoners at various times.594 
Furthermore, Tasuki knew that the three airmen did not receive a trial—something that Tasuki, 
according to his rank and experience, would or should have known. Shaw JA concluded that: 
We thus do not have the case of an executioner who receives and blindly carries out a mandate 
of his superior, without knowledge of its illegality, or in fear of dire personal consequences 
awaiting refusal to obey. … There is no reason to doubt that Tasuki’s concurrence or at least 
acquiescence in the plan of execution was given. He did not hesitate to fulfill the order nor does 
he claim coercion or fear of consequences for failure to act. Any Japanese naval officer is well 
aware of the fact that an execution cannot be carried out without a written order from a competent 
commander and a writ of the prosecutor concerned, and that under Japanese naval law, a further 
order of the Minister of the Navy is required (Japanese Naval Court-Martial Law Article 504). 
Tasuki, one of the senior officers under Yamaguchi and admittedly aware of the lack of legal 
procedure, was in a position to refuse his order if he so desired.595 
The main grounds for distinguishing Suguwara’s role from Tasuki’s role in the executions were 
that Suguwara, unlike Tasuki, had no personal contact with the airmen prior to their execution 
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and was, therefore, not within the ‘inner-sanctum’ of the command.596 Suguwara could also 
not be held criminally responsible because he had little knowledge of the rules of land warfare 
and did not exhibit any ill feeling or vengeance towards the victims. On that basis, he was 
doing ‘no more than what to him was military duty, and would have no greater degree of guilt 
than would any military member of a firing squad who, unbeknown to himself, was carrying 
out an execution under an illegal order’.597 
Establishing a Precedent for Applying Superior Orders 
Significantly, the second reason why Shaw JA accepted that superior orders should mitigate 
Sugiwara’s original sentence, was that to do so would provide precedential value and 
clarification for other military commissions. Shaw JA acknowledged that by accepting the 
prospect that superior orders did play a crucial role in the unlawful killing of the three US 
airmen, SCAP would establish ‘a criterion for the exercise of clemency which will not strip of 
meaning his instructions respecting mitigation of punishment under paragraph 5d(6) of the 
regulations promulgated by him’.598 
Shaw JA accepted that the ‘possibility of creating an undesirable precedent is not present’ 
because Suguwara’s case was unique.599 That assessment was based on his view that obedience 
to superior orders was the ‘sole impelling inducement to the commission of an act, not to the 
accused, patently illegal’.600 In other words, possibly due to Suguwara’s limited knowledge of 
military law and his rank, it was not entirely clear that it would have been clear to him the order 
to execute the airmen was unlawful under the laws of war. On that basis, argued Shaw JA, 
Suguwara’s case presented the precise ‘case for which must have been intended the exercise 
of clemency authorized by the Supreme Commander…’.601 
Contained in correspondence dated February 1947 from General MacArthur’s office, Shaw 
JA’s recommendations were upheld and Suguwara’s death sentence was commuted to 15 
years’ imprisonment. Likewise, Shaw JA’s recommendations that Yamaguchi and Tasuki not 
be granted clemency was also accepted and their execution orders were confirmed.602 
Suguwara’s case is significant because it provides an example of the types of instances where 
a review authority was willing to disturb an original sentence by a military commission in 
favour of an accused, in this case, when superior orders might operate to provide clemency to 
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tribunal examined a range of circumstances that justified the application of superior orders and 
distinguished the conduct of Suguwara from that of his co-accused. This case represents a 
situation whereby the reviewing authority clearly believed clemency was warranted. 
A counter argument could just as well have been made if the accused was ranked higher, then 
clemency would not be available because, for example, the accused would have had the 
opportunity to exercise his discretion in relation to the unlawful order. It is curious, therefore, 
why clemency would be offered to junior ranking soldiers but not higher ranking soldiers on 
the basis that one’s discretion increases with rank, when in reality, it would be highly doubtful 
that a Japanese soldier of any rank would be in a position to refuse any order from superiors. 
* * * 
The main points in relation to the defence of superior orders coming from the Manila trials are 
as follows: 
• repeated disregard of evidence supporting, and a denial of, the validity of the defence 
of superior orders; 
• subjective bias due to the status/ role of the accused; 
• reliance on the defence of superior orders is akin to an admission of guilt; 
• superior orders at times were accepted as a point of mitigation where evidence was 
clear that orders were promulgated from higher command; 
• the defence of superior orders can be considered as a reason to mitigate the sentence 
(but not to absolve the accused from criminal responsibility) where certain criteria are 
established by the defendant. 
 
The following chapter argues for a ‘normative reconceptualization’ of superior orders in light 
of the historical context of the defence of superior orders and its application at the Manila Trials 






THE PARADOX OF SUPERIOR ORDERS: A NORMATIVE 
RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF AN OLD DILEMMA 
I. Introduction 
This chapter posits a normative theoretical position on how the doctrine of superior orders 
should be applied as part of future war crimes jurisprudence. The normative position adopted 
in this chapter is based on the legal standards and jurisprudence derived from cases and the lex 
scripta outlined in Chapters 5 and 6. In short, this chapter argues that the defence of superior 
orders should be available to defendants to mitigate the sentence and, in rare circumstances, 
absolve the defendant of all criminal responsibility. One of the key aspects underlying this 
position is the fact that military orders are far too important to be ignored as a significant 
contributing factor as to why war crimes are carried out. What the cases in the Manila trials 
and elsewhere clearly point out, is that if not for specific orders, some war crimes would not 
have occurred.  
The test that should be undertaken to determine whether superior orders played a part in the 
criminal wrongdoing, is what is termed in this thesis, as the ‘intermediate’ test that requires the 
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant was not able to exercise his 
or her ‘moral choice’ when it came to carrying out the order and that he or she neither knew or 
believed that the order was manifestly illegal. This test incorporates both the subjective 
assessment of the mens rea and an objective assessment of what would have been reasonable 
under the circumstances. The ‘intermediate’ position operates to hold those personally 
responsible for carrying out criminal acts, while at the same time allows the external factors 
(ie the imperative to obey superior orders) to be incorporated as part of determining criminal 
responsibility.  
This thesis rejects the ‘absolute liability’ theory that holds a subordinate responsible merely for 
following unlawful orders for the reasons outlined and discussed below. Essentially, the reason 
why this thesis rejects the ‘absolute liability’ theory is that it fails to reflect the real and 
perceived consequences for a subordinate if they refuse to follow orders. At the same time this 
thesis rejects the respondeat superior position adopted by some who assert that subordinates 
should not be held responsible if they are merely following superior orders. The respondeat 
superior position fails to acknowledge that subordinates have agency and can lawfully reject 
orders they believe are illegal.  
The plea of superior orders is raised by an accused who seeks to avoid criminal responsibility 




whether the orders came from military or civilian sources.603  As has been shown by the 
examples cited in earlier chapters, the defence of superior orders was made throughout history, 
with varying degrees of success by those who have sought to rely on it. Superior orders has 
undergone a series of reformulations in its application to criminal responsibility over the course 
of WWI and WWII.604 One of the enduring problems with allowing the plea of superior orders 
to serve as a legitimate defence to war crimes is that it would validate conduct that would, 
under most circumstances, constitute brutal, criminal acts.605 On the other hand, to disregard 
completely any legitimacy to a plea of superior orders could lead to an unacceptable level of 
injustice imposed on the subordinate who merely followed what they believed to be a lawful 
superior order. 
This dilemma was succinctly put by A V Dicey in 1885: 
Hence the position of a soldier is in theory and may be in practice a difficult one. He may … be 
liable to be shot by a Court-martial if he disobeys an order, and to be hanged by a judge and jury 
if he obeys it.606 
In one of the seminal texts on the question of superior orders, The Defence of ‘Obedience to 
Superior Order’ in International Law, Yoram Dinstein describes the transformation in thinking 
within the international legal community of superior orders as a legitimate defence in 
international law.607 Dinstein asserts, with seeming approval from other scholars,608 that the 
legitimacy of superior orders as a defence throughout international legal history, has swung 
between ‘absolute liability’ on the one hand and ‘respondeat superior’ on the other.609 Kudo, 
however, describes a third position, which he suggests is an ‘intermediate position’ that takes 
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into consideration the invidious position of the subordinate yet ensures that certain acts remain 
within the realms of criminality, as will be explained below.610 
A. ‘Absolute Liability’ of the Subordinate a Failure of Justice 
Dinstein asserts that the proponents of absolute liability tend to adopt a binary position 
reflective of the notion that ‘obedience to orders does not create a defence per se, nor can it be 
taken into account within the compass of any other defence’.611 As such, the doctrine of 
absolute liability is the exact opposite of the defence of superior orders in so far as absolute 
liability presumes liability on the part of the subordinate for unlawful acts irrespective of 
whether the genesis of those acts emanated from orders of the subordinate’s superior(s). The 
doctrine of absolute liability cares not that the subordinate is under a legal obligation to follow 
orders, but rather that the subordinate has an obligation to differentiate between lawful and 
unlawful orders. If the subordinate fails to make an appropriate determination between lawful 
and unlawful orders and proceeds to commit acts that violate the laws of war in obedience to 
such orders, then liability will flow to the subordinate. 
The proponents of absolute liability arrive at their position more out of a rejection of the 
mischief which they believe exists in the doctrine of respondeat superior through the ‘upward 
transfer’ of liability from the subordinate to the superior.612 This ‘swinging of responsibility 
from one echelon of command to another’ results in ‘total immunity’ or, what has been 
described by some, as the ‘reductio ad absurdum’ which operates to avoid criminal 
responsibility being assigned to anyone.613 Such an undesirable outcome could allow the actual 
perpetrators to escape criminal responsibility—due to the favourable approach given to 
subordinates with the doctrine of respondeat superior—and also those who gave the order in 
the first place. What ensues is that each subordinate hides behind the orders of his superior—a 
situation so described by Appleman: 
The soldier says, ‘I shoot this man upon the sergeant’s orders’. The sergeant says, ‘Captain Hirsch 
issued a general order covering this situation’. Captain Hirsch refers to Major Blank, Major Blank 
to Colonel Jacobs, Colonel Jacobs to Lieutenant General Abrams, and Abrams refers to a 
directive of Goering. Goering says, ‘Ah yes, but the Fuhrer ordered it’.614 
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The same situation was succinctly put by Robert H Jackson, the US Chief Prosecutor at the 
Nuremberg Trials, when he stated that the ‘inference is that the doctrine of respondeat superior 
incites “international lawlessness” on a large scale’.615 
As to whether the position in modern times is one of absolute liability or respondeat superior, 
Paolo Gaeta concludes that ‘close scrutiny of national legislation and case law shows that the 
… customary rule on superior orders upholds the absolute liability approach’.616 Indeed, early 
proponents of the absolute liability approach cite ‘heavenly’ authority for their stance on the 
absolute liability of those who violate the ‘laws of nature’. Hugo Grotius espoused this ideal in 
the seventeenth century when he wrote that, ‘if the authorities issue any order that is contrary 
to the law of nature or to the commandments of God, the order should not be carried out.617 As 
Insco points out, the position adopted by Grotius and those who support this ideal, was 
predicated on the basis of ‘natural law’ and religion in the assignment of moral 
blameworthiness to subordinates who adhere to unlawful orders.618 
B. Mens Rea and Superior Orders 
Insco, an opponent of the absolute liability approach, argues that subordinates who obey 
unlawful orders from superiors should have available to them the defence of superior orders.619 
That argument is given some support if one is to believe that criminal responsibility should be 
limited to those who attempt or complete the physical elements of the offence in conjunction 
with possessing the requisite ‘guilty mind’. The mens rea, or ‘guilty mind’ that is used to 
attribute criminal responsibility under criminal law, is one aspect that both Dinstein and Insco 
argue should be present if an accused is to be criminally liable for carrying out unlawful orders 
from a superior. 
The principle of mens rea is one of the fundamental tenets of criminal law which has been used 
to attribute guilt to an accused person for centuries throughout common law jurisdictions. 
Given the important relationship that exists between mens rea and the attribution of criminal 
responsibility elsewhere, it is difficult to imagine why an assessment of the accused’s mind at 
the time of the commission of the alleged offence(s) would not be relevant. In other words, 
why is it that international criminal law relating to war crimes does not require one of the most 
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important elements of an offence—namely that of mens rea—to be at the forefront in the 
process of determining criminal responsibility? 
Dinstein asserts that the ‘mere fact of obedience [to superior orders] is of secondary 
importance’ and the fact that a person obeys what may or may not appear to be lawful orders 
should not constitute a ‘defence per se but only a factual element that may be taken into account 
in conjunction with the other circumstances of the given case ...’.620 He goes on to assert that 
‘only a lack of mens rea, … serves to protect from criminal responsibility’.621 
Accordingly, that a subordinate followed superior orders would merely constitute but one of a 
multitude of factual matters such as the ‘time when, and the place where, the offence was 
committed; just like the weapon by which it was carried out; and just like myriads of other 
circumstantial minutiae’.622 Dinstein’s position is clear when he states that ‘the mere fact that 
a defendant obeyed orders does not render him immune from criminal prosecution under 
international law’ and he may be convicted even when the offences are committed under 
superior orders.623 The existence of superior orders does, however, ‘contribute to the proof of 
lack of mens rea and consequently bring about the acquittal of the accused.’624 Similarly, Insco 
asserts that the ‘law does not seek to assign responsibility to those who do not deserve it and 
some degree of mental culpability is usually a condition precedent for determining [just] 
desserts.’625 
C. Respondeat Superior 
The doctrine of respondeat superior operates as a form of strict liability for superiors and 
assumes that a superior will bear responsibility for the acts of subordinates, even though he or 
she did not directly give the order in relation to the subordinate’s criminal act. The doctrine of 
respondeat superior has been argued by some to absolve subordinates from culpability, thereby 
acting as a form of defence to allegations of war crimes. One eminent legal theorist who 
supported the doctrine of respondeat superior was Lassa Oppenheim, as shown in his first five 
editions of the second volume of Treatise on International Law. Oppenheim was unequivocal 
in his position regarding the lack of liability that is attributable to subordinates where direct 
orders emanate from either the subordinate’s Government or his commanders. Oppenheim 
stated his position in the first edition of the Treatise published in 1906: 
Violations of rules regarding warfare are war crimes only when committed without an order of 
the belligerent Government concerned. If members of the armed forces commit violations by 
order of their Government, they are not war criminals and cannot be punished by the enemy; the 
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latter can, however, resort to reprisals. In case members of forces commit violations ordered by 
their commanders, the members may not be punished, for the commanders are alone responsible, 
and the latter may, therefore, be punished as war criminals on their capture by the enemy.  
It is clear from Oppenheim’s position that the outcomes for subordinates who obey unlawful 
orders from either their Government or their commanders is that they bear little liability. The 
difference, however, argued by Oppenheim, are the consequences for the issuing of unlawful 
orders insofar as enemy reprisals are lawful, if the unlawful orders come from the Government, 
and that commanders who issue unlawful orders are themselves held accountable for those 
orders (the situation being akin to command responsibility). 
The doctrine of respondeat superior arguably formed the underlying rationale for liability for 
acts committed in violation of the laws of war prior to WWI. Dinstein argues, however, that 
this doctrine was not without controversy, primarily due to the lack of authority that 
Oppenheim cited for his position. Despite this, there appears to have been little resistance in 
the literature to the doctrine at the time. As Dinstein notes, the lack of a challenge to 
Oppenheim’s respondeat superior doctrine was probably due to the fact that at the time the 
world was in a state of peace rather than conflict, and the cruelties which were to come in the 
subsequent two world wars were not yet contemplated.  
As it became clear in the subsequent decades, nations which suffered from the ravages of war 
were in no way amenable to sit back and allow the perpetrators—no matter how senior or junior 
in rank—to escape liability merely on the basis that they were obeying superior orders. Not 
long after WWI commenced, a stark re-evaluation of the respondeat superior doctrine began 
with a number of opponents arguing that it was not viable under international law.  
The basis of Oppenheim’s position appeared to be premised on the injustice that would result 
if a subordinate faced criminal charges merely for obeying something that he was ‘compelled 
by law to commit’. Thus, according to Oppenheim, the dilemma that is created through the 
collision of interests in preventing crime against the interests of maintaining military discipline, 
appears to be answered in favour of the subordinate. Oppenheim recognised the dilemma that 
existed for both subordinates and military discipline should a subordinate disobey superior 
orders, no matter how manifestly illegal the orders may have appeared. The respondeat superior 
doctrine, however, as argued by Insco, fails in a number of areas such as ‘favouring military 
efficiency to the complete neglect of criminal accountability’, and its ‘underinclusivity to 
assign responsibility in cases where a subordinate willingly follows an illegal order that he or 
she knows to be illegal’. 
D. An ‘Intermediate Position’? 
The ‘intermediate position’ is neither absolute in assigning guilt to the accused nor does it 
entirely relieve the accused of guilt for having committed an offence/atrocity/war crime?. 
Rather, the ‘intermediate position’ acknowledges the imperative that accompanies obedience 




committing the acts and, on that basis, they should not be completely absolved from criminal 
responsibility. The intermediate position, as argued by Kudo, can be divided into the following: 
1. the ‘moral choice test’; and 
2. the ‘manifest illegality principle’.626 
Kudo asserts that the ‘moral choice test’ permits the use of superior orders as a defence at times 
when ‘moral choice’ is impossible—in other words, when the accused feels they are unable to 
refuse the order.627 He fails to elaborate by providing examples of when such choices are 
impossible, but one could speculate that such instances might include when the subordinate is 
faced with grave consequences for failing to obey orders such as possible loss of liberty and/or 
life. Kudo asserts that the ‘moral choice test’ is subjective in nature since it would be necessary 
to subjectively ascertain whether the accused actually believed they had choices about whether 
or not to carry out the unlawful orders.628 
The second aspect of the ‘intermediate position’ which Kudo argues is the ‘manifest illegality’ 
principle. This principle, according to Kudo, is premised on the notion that a subordinate 
should escape criminal responsibility if they did not know (according to the test of a reasonable 
person) that the orders were unlawful. So, where the order was manifestly unlawful according 
to a reasonable person, they would not escape liability.629 
While Kudo’s ideas have some merit, what he fails to make clear is that the ‘moral choice test’ 
and the ‘manifest illegality principle’ are better described as factors of mitigation regarding the 
final sentence rather than factors affecting criminal responsibility. As such, an intermediate 
position would operate to mitigate the sentence rather than completely absolve the individual 
from criminal responsibility. As was shown throughout this thesis, the various tribunals that 
examined the question of superior orders were far more inclined to accept that superior orders 
could be used to mitigate the sentence rather than absolve the accused from criminal 
responsibility.630 
*** 
The purpose of this and the two preceding chapters regarding superior orders was to highlight 
the complexities and difficulties with which courts and tribunals have struggled in trying to 
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develop an optimal stance on superior orders. This chapter put forward a normative 
conceptualisation of superior orders and in doing so, it is hoped that that such a framework is 
useful for future trials where superior orders is an issue. The final issue that will be addressed 







HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF MILITARY NECESSITY 
I. Introduction 
By the end of August 1945, much of the Japanese home islands lay in smouldering ruins.631 A 
relentless Allied aerial bombing campaign had brought the once mighty Imperial Japan to a 
halt.632 Still, whatever pockets of resistance remained of the Japanese Imperial Army and Navy 
were enough to cause great apprehension in the minds of the Allied military and civilian 
planners as they advanced on the Japanese homeland. The President of the United States, Harry 
S Truman believed—as did most other Allied leaders—that any Allied landing force arriving 
on the shores of the Japanese main island Honshu would be met with fierce opposition from 
whatever military and non-military resistance remained. Such a potential threat, even for a 
well-armed, advancing Allied landing force, was a risk too great to take. 
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By the middle of 1945, the fate of the industrial cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, along with 
the lives of over 200,000 civilians, was settled. On 8 August 1945, the first atomic weapon to 
be used against human beings was dropped on the city of Hiroshima—a city with over 318,000 
people.633 Over 100,000 people were killed instantly with many more in the coming weeks, 
months and years.634 In a matter of days, a second bomb was detonated over the city of 
Nagasaki, an industrial city situated on the southern tip of the island of Kyushu. Similar to 
Hiroshima, the results were complete destruction of buildings, roads, railways and other vital 
infrastructure, and the annihilation of over 100,000 people within a 2.5 kilometre radius of the 
epicentre of the blast. Like Hiroshima, tens of thousands of people who initially survived the 
blast lived only to experience excruciating pain and suffering for months and years to come. 
The aftereffects of burns and radiation, with virtually no medical assistance, would have been 
horrific. Within days of the dropping of the atomic bombs, Japan’s war with the Allies was 
over. 
On what basis did the US Commander-in-Chief, President Truman, believe he had the legal 
authority under international law to issue an order that would, knowingly, lead to the deaths of 
so many non-combatants, and the destruction of civilian infrastructure, much of which was not 
directly related to Japan’s war effort? The answer to this question lies in the conceptualisation 
of what constitutes ‘necessity’ at law. The decision to use two atomic weapons against civilians 
was not taken lightly.635 The loss of US military personnel suffered during the Okinawan 
campaign was a particular cause for concern for Truman.636 He, like many of his Cabinet, 
believed that casualties would be far greater once they reached Honshu and the use of such 
weapons would pre-emptively alleviate that loss.637 
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Many factors played in the minds of those who made the decision to drop the atomic bombs 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Principally, the decision to strike an already embattled nation with 
two atomic weapons was justified at the time on the basis of ‘military necessity’—necessity to 
save the lives of untold numbers of US military personnel and to hasten the conclusion of a 
bloody and costly war. The US Administration believed that the deaths of countless Japanese 
non-combatants and the destruction of vital civilian infrastructure, while unfortunate, could be 
justified under international law through the doctrine of military necessity. 
Military necessity is a doctrine that permits belligerents to commit acts that would otherwise 
breach the rules and customs of war.638 It has long been recognised as a valid rationale for 
belligerents to fulfil their military objective when no reasonable alternatives exist. What would 
have necessitated the use of atomic weapons on two cities in Japan? Perhaps there is no one 
reason for this: it was necessary to use atomic weapons to hasten the end of the War, save US 
lives, to prevent Japan falling to the USSR, and to assert US military and geo-political 
dominance in North Asia. 
This chapter examines the apparent contradictions and inconsistencies in the application of 
military necessity over time. In short, the overall position adopted in this thesis regarding 
military necessity, as borne out by the cases from Manila and elsewhere, is that international 
law jurisprudence should not be expanded further to allow a broader acceptance of military 
necessity. The danger of allowing an expanded definition of military necessity—despite the 
apparent convenience to military and political decision-makers—is that to do so would 
inevitably result in greater suffering to non-combatants and unreasonably high US casualties. 
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II. Defining Military Necessity 
The jurisprudence surrounding military necessity predates WWI and WWII and can be traced 
to early human civilization.639 The regularity with which nations have deemed it necessary to 
engage in armed conflict is a constant theme throughout the ‘human project’. Some suggest 
that war is the natural ‘state’ and that it is more accurate to say that war is interrupted by an 
‘outbreak of peace’.640 Although the occurrence of war has been, and continues to be, an 
integral part of the human experience, less clear are the bases for the rules for engaging in a 
war of necessity and the circumstances in which criminality should follow the violation of 
those rules.641 As indicated by the mass aerial bombing campaigns that were carried out by 
both sides of the conflict during WWII, nations at war are prepared to go to extraordinary 
lengths to achieve what they believe are their military objectives. The important normative 
question is, however, what are the limits and the boundaries of these actions? Is it only the case 
that the victors get to decide what is and what is not considered ‘necessary’ and allowable 
during war? To answer this question, one must explore how the concept has been defined 
throughout the ages. 
The term ‘military necessity’ can generally be defined as those acts by a belligerent that serve 
to ‘legitimize destructive actions and to privilege military considerations at the cost of 
humanitarian values’.642 Prior to WWII, the term was undefined. In 1956, the United States 
Department of the Army Field Manual (‘US Army FM’) defines military necessity as: 
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that principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international law which are 
indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as soon as possible. Military 
necessity has been generally rejected as a defense for acts forbidden by the customary and 
conventional laws of war inasmuch as the latter have been developed and framed with 
consideration for the concept of military necessity.643 
Incorporating this definition of military necessity, pursuant to paragraph 41 of the US Army 
FM under the heading of ‘Unnecessary Killing and Devastation’, provides further clarification 
of the scope and limitations of what may lawfully be done in the field under the guise of 
military necessity. Paragraph 41 states that: 
loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained. Those who plan or decide upon an 
attack, therefore, must take all reasonable steps to ensure not only that the objectives are 
identified as military objectives or defended places … but also that these objectives may be 
attacked without probable losses in lives and damage to property disproportionate to the military 
advantage anticipated. Moreover, once a fort or defended locality has surrendered, only such 
further damage is permitted as is demanded by the exigencies of war, such as the removal of 
fortifications, demolition of military buildings, and destruction of military stores.644 
Downey, writing in 1953, posited that any lawful claim to military necessity must satisfy four 
elements comprising urgency, indispensability, regulated violence and non-prohibited laws. 
Downey states that: 
Military necessity is an urgent need, admitting of no delay, for the taking by a commander of 
measures, which are indispensable for forcing as quickly as possible the complete surrender of 
the enemy by means of regulated violence, and which are not forbidden by the laws and customs 
of war.645 
Kennedy and Andreopoulos argue that the nature of military necessity is subjective and that 
‘everything hangs upon a decision by generals and/or politicians as to what they judge to be 
needed’.646 They describe military necessity as a ‘catch all excuse’ and cite numerous examples 
of where military necessity was regarded as a legitimate excuse for engaging in conduct that 
would otherwise be contrary to the laws and customs of war.647 Similarly, Schmidt argues that 
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military necessity has been used to ‘justify horrendous abuses during armed conflicts’ and to 
legitimise the abrogation of the rules of international law.648 
A. United States v Russell 
The concept of ‘necessity’ in domestic and international law has been considered in a range of 
contexts. In 1871, the United States Supreme Court considered it in the case of United States v 
Russell.649 In Russell, the Court was required to consider an earlier decision handed down in 
the Court of Claims that awarded damages to Captain J H Russell—the owner of three steamers 
that were seized by authority of the United States Government. The circumstances of the 
seizure and use of the steamers by US authorities arose during the US Civil War when they 
were commandeered for reasons of military ‘emergency’. The US authorities seized the vessels 
for varying lengths of time to transport freight between various US ports. When Captain 
Russell claimed compensation, the US authorities argued that the Court of Claims had no 
legitimate jurisdictional basis on which to hear the matters as the property had been 
‘appropriated’ pursuant to an Act of Congress in 1864. In reference to the Act, the US 
authorities asserted that seizing the vessels amounted to an ‘appropriation’ by the US 
authorities which was beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, due to the wording of the 
Act which stated that: 
The jurisdiction of the said court shall not extend to or include any claim against the United 
States, growing out of the destruction or appropriation of, or damage to property by the army, 
navy, or any part of the army or navy engaged in the suppression of the rebellion, from the 
commencement to the close thereof.650 
The US Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the earlier decision of the Claims Court to 
award compensation of $41,355 to Captain Russell. In doing so it held that there was no 
evidence to suggest the extent and scope of use of the vessels indicated that the authorities 
intended to ‘appropriate’ the vessels for any length of time beyond the military emergency. 
The US authorities merely intended to ‘compel the captains and crews with such steamers to 
perform the services needed, and to pay a reasonable compensation for such services’.651 The 
Court therefore held that there was no ‘appropriation’ of the claimant’s property and that ‘each 
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of the steamers, so soon as the services for which they were respectively required had been 
performed, were returned to the exclusive possession and control of the claimant’.652 
In reaching its decision, however, the Court acknowledged that the justification for seizing 
private property in times of necessity is valid. It stated: 
Such a taking of private property by the Government, when the emergency of the public service 
in time of war or impending public danger is too urgent to admit of delay, is everywhere regarded 
as justified, if the necessity for the use of the property is imperative and immediate and the danger 
is impending.653 
Although rejecting the US Government’s argument on the definition of ‘appropriation’, the US 
Supreme Court did provide a useful description of the elements of military necessity. It 
includes a ‘public service’ aspect to the necessity, ‘in a time of war or impending public 
danger’. It also held that necessity occurs when there is some degree of urgency and the need 
for the use of the property is ‘imperative’ and ‘immediate’. 
B. Mitchell v Harmony 
In 1851, the US Supreme Court was asked to consider the meaning of ‘urgent necessity’ in the 
case of Mitchell v Harmony.654 Several years prior, when the United States was at war with 
Mexico, Harmony’s property was seized by Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell, an officer of the US 
army on the basis that Harmony was alleged to have been trading with the enemy and, as 
importantly, so as ‘to insur[e] the success of a distant expedition’.655 The ‘distant expedition’ 
to which the Court referred, related to a US expeditionary force that was to advance to a 
position forward of where Harmony was trading. To ensure the most favourable circumstances 
for the expedition, Lieutenant Colonel Mitchell, acting under the orders of Colonel A W 
Doniphan, ‘seized, took, drove, and carried away and converted to his own use the horses, 
mules, wagons, goods, chattels, and merchandise of the plaintiff and compelled the workmen 
and servants of the plaintiff having charge to abandon his service and devote themselves to the 
defendant’s service’.656 
Harmony, being an American sutler, had lawfully ventured into the Mexican provinces of 
Chihuahua and Santa Fe to trade with the occupying US army and Mexican locals. The 
lawfulness of Harmony’s activities was based on the fact that in 1845, the US Congress passed 
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an Act that allowed such trading to occur in certain areas. Thus, the Court held that Harmony 
was not in breach of any US laws in relation to trading with the enemy.657 
The basis of the Army’s claim for seizing Harmony’s property was predicated on the urgent 
necessity to confiscate the goods so that they would not fall into the hands of the enemy—thus 
depriving the enemy of some, albeit small, material advantage.658 The Army also claimed that 
seizure of the goods was compatible with the military objectives associated with the forward 
expedition, thereby satisfying a further necessity. The case report does not explain why or how 
the Army arrived at this conclusion. However, in considering the Army’s claims, the Court 
examined the nature of the urgency of the necessity in confiscating the goods. The Court 
determined that, as a general rule, private property could indeed ‘be taken by a military 
commander to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy or for the purpose of 
converting it to the use of the public’.659 However, the important thing is that there must be an 
immediate and impending danger or an urgent necessity in taking the goods. The Court held 
that possession of private property must not be taken ‘for the purpose of insuring the success 
of a distant expedition upon which he is about to march’.660 
The problem for the Court was that the Army was unable to show that there was any such 
urgency that would warrant the seizure of the goods in the manner in which they were taken 
from Harmony. The Court ruled that the property was not taken to defend military positions or 
to repel an advancing attack, but merely for a possible advantage at some point in the future.661 
This lacked any sense of urgency that would necessitate taking private property. On that basis, 
the Army was ordered by the Court to pay Harmony restitution. 
C. William Hardman (Great Britain v United States) 
An example can be seen of where the actions of one party did constitute a valid military 
necessity in Hardman’s case.662 In 1898, in the period during the war between the United States 
and Spain, the United States military occupied the Cuban town of Siboney. The US Army 
burned and destroyed a number of dwellings and other property in the town to prevent the 
spread of yellow fever among US military personnel. One of the houses destroyed belonged to 
a British citizen by the name of William Hardman. On behalf of Hardman, the British 
government brought an action against the US government seeking an amount of £142 on 
account of the destroyed property. 
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The US government claimed that because they were in a time of war, the right arose to ‘destroy 
private property for the preservation of the health of the army … and that such authorized 
destruction constituted an act of military necessity … and did not give rise to any legal 
obligation to make compensation’.663 Britain argued that the US did have such a right because 
Hardman’s loss did not constitute a ‘necessity of war’; rather the US Army carried out the 
destruction simply to ‘better secure the comfort and health of the United States troops’. For 
that reason, they argued compensation should be payable.664 The question for the Tribunal was 
whether, under the circumstances, the destruction of the private property ‘was or was not a 
necessity of war’.665 
In arguing its case, the US adduced evidence from Brigadier-General George H Torney, 
Surgeon General of the United States Army, who believed that the sanitary conditions in the 
town were such that the destruction of property was necessary.666 Britain failed to produce any 
contrary evidence that contradicted or negated that evidence in relation to the degree of health 
risks. 
On the question of necessity, the Tribunal established that the necessity of war for the United 
States in this case was primarily ‘the occupation of Siboney, and that occupation, which was 
not criticized by the British Government, involved the necessity, according to medical 
authorities … of taking the said sanitary measures’.667 It is apparent that the necessity primarily 
related to the occupation of the town of Siboney and the necessity of destroying the property 
was necessarily directly related to maintaining the occupation. On that basis, the Tribunal held, 
‘the presence of the United States troops at Siboney was a necessity of war and the destruction 
of civilian property required for their safety was consequently a necessity of war’.668 The 
Tribunal ruled in favour of the United States. 
 
 
663 Ibid, 25. 
664 Ibid. 
665 Ibid, 26. 
666 Brigadier-General Torney was present at the town when the order was given to destroy the 
property and was believed to have a sufficient understanding of the scientific and health conditions 
for which the order was made. 
667 William Hardman, 26. 
668 Ibid. Although the Tribunal agreed that the action taken by the United States did constitute a valid 
necessity of war, in the closing paragraph of the decision, it urged the United States, on the basis of 
‘humanitary conduct’, to compensate the plaintiff’s losses ‘as a matter purely of grace and favour … 
when the sufferer appears to be specially worthy of interest’, despite there not being any legal 




D. The Lieber Code 
Carnahan asserts that the modern conceptualisation of the law of war stems from the 1860s.669 
Specifically, he cites a number of key developments starting in 1862 with Dunant’s Un 
Souvenir de Solferino which, two years later, led to the first Geneva Convention on the 
treatment of the sick and wounded.670 Following these developments was the promulgation of 
the Declaration Renouncing Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes.671  However, even 
more prescient than these developments, argues Carnahan, was the promulgation in the United 
States of the Lieber Code672 which ‘may be considered the final product of the eighteenth-
century movement to humanize war through the application of reason’.673 
He argues that one of the most significant influences on the development of the Lieber Code 
was the ‘identification of military necessity as a general legal principle to limit violence, in the 
absence of any other rule’.674 Bringing the skill and knowledge gained from combat during the 
Waterloo campaign and the Greek War of Independence, Francis Lieber was able to codify 
laws in relation to how the American Civil War should be conducted.675 Drafted during a 
tumultuous time in American history meant that the Lieber Code provided a significant 
contribution to creating a legal framework to deal with a number of urgent issues incident of 
the War. For instance, how to treat Confederate prisoners, how to deal with guerilla fighters, 
the creation of offences and punishment, and so on. From a political point of view, argues 
Carnahan, Francis Lieber offered the Lincoln administration an attractive way to ‘accord 
individual Confederates the privileges of belligerency for humanitarian reasons, without in any 
way recognizing the legitimacy of their government’.676 
 
 
669 Burrus M Carnahan, ‘Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the 
Principle of Military Necessity’ (1989) 92(2) The American Journal of International Law 213, 213. 
For these assertions, Carnahan cites various authorities – see, eg, Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise 
History of the Law of Nations (rev ed 1954); Henry Dunant, A Memory of Solferino (English ed 
1959). 
670 Ibid. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, 
Opened for signature 22 August 1864. 
671 Declaration Renouncing the Use in War of Certain Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes 
Weight, opened for signature 29 November 1868 (entered into force 11 December 1868). 
672 General Orders 100, Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the 
Field, Article 14. (‘Lieber Code’) or (the ‘Code’). 
673 Carnahan (n 669) 213. 
674 Ibid. 
675 Ibid, 214. 
676 Ibid. Carnahan cites as authority for this proposition Richard S Hartigan, Lieber’s Code and the 




The Lieber Code came into force at Washington DC on 24 April 1863 with the title, 
‘Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field’.677 The Code 
comprises ten sections, each dealing with a specific issue in relation to matters arising during 
war.678 Section I deals with three provisions directly related to military necessity.679 Article 14 
states that: 
Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those 
measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of war, and which are lawful according 
to the modern law and usages of war. 
Article 14 defines, in broad terms, the meaning of military necessity. The definition of military 
necessity incorporates an understanding that certain conduct in war—which might otherwise 
be contrary to the principles of humanity—is legitimate providing the conduct is engaged in 
by the belligerent on the basis of ‘necessity’ and is intended to achieve the goal of securing an 
end to war. Is such a provision, therefore, a denouncement of, and a departure from the 
principles espoused by, for example, the likes of earlier military thinkers such as Clausewitz? 
Clausewitz saw the sole object of war as the ‘disarmament’ of the enemy—to lead to an end of 
hostilities and an eventual political conclusion. 680  There is one significant qualification 
between what acts may legitimately be deemed necessary in accordance with Article 14 and 
the concept of necessity espoused by earlier military thinkers, such as Clausewitz. The 
difference is the explicit limitation that Article 14 places on the belligerent. The provision 
requires that the conduct itself is limited to being lawful in accordance with the ‘modern law 
and usage of war’. Such a limitation does not appear to be a requirement in the Clausewitzian 
framework. For that reason it can be argued that the Lieber Code was an express departure 
from the rules of war that existed at that time in relation to military necessity. 
 
 
677 Lieber Code reprinted in Leon Friedman (ed) The Law of War: A Documentary History Volume 1 
(Random House, 1972) 158. 
678 Ibid, 158–86 citing the Lieber Code, Sections I–X. Section I deals with Martial Law, Military 
Jurisdiction, Military Necessity and Retaliation; Section II addresses Public and Private Property of 
the Enemy, Protection of Persons, and Especially of Women, of Religion, the Arts and Sciences, 
Punishment of Crimes against the Inhabitants of Hostile Countries; Section III deals with Deserters, 
Prisoners of War, Hostages and Booty on the Battlefield; Section IV – Partisans, Armed Enemies Not 
Belonging to the Hostile Army, Scouts, Armed Prowlers and War Rebels; Section V – Safe Conduct, 
Spies, War Traitors, Captured Messengers; Section VI – Exchange of Prisoners, Flags of Truce, 
Abuse of the Flag of Truce and Flags of Protection; Section VII – The Parole; Section VIII – 
Armistice and Capitulation; Section IX – Assassination; and Section X – Insurrection, Civil War and 
Rebellion. 
679 General Orders 100, Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the 
Field, Articles 14, 15 and 16. 




The question, what is ‘lawful’ in accordance with ‘modern law and usage of war’ can be 
ascertained in the preceding and subsequent Articles of the Code.681 In other words, it operated 
as an all-encompassing interpretive framework setting forth the rules of war, and reference to 
lawfulness ‘according to the modern law and usages of war’ in Article 14, simply meant 
according to the Code itself and the rules contained therein. The lex scripta that bound the 
Union soldiers was contained in the Code and, therefore, provided the legal framework for how 
Union soldiers could operate during that conflict.682Article 15 of the Lieber Code states that: 
Military necessity admits of all destruction of life or limb of armed enemies, and of other persons 
whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of war; it allows of the 
capturing of every armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hostile government, or 
of peculiar danger to the captor; it allows of all destruction of property, and obstruction of the 
ways and channels of traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance or 
means of life from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an enemy’s country affords 
necessary for the subsistence and safety, and safety of the army, and of such deception as does 
not involve the breaking of good faith either positively pledged, regarding agreements entered 
into during the war, or supposed by the modern law of war to exist. Men who take up arms against 
one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one 
another and to God.683 
Article 15 is a further qualification of the definition of military necessity that is contained in 
Article 14. It accepts that acts committed under the auspices of military necessity include 
killing and wounding of ‘armed enemies’. It also accepts that under a legitimate claim of 
military necessity it is acceptable to kill others—such as non-combatants—‘whose destruction 
is incidentally unavoidable’. The modern understanding of that assertion is colloquially known 
 
 
681 For example, see Sections I–X of the Lieber Code.  
682 See Schmitt (n 656) 801, especially footnote 20. Schmitt claims that there is only minimal 
reference to the notion of military necessity arising within the lex scripta and that the Lieber Code 
was a significant contribution to it. Schmitt correctly points out that the Lieber Code was a national 
regulation and not a treaty, however, the significance of the rules contained within the Lieber Code 
led to the creation of much of the subsequent international humanitarian law. 
683 Lieber Code as cited in Leon Friedman (ed) The Law of War: A Documentary History Volume 1 




as ‘collateral damage’684 and is still regarded as an acceptable, although unfortunate, incidence 
of war.685 
Article 16 of the Lieber Code states that: 
Military necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of 
suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort 
confessions. It does not admit of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of 
a district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general, military necessity 
does not include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult. 
This provision provides further qualification of what is not acceptable within the auspices of 
military necessity. There is an emphasis on the prohibited conduct in relation to ‘revenge’ and 
‘torture’. The same principles regarding revenge—or reprisal killings—were applied in the 
Nuremberg trials in the Hostages case where a number of German officers failed in their 
attempt to argue that the killing of civilians was necessary to prevent insurrection against, and 
 
 
684 The term appears ubiquitously in a variety of contexts, including throughout scholarly disciplines, 
especially within the field of medical science, see, eg, Erik von Elm and Markus K Diener, ‘The 
Language of War in Biomedical Journals’ (2007) 369 The Lancet 274; Sheila M Bird, ‘Military and 
Public Health Sciences Need to Ally’ (2004) 364 The Lancet 1831. In the context of war, the term is 
now synonymous—often used pejoratively—with the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, and appears 
commonly throughout scholarly literature and popular culture. See, eg, Michael Mandel, How 
America Gets Away with Murder: Illegal Wars, Collateral Damage and Crimes Against Humanity 
(Pluto Press, 2004) especially Part I Illegal Wars/ Collateral Damage; Bruce Cronin, ‘Reckless 
Endangerment Warfare: Civilian Casualties and the Collateral Damage Exception in International 
Humanitarian Law’ (2013) 50(2) The Journal of Peace Research 13; Robert McCAdams, ‘Iraq’s 
cultural heritage: Collateral damage’ (2001) 293 The American Association for the Advancement of 
Science 13; Michael Welch, Crimes of Power and States of Impunity: The US Response to Terror 
(Rutgers University Press, 2009) especially pages 113–35; In the context of war, the term also refers 
to damage incidental to combatants such as post-traumatic stress disorder – see, eg, Terri Tanielian 
and Lisa H Jaycox (eds), Invisible Wounds of War: Psychological and Cognitive Injuries, Their 
Consequences, and Services to Assist Recovery (Rand, 2008). 
685 In 2006, responding to over 240 separate allegations of war crimes committed in the course of the 
Coalition’s invasion of Iraq, the Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court (‘ICC’), 
investigated, inter alia, ‘allegations concerning the targeting of civilians or clearly excessive attacks’ 
and ‘allegations concerning wilful killing or inhuman treatment of civilians’. On both counts, the 
prosecutor’s office found no evidence to substantiate the allegations, despite the clear evidence of 
high civilian casualties. The ICC was unable to act upon civilian deaths due to the ‘specific gravity 
threshold … set down in Article 8(1) [of the Rome Statute]’. See open letter from Luis Moreno-
Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 9 February 2006  
<https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/04D143C8-19FB-466C-AB77-4CDB2FDEBEF7/143682 
/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf> 4–10.; Rome Statute Article 8(2)(b)(i) 





the killing of German soldiers in various theatres throughout Europe. 686  Article 16 also 
prohibits the use of poison and the ‘devastation of a district’—acts considered making the 
return to ‘peace unnecessarily difficult’. 
Article 19 permits for necessity in relation to surprise attacks by stating that: 
Commanders, whenever admissible, inform the enemy of their intention to bombard a place, so 
that the noncombatants, and especially the women and children, may be removed before the 
bombardment commences. But it is no infraction of the common law of war to omit thus to inform 
the enemy. Surprise may be necessary. 
The corollary of the principles espoused throughout the Lieber Code provide a substantial 
addition to the lex scripta in relation to the law of necessity, not only for subsequent 
jurisprudence regarding the laws of armed conflict during the American Civil War and its 
immediate aftermath, but it also served as a valuable precursor to the legal understanding and 
application to major international conflicts including the various tribunals conducted after the 
Pacific War. 
E. Duncan v Kahanamoku 
In 1946, the US Supreme Court reversed two earlier decisions of the United States District 
Court for Hawaii in relation to the denial of habeas corpus. 687  The case of Duncan v 
Kahanamoku involved two US civilians—White and Duncan—who were charged and 
convicted separately for offences committed while Hawaii was under martial law in the 
aftermath of the Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor. White was charged with offences involving 
embezzlement on 20 August 1942. He was arrested and brought before a military tribunal and 
was denied the right to a jury. Duncan was arrested on 22 February 1944 for offences involving 
‘brawls’ with US marines and was tried and convicted before a military tribunal. The decisions 
of the military tribunals were challenged by White and Duncan in the District Court for Hawaii 
in 1944 with that Court reversing the earlier decisions of the military tribunals on the basis of 
jurisdictional error. The District Court held that there was insufficient argument for ‘military 
necessity’ that would justify denying the prisoners’ constitutional rights to a trial in a regular 
court. The District Court held that the only reason why civilians would come before a military 
tribunal, even under martial law, is if, 
required by military necessity due to actual or threatened invasion, which even if it did exist on 
December 7, 1941, did not exist when the petitioners were tried; and that, whatever the necessity 
 
 
686 United States v List (Wilhelm) and Ors, (‘Hostages case’) Case No 7, (1948) 8 LRTWC 34, 
reprinted in William Schabas and Göran Sluiter (eds) Oxford Reports on International Law 
<http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:icl/491us48.case.1/law-icl-491us48>. See below n 686 for 
further explanation of the facts and legal rationale associated with the Hostage case. 




for martial law, there was no justification for trying them in military tribunals rather than the 
regular courts of law.688 
The Circuit Court of Appeal, however, later reversed the District Court’s verdicts on the basis 
of, what it believed, the broad powers conferred upon the military under s 67 of Hawaiian 
Organic Act. The powers of the Act, according to the Court of Appeal, included the power to 
remove the constitutional right of habeas corpus.689 On appeal, the US Supreme examined the 
scope of military power during martial law and disagreed with the Circuit Court of Appeal. 
The Supreme Court indicated that there was no practical reason martial law would preclude the 
right of habeas corpus and a jury trial, unless the 
dangers apprehended by the military were … sufficiently imminent to cause them to require 
civilians to evacuate the area or even to evacuate any of the buildings necessary to carry on the 
business of the courts. In fact the [Court] buildings had long been open and actually in use for 
certain kinds of trials.690 
That the military tried the individuals some two or more years after the Pearl Harbor attacks—
conditions that were no longer in what could be described as imminently dangerous—the Court 
ruled that there was no valid reason for which to suspend habeas corpus to White and Duncan 
and reversed the District Court’s ruling. 
In its majority judgment, the Court made it clear that there needed to be exceptional 
circumstances for which to elevate the powers of a military tribunal beyond its usual powers. 
The necessity for which the Court alluded to must be capable of disturbing the long established 
‘political philosophy’ of the ‘boundaries between military and civilian power’.691 
F. United States v List (Wilhelm) and Ors (the Hostage Case) 
The US Military Tribunal in the United States v List (Wilhelm) and ors, (‘Hostage case’) Case 
No 7, (1948) 8 LRTWC 34692 rejected the argument that military necessity could be used to 
defend reprisal killings to compel the submission of the enemy. In 1947, the German Field 
Marshall, Wilhelm List, and eleven other senior-ranking German officers were charged with a 
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Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. Section 67 of the Act suspended the 
constitutional writ of habeas corpus and authorised the Territory’s Governor to take action ‘in case of 
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691 Ibid 324. 
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range of offences including committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. The 
prosecution alleged that each of the defendants were accessories to the unlawful killing of 
civilians across a wide area of German occupied territory, including Greece, Yugoslavia, 
Norway and Albania. It was alleged that the accused either issued orders, or were central in the 
systematic apprehension, torture and killing of civilians. The Tribunal’s Carter J summed up 
the indictment by stating that each of the accused: 
participated in a deliberate scheme of terrorism and intimidation, wholly unwarranted and 
unjustified by military necessity, by the murder, ill-treatment and deportation to slave labor of 
prisoners of war and members of the civilian populations in territories occupied by the German 
armed forces; by plundering and pillaging public and private property and wantonly destroying 
cities, towns, and villages for which there was no military necessity.693 
The acts perpetrated by the German forces were in response to civilian insurrection and reprisal 
attacks from resistance movements throughout the German occupied territory. Orders were 
given that, for every German soldier killed, 100 hostages would be executed; and for every 
German soldier injured, 50 hostages would be executed.694 
As part of their defence, the accused claimed that hostages were taken on the basis of military 
necessity to prevent the killing of German forces and to maintain order within the occupied 
territories. On the plea of necessity, Carter J discussed at length a number of salient points in 
relation to the applicability of necessity as it relates to the killing of hostages in time of war. 
He claimed that the ‘origination’ of killing civilians in modern times as a retaliatory act, lies 
squarely at the feet of Germany.695 While acknowledging that British, American and French 
field manuals allow reprisal killings of civilians ‘as a last resort’,696 no evidence was presented 
at the time that such actions were taken by forces other than Germany. 
Carter J was critical of the ‘complete failure on the part of the world to limit or mitigate the 
practice [of killing civilians as reprisals] by conventional rule’, and for that reason he was 
 
 
693 Hostages case. 
694 Ibid [17]. 
695 Ibid [68]. Carter J cited a number of examples in the judgment where the German army targeted 
the killing of civilians, including, the Franco-Prussian War, World War I and World War II. Carter J 
claimed that ‘no other nation has resorted to the killing of members of the civilian population to 
secure peace and order insofar as our investigation has revealed.’ 
696 Ibid. As cited by Carter J: The American manual provides in part [Rules of Land Warfare, US 
Army, Field Manual 27–10, op. cit. supra, par. 358d, p. 89–90.]: ‘The offending forces or populations 
generally may lawfully be subjected to appropriate reprisals. Hostages taken and held for the declared 
purpose of insuring against unlawful acts by the enemy forces or people may be punished or put to 
death if the unlawful acts are nevertheless committed.’; and the British field manual provides in part 
[British Manual of Military Law, par. 458.]: ‘Although collective punishment of the population is 
forbidden for the acts of individuals for which it cannot be regarded as collectively responsible, it may 
be necessary to resort to reprisals against a locality or community, for some act committed by its 




required to apply customary law to reach an outcome.697 In discussing the general principle of 
military necessity, Carter J asserted that the Germans ‘confuse for convenience and strategical 
interests’ correct usage of military necessity. He goes on to state that, ‘where legality and 
expediency have coincided, no fault can be found … but where legality of action is absent, 
[killing civilians] as a measure of reprisal is not only criminal but it has the effect of destroying 
the basic relationship between the occupant and the population’.698 His Honour identified 
serious deficiencies with the way the accused controlled the population by taking reprisal 
hostages. What is necessary, argued Carter J, is a ‘proclamation’ clearly indicating 
consequences in the event the perpetrators are not apprehended. However, if the ‘perpetrators 
are apprehended, there is no right to kill either hostage prisoners or reprisal prisoners’.699 His 
Honour went on to state that a belligerent would not have the right, under international law, to 
execute reprisal prisoners unless the entire population from which the prisoners are taken is a 
party to the acts committed by the perpetrators. In other words, there is no right to arbitrarily 
assign collective guilt to an entire group for the actions of a few. Even more importantly, if the 
reprisal hostages are taken from communities other than those from where the perpetrators are 
not from, then there is little deterrent effect in taking hostages.700 He also stated that the scope 
of reprisals must not exceed the actual offences committed and that there must be some form 
of proportionality associated with them.701 He stated that ‘fundamental concepts of justice and 
the rights of individuals’ require that the belligerent provide a fair trial prior to pronouncement 
of sentence and execution.702 On the issue of military necessity, His Honour summed up by 
stating: 
Military necessity permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount and kind 
of force to compel the complete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of 
time, life and money. In general, it sanctions measures by an occupant necessary to protect the 
safety of his forces and to facilitate the success of his operations. It permits the destruction of life 
of armed enemies and other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the armed 
conflicts of the war; it allows the capturing of armed enemies and others of peculiar danger, but 
it does not permit the killing of innocent inhabitants for purposes of revenge or the satisfaction 
of a lust to kill. The destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively demanded by the 
necessities of war. Destruction as an end in itself is a violation of international law. There must 




697 Ibid, [70]. 
698 Ibid, [71]. 
699 Ibid, [72]. 
700 Ibid, [73]. 
701 Ibid. 
702 Ibid, [74]. Although Carter J does allude to the fact that trials conducted in war time may give the 
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preventing ‘cruelty’ and ‘injustice’. 




While expressly acknowledging the legitimacy of military necessity, and alluding to some of 
the circumstances in which it might arise, Carter J was forthright in his assessment of the 
limitations and boundaries as to when military necessity can legitimately be argued. Clearly, it 
is accepted that any claim to military necessity will be subject to the ‘laws of war’. While 
accepting that military necessity be claimed by a belligerent to ‘protect the safety of his forces’ 
and to ‘facilitate the success of his operations’—including the destruction of life as a natural 
incidence of war—there are limitations to such a claim. Carter J held that killing premised on 
revenge, or ‘the satisfaction of a lust to kill’, falls outside of the scope of any legitimate plea 
of military necessity. The actions of the accused in their part in the reprisal killings, in Carter 
J’s view, clearly fell outside of the scope of a legitimate claim to military necessity. The 
circumstances for which List and others stood accused, in no way satisfied this basic test. 704 
Carter J did not believe that there was any necessity—or indeed whether there was anything to 
be achieved—in the execution of civilians on the basis of reprisals. The Tribunal found List 
guilty of three of the four charges and sentenced him, and another, to life imprisonment. 
Another six defendants were also found guilty and received varying sentences between seven 
and twenty years imprisonment. Two defendants were found not guilty of any of the charges, 
one committed suicide, and one lacked the capacity to stand trial.705 
The limitations to which the Tribunal in the Hostages case alluded, were, at the time clearly 
provided for at international law and did not constitute substantially new ground. Schmitt 
argues that the relationship between military necessity and international humanitarian law 
represents a fine balance ‘which seeks to limit the suffering and destruction incident to 
warfare’. 706  Such limitations were provided for by way of codification in numerous 
international law instruments. 
 
 
704 It is important to note that military necessity was not the only concept under judicial consideration 
as part of the trial. The Tribunal faced further questions associated with whether List and the others 
were criminally responsible for orders that came from as far up the chain of command as Hitler 
himself. Thus, the Tribunal grappled with questions relating to the criminal responsibility of the 
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the Tribunal held, as was commonplace in other Allied tribunals, that an unlawful order—no matter 
from whom—was unlawful per se and that the excuse of superior orders would in no way relieve 
individual responsibility from those carrying out such orders. Although, it must be said that perhaps 
there was some, albeit tacit, acknowledgement of superior orders playing some part in the conduct of 
the accused. Such an acknowledgment being reflected in the sentencing whereby none of those 
sentenced received the death sentence. 
705 Hostages case. 
706 Michael N Schmitt, ‘Military Necessity and Humanity International Humanitarian Law: Preserving 
the Delicate Balance’ (2010) 50(4) Virginia Journal of International Law 795, 796, 816. Schmitt 
states that the balance between military necessity and humanity exists ‘in fragile equipoise’ in 




G. Military Necessity and the Declaration of St Petersburg 
The Declaration of St Petersburg, December 1868, was a declaration renouncing the use in 
war of certain explosive projectiles that ‘fixe[s] by a common accord the technical limits within 
which the necessities of war ought to yield to the demands of humanity …707 In furtherance of 
this object, the Declaration stated: 
That the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as possible the 
calamities of war; 
That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to 
weaken the military forces of the enemy; 
That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men; 
That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which uselessly aggravate the 
sufferings of disabled men, or render their death inevitable; 
The Declaration makes it an express requirement to reduce as much as possible the ‘calamities 
of war’, while at the same time stipulating that there is but one legitimate object during war, 
which is reducing the capacity of the military forces of the enemy. The emphasis which the 
Declaration places on the weakening of enemy forces by disabling the greatest number of men, 
is a recognition of the kriegsraison doctrine. The qualification of the kriegsraison doctrine 
occurs in the proceeding sentence which serves to particularise the excessive use of, in this 
case, weapons that ‘uselessly aggravate’ the suffering of ‘disabled men, or render their death 
inevitable’. Such weapons, according to the Declaration, are those employed by ‘military or 
naval forces that employ any projectile of less weight than four hundred grammes, which is 
explosive, or is charged with fulminating or inflammable substances’. In other words, weapons 
designed to disable an individual to such an extent that there is no useful, or beneficial, military 
objective achieved as a result of the employment of that particular weapon. 
Some years later, the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 made it clear that there are 
limitations to a belligerent’s right to use whatever means necessary to achieve a military 
objective: 
Article 22: The right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.708 
 
 
707 Declaration Renouncing the Use in War of Certain Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes 
Weight, opened for signature 29 November 1868 (entered into force 11 December 1868) 
(‘Declaration’). The Declaration was the first formal international agreement which sought to restrict 
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?action=openDocument&documentId=3C02BAF088A50F61C12563CD002D663B>. 





Article 23 In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially 
forbidden: … 
(g) To destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively 
demanded by the necessities of war;709 
H. Military Necessity and the Destruction of Infrastructure and other Property 
Aside from being used as a justification for the use of force against combatants and non-
combatants, military necessity provides a legitimate basis for the destruction of property and 
infrastructure—including both military and non-military related property. 710  Necessity in 
relation to the destruction of property, in this discussion, refers to both cultural heritage 
property and property associated with combatant and non-combatant infrastructure—that is, 
any physical property that is subject to destruction during armed conflict. That one would adopt 
such a wide definition of property is logical given the destructive capacities of war. 
According to Forrest, cultural property is often damaged intentionally during war—for 
example, where property is used to ‘shield’ military equipment; or where property is destroyed 
through pillaging.711 Property is also destroyed unintentionally through the natural incidence 
 
 
opened for signature 29 July 1899 (‘Hague II’); Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land and its annex art 22 The Hague, opened for signature 18 October 1907 (‘Hague IV’). 
709 Hague IV, article 23(g). 
710 The Lieber Code reprinted in Leon Friedman (ed) The Law of War: A Documentary History 
Volume 1 (Random House, 1972). See especially Articles XIV, XV, XVI, XXXVIII, and XLIV. Also, 
for a contemporary definition of cultural property, see UNESCO definition of cultural property. See 
Article 1. Definition of cultural property Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
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(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every 
people, such as monuments of architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; 
archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic 
interest; works of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or 
archaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important collections of 
books or archives or of reproductions of the property defined above; 
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable cultural 
property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such as museums, large libraries and depositories 
of archives, and refuges intended to shelter, in the event of armed conflict, the movable 
cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a); 
(c) centers containing a large amount of cultural property as defined in sub-paragraphs (a) 
and 
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of war. The importance of protecting cultural property during times of war has been recognised 
in various lex scripta throughout history. For example, the Lieber Code provides several 
provisions that aim to protect various institutions and repositories of cultural property 
emanating from religious institutions, museums, and places of education. 712  Specific 
provisions under Section II of the Lieber Code—ie Articles 35 and 36—provide rules for the 
protection and preservation of private property of the enemy, including property in relation to 
religion, the arts and sciences.713 
At the international level, the Hague Convention of 1907 similarly provides protection for 
property.714 Article 23(g) prohibits the destruction or seizure of ‘the enemy’s property, unless 
such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war’. In relation to 
cultural property, the Hague IV provides protection of cultural property by virtue of Articles 
27 and 56. Article 27 provides that: 
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, 
buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, 
hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used 
at the time for military purposes. It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such 
buildings or places by distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy 
beforehand.715 
Article 56 provides that: 
The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, 
the arts and sciences, even when State property, shall be treated as private property. All seizure 
of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions of this character, historic monuments, works 
of art and science, is forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal proceedings.716 
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Article 36: 
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Throughout much of the literature that deals with war and military necessity, there appears to 
be general agreement regarding the contemporary origins of the principles associated with 
military necessity.717 As with much of international law, the origins of military necessity have 
historical roots stemming from the rules promulgated in the chivalric period. As stated by 
Henkin, ‘modern international law has addressed the rules of war—the offspring of the age of 
chivalry’.718 Downey, writing in 1953, begins his survey of the law of necessity from its 
beginnings within the concept of Kriegsraison. 719  Downey asserts that the pure 
conceptualization of Kriegsraison represents an understanding that necessity ‘overrode all 
law’.720 Such an understanding, however, as Downey goes on to state, is tempered with new 
conceptualisations of military necessity that came from the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg in the aftermath of World War II, that held that ‘military necessity is governed by 
positive international law’.721 
Prussian born soldier and philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz, in his seminal work of the early 
nineteenth century—Clausewitz on War—stressed that the sole objective of war is to disarm 
the enemy: disarmament being the necessary precursor to achieving the ‘political’ objective.722 
Then, and only then, will the enemy be forced to make peace.723 An intention ‘to do him 
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is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will … and in order to attain 
this object fully, the enemy must be disarmed, and disarmament becomes therefore the immediate 
object of hostilities in theory...725 
The necessity which Clausewitz writes is the disarmament and the eventual cessation of armed 
conflict leading to the political goal. Clausewitz makes it quite clear that to achieve the interim 
and final goals, the military objective is to be achieved from whatever means available. For 
instance, Clausewitz writes, 
Now, philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skillful method of disarming and overcoming 
an enemy without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the Art of War. 
However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated; for in such 
dangerous things as War, the errors of which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are the worst. 
… it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the bloodshed involved, 
must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigour in its application. The former then 
dictates the law to the latter, …726 
He went on to say: 
This is the way in which the matter must be viewed, and it is to no purpose, it is even against 
one’s own interest, to turn away from the consideration of the real nature of the affair because 
the horror of its elements excites repugnance. If the Wars of civilized people are less cruel and 
destructive than those of savages, the difference arises from the social condition both of States in 
themselves and in their relations to each other. Out of this social condition and its relations War 
arises, and by it War is subjected to conditions, is controlled and modified. But these things do 
not belong to War itself; they are only given conditions; and to introduce into the philosophy of 
War itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity.727 
The corollary of Clausewitz’s argument is that acts committed during times of war must be 
seen in their relationship to the overall goal, and that necessity in achieving that goal will dictate 
the nature of those acts committed. Clausewitz asserts that ‘control’ and ‘modification’ of 
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behaviour during war—presumably through the implementation of rules of war—have no place 
in the nature of war and are, in fact, an ‘absurdity’. A pragmatist focused solely on achieving 
a military objective might agree there is some merit to this notion. To impose rules upon acts, 
such as killing in time of war, is not only oxymoronic but also an anathema to achieving the 
subjugation and eventual disarmament of one’s enemy. Indeed control and modification of 
what is permissible in times of war was a firm tenet of, for example, those involved with the 
American Civil War.728 
In 1921, Elihu Root, the then President of the American Society of International Law, raised 
concerns of the inherent dangers associated with kriegsraison as a doctrine of international 
law.729 The danger lies, according to Root, in that the belligerent is the ‘sole judge’ as to what 
constitutes a valid ‘necessity’ which justifies a violation of international law. Root suggests 
that international law—with the adoption of kriegsraison—becomes, in effect, superfluous, or 
‘no more’ and that the result will be a ‘world without law, in which alliances of some nations 
… enforce their ideals of suitable conduct upon other nations’.730 
Having now outlined the problem for international law of the doctrine of military necessity, 
the following chapter will provide a normative overview of the way that the law should be 
regarded. As will become clear, any further expansion in regard to the legitimisation of military 





728 For a detailed discussion on the political, legal and historical circumstances of the American Civil 
War, see generally Stephen Douglas Engle, All the President’s Statesmen: Northern Governors and 
the American Civil War (Marquette University Press, 2006); Lewis L Gould, Alexander Watkins 
Terrell: Civil War Soldier, Texas Lawmaker, American Diplomat (University of Texas Press, 2004); 
Jeremy Black, America As a Military Power, 1775–1865 (Greenwood Press, 2002) especially chapter 
7; Bruce Catton, America Goes to War: The Civil War and Its Meaning in American Culture 
(Wesleyan University Press, 1992); Leon Friedman (ed), The Law of War: A Documentary History – 
Volume 1 (Random House, 1972) especially ‘Treaties, Conventions and Agreements: The Lieber 
Code (1863)’; Mark E Neely, Lincoln and the Triumph of the Nation: Constitutional Conflict in the 
American Civil War (University of North Carolina Press, 2011). 






THE PLEA OF MILITARY NECESSITY AT THE US ARMY TRIALS, 
MANILA – A VALID DEFENCE AT INTERNATIONAL LAW? 
I. Introduction 
The excuse of ‘military necessity’ was argued by defendants at the US trials in Manila as a 
means to avoid criminal responsibility, although it was not raised to the same extent as the plea 
of superior orders. Defendants used military necessity as a way of explaining or excusing 
otherwise unlawful behaviour—behaviour which often involved atrocities committed against 
US and Allied POWs or Filipino non-combatants. The excuse of military necessity was 
predicated on the notion that the actions were necessary to achieve a military objective (and 
were therefore necessary—hence the term, ‘military necessity’). The Manila trials show that it 
was not used as a defence per se, but was used by the defence to mitigate or justify the accused’s 
actions in committing acts such as killing and/ or torture. 
In the Manila trials, Japanese defendants predominantly raised military necessity on the basis 
that their harsh actions were required to subjugate a fierce guerrilla insurgency being waged 
against their forces. Military necessity also arose in the context of summary executions of US 
and Allied POWs—particularly of downed airmen and POW escapees. In addition, military 
necessity was raised in situations whereby the Japanese forces killed US military personnel 
hors de combat by virtue of captivity, injury or sickness. Often the accused argued it was 
necessary to kill the victims simply to save their own lives, such as in the case of Major 
Mikami. 
However, the cases show that even as a factor in mitigation, military necessity was mostly 
unsuccessful and did not relieve the accused of criminal responsibility. This was despite the 
plethora of US municipal law, international law, military law, and scholarly commentary in 
existence at the time regarding the validity of the plea of military necessity as a basis for 
relieving criminality in certain contexts. The fact that tribunals were reluctant to entertain 
military necessity as a valid plea—even to mitigate the sentence—was understandable given 
the plea was often associated with extremely brutal acts committed against US soldiers and 
Filipino civilians. Any precedent set by allowing military necessity to mitigate the sentence 
would have profound consequences for many Japanese who were on trial for killing US 
soldiers, and military commissions could not entertain an accused escaping criminal 
responsibility under such circumstances. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the US military’s interpretation of military necessity 
at the time. Integral to that discussion is an important legal memo provided by Lieutenant 




military necessity. 731  Robinson’s memo is important because it provides a then 
contemporaneous record of military necessity as it was interpreted at the trials. As far as can 
be determined, it is one of the only legal advices in existence that provides a detailed overview 
of the doctrine. 
II. US Army’s Legal Interpretation of Military Necessity at the Manila 
War Crimes Trials 
A. The Use of Force against Filipino Insurgents not Prima Facie Unlawful 
From the beginning of the Manila trials in 1945, it quickly became apparent to both prosecution 
and defence counsel that additional direction from legal sources was required on how to tackle 
the difficult issue of military necessity when raised as a defence to war crimes. Clarification of 
the legal position of the doctrine of ‘necessity’ was particularly warranted in the Philippines 
trials given that many of the crimes alleged to have been committed by Japanese forces were 
committed as part of Japan’s attempt to subjugate a fierce Filipino insurgency. Japanese forces 
were therefore engaging in the use of force to put down pockets of resistance to their authority, 
thus, the case was made by some defendants that tough measures were required, and they 
contended this was a legitimate tactic under international law. 
Pertinent legal arguments regarding Japan’s use of force against Filipino insurgents could be 
made if it was deemed that Filipino guerrilla activities were unlawful. In addressing this 
problem, US lawyers expended some considerable time and effort in formulating a legal 
argument that acknowledged the legal conundrum, and as is discussed below, validated the 
actions of Filipino guerrillas in their resistance against Japan. The legal position adopted by 
the US thus avoided the uncomfortable situation of legitimising the excuse of military 
necessity. 
B. Designing a ‘Fit for Purpose’ Definition of Military Necessity 
In the Manila trials, military necessity needed to be defined in such a way that it did not extend 
to the actions of Japanese defendants, while at the same time did not implicate the US and its 
Allies in war crimes—particularly over the use of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons against 
Japanese civilians. If the elements of military necessity were defined too narrowly, the US may 
not have been able to justify its own actions (and the actions of its troops) during the course of 
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the War. The US itself might very well have been accused of committing the very crimes for 
which they were holding Japanese individuals accountable. 
Likewise, any definition that was too broad meant that the perpetrators of heinous acts against 
US and Allied combatants and non-combatants, might evade criminal responsibility. One 
interpretation of acceptable conduct in the guise of military necessity might allow a broad, and 
possibly unlimited array of actions that would make prosecuting war crimes an impossible task. 
C. Towards a Theory of Military Necessity 
For this purpose, in October 1945, Lieutenant Walter H Robinson of the US Army provided 
some guidance on the matter when he drafted a memo in which he attempted to deal with the 
specific content of, and limitations to, the doctrine of military necessity. 732 In the memo, 
Lieutenant Robinson outlined a range of factors associated with the doctrine and described the 
general legal position of military necessity at law and the application of military necessity in 
relation to people and property. 
As will be shown below, however, Robinson’s memo appears predominantly designed to 
provide a legal justification for denying military necessity as a defence for Japanese defendants 
accused of war crimes. At the very least, Robinson’s memo could be described as an attempt 
to define the doctrine in very specific terms. The memo suited the US prosecution while, at the 
same time, avoided the embarrassing situation of an interpretation too broad that it might 
prevent the US from justifying the killings of hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians and 
annihilating vast areas of property and infrastructure throughout Japan. 
In fairness to Lieutenant Robinson’s analysis, there is little doubt that boundaries needed to be 
applied to the doctrine since, without limitations, any allegation of war crimes could be 
defeated due to ‘necessity’. In other words, the more broadly military necessity is defined, the 
more likely it would be that perpetrators of cruel and inhumane acts could escape criminal 
sanction. Such a proposition would have been unpalatable to the Allies given the scale of loss 
in terms of human life and property due to Japan’s military activities during the War. 
D. No Clear Direction on Onus and Standard of Proof 
Lieutenant Robinson’s legal advice was silent on important matters regarding the onus and 
standard of proof required when raising the excuse of military necessity. He did not make it 
clear whether the defendant needed to prove military necessity beyond reasonable doubt or to 
the lesser civil standard, on the balance of probabilities. From the cases, one can extrapolate 
that the accused needed to do several things. They firstly needed to raise the excuse and, in 
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doing so, provide sufficient evidence that would substantiate a reasonable basis on which 
commissions could even consider it. 
Once the excuse was raised, the onus was squarely placed on the accused to prove military 
necessity to a very high standard. Although there does not appear to be any discussion in 
relation to the nomenclature of the standard, it would appear that the relevant standard for 
which the accused must prove is akin to the higher standard of beyond reasonable doubt—a 
difficult task for the accused given the limited resources available to defence teams. 
E. General Statement of the Rule: the Three Interdependent Principles 
Robinson began his discussion of military necessity by outlining the background of and 
rationale for, the doctrine. He submitted that ‘military necessity was not the sole influence 
determining the laws of war, but that it was … subject to other principles’. 733  By ‘other 
principles’, he was making the obvious point that military necessity is subject to certain 
requirements under international law and could never be used as an excuse for all acts 
committed in the course of war. On this point he referred to the legal writings of Grotius and 
Hersch Lauterpact.734 To further this point, he stated that the limits of military necessity are 
predicated on three separate, but ‘interdependent principles’ which were incorporated in 
paragraph 4 of the US FM27-10: 
(a) The principle of military necessity [is] subject to the principles of humanity and chivalry; 
(b) The principle of humanity, prohibiting employment of any such kind or degree of 
violence as is not actually necessary for the purpose of the war; and 
(c) The principle of chivalry, which denounces and forbids resort to dishonorable means, 
expedients, or conduct.735 
Robinson also cited paragraph 23 of the US FM27-10 which stated that ‘military necessity 
justifies resort to all the measures which are indispensable for securing this object and which 
are not forbidden by the modern laws and customs of war’.736 As further evidence for his legal 
advice regarding the correct legal position of military necessity, he cited, with approval, the 
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work of C Hyde and emphasised that military necessity ‘does not embody a formulation of 
excuses for lawlessness’.737 
Robinson relied heavily on various aspects of the Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land 1907 (‘Hague IV’) for his analysis. The Hague IV (together with 
its annexed Regulations) was intended to provide an international standard on the acceptable 
limits of armed conflict. Specifically, Robinson cited the Preamble which provided that, inter 
alia, the parties to the Convention ‘desire to diminish the evils of war, as far as military 
requirements permit… .’ He went on to cite Article 22: ‘[t]he right of belligerents to adopt 
means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited’.738 Furthermore, he cited Article 23 which 
forbids a range of specific actions that was regarded as being unjust, unfair and unethical. 
Article 23(a) – (g) prohibits: 
(a) employment of poison gas; 
(b) killing or treacherous wounding; 
(c) killing or wounding of an enemy that has ‘laid down his arms’ or no longer has the means 
of defence; 
(d) declaration that ‘no quarter’ will be given; 
(e) … intention to cause ‘unnecessary suffering’; 
(f) improper use of flags of truce or other national and international insignia; 
(g) unnecessary destruction or seizure of enemy property;739 
Further to the list of prohibited conduct are those matters that are contained in subsequent 
treaties, such as the rule against killing or mistreating prisoners of war, as stated in the 1929 
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Geneva Prisoners of War Convention (GC 1929).740 According to Robinson, belligerents must 
adhere to these rules, and the rules themselves are ‘not subject to or suspended by 
circumstances of military necessity, no matter how compelling these may be’741 and ‘military 
necessity does not justify the violation of any of these treaty rules, even though in an extreme 
case compliance with the rule might cause the belligerent to lose the war.’742 
The fact that Robinson appeared to give such weight to the Hague IV is hardly surprising given 
that Japan and the United States were both parties to the Hague Convention. However, although 
a signatory, Japan failed to ratify the later Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War, so it is 
debatable whether Robinson’s analysis in relation to Japan is correct in so far as it includes 
Japan being bound by the provisions as in the Prisoner of War Convention. Despite the 
ambiguity on this point, Robinson argued that the body of international law already in existence 
up until the close of the Pacific War made it clear that the correct characterisation of military 
necessity should be distinguished from the ‘doctrine of military necessity (Kriegsraison) 
propounded by certain German writers’.743 
The danger of accepting the earlier conceptualisations of military necessity along the lines of 
the Kriegsraison doctrine, meant that almost any action could be justifiable—no matter how 
brutal or inhumane—provided there was some proof of the nexus between the act and the 
necessity to achieve the military objective. Such a broad interpretation would, according to 
Robinson, mean that ‘necessity knows no law’.744 Instead, he set about in his advice to further 
develop a framework for the lawful application of the doctrine of military necessity based on 
what could be described as restrictive principles derived from the various conventions and 
treaties previously in force. 
F. Military Necessity as it Related to War Crimes against ‘People’ 
When applying the doctrine of military necessity in so far as it affected people (combatants 
and non-combatants), Robinson argued that the extent of lawful force that is justified on the 
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grounds of necessity, can be found in Hague Regulations and the Rules of Land Warfare (FM 
27-10). Paragraph 24 of the FM 27-10 provided that military necessity allows: 
(a) All direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies, and of other persons whose 
destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of war; 
(b) The capturing of every armed enemy, and of every enemy of importance to the hostile 
government, or of peculiar danger to the captor.745 
In relation to paragraph 24(a), there is no further discussion from Robinson as to the types of 
‘destruction’ that is ‘incidentally unavoidable’. On this point he merely cites paragraph 25 of 
the FM27-10 which provides 
Military necessity does not admit of cruelty … that is, the infliction of suffering merely for spite 
or revenge; nor of maiming or wounding except in combat; nor of torture to extort confessions. 
… It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy.746 
Paragraph 25 makes it clear that ‘maiming or wounding’ is not permitted, unless in combat or 
torture. 
G. Ambiguity in Relation to the Relevant Test to Determine the Meaning of ‘Cruelty’ – 
Subjective or Objective Determination? 
Paragraph 25 provides a further problem in so far as it relates to the meaning of ‘cruelty’. The 
provision is unclear as there is no indication as to an appropriate test. Accordingly, a literal 
reading of the paragraph would make cruelty acceptable per se, so long as it is not accompanied 
by, or occurs as a result of, ‘spite’ or ‘revenge’. In the absence of evidence proving the accused 
acted with ‘spite’ or ‘revenge’, liability would not follow. A determination of what constitutes 
‘cruelty’, therefore, would require a subjective assessment of what was in the mind of the 
accused at the time of committing the offence. On that basis, the fault element, mens rea, is an 
integral part in the determination of military necessity. 
An alternative interpretation of whether ‘cruelty’ existed, is based on an objective assessment. 
An objective assessment examines the accused’s actions in light of the surrounding 
circumstances in which the offending took place and asks whether the accused’s conduct was 
reasonable. In other words, the determination of ‘cruelty’ based on the existence of ‘spite’ and 
‘revenge’ is not dependant on what the accused was thinking, but an assessment of the 
circumstances that led to the offending behaviour. Potentially that would allow a wide range 
of matters to be considered. 
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An objective assessment tends to favour the prosecution’s argument. This is because acts of 
cruelty and violence are more difficult to justify to a reasonable observer. On the other hand a 
subjective analysis seeks to determine whether the accused ‘subjectively’ believed it necessary 
to act the way they did—which is more difficult to prove since this is an assessment of the 
machinations of the mind of the accused. 
Unfortunately, as part of his analysis, Robinson did not consider these points and appeared 
oblivious to the ambiguities that FM 27-10 paragraph 25 provided regarding the definitions of 
‘cruel’ and ‘torture’. The fact remains that it is unclear whether Robinson’s avoidance of any 
discussion of these points was deliberate or whether it was inadvertent. However, there was 
certainly no disadvantage to the prosecution by Robinson not resolving these points. 
H. Whether Objectively and Subjectively Determined, Defendants had Good Arguments 
in Places 
Given that Japanese forces throughout the Philippines were mired in a fierce and bloody 
struggle with Filipino guerrilla forces—coupled with the US forces inflicting heavy casualties 
as they advanced towards retaking the Philippines—the argument could quite easily be made 
that the Japanese were acting out of military necessity. Whether based on a subjective or 
objective assessment, the argument was made that acts such as torture, which was commonly 
inflicted by the Kenpeitai, was a military requirement in an attempt to extract information from 
anyone who was suspected of having information about Filipino guerrilla activities. Likewise, 
food and resources for POWs and other non-combatants was in such short supply due to the 
success of the Allied counteroffensive, which impacted the way that Japanese guards behaved 
in the camps. 
Such arguments, however, were not sufficient to sway commissions and a defendant who relied 
on military necessity in those circumstances was not successful whether pledging it either as a 
complete defence to criminal responsibility or to mitigate the sentence. 
I. Military Necessity as it Related to ‘Property’ 
 
In discussing the law of military necessity as it related to property, Robinson clearly expressed, 
in no uncertain terms, that ‘no attempt is made to summarize all the laws of war relating to 
property.’ 747  That he ignored the plethora of law—including US law, foreign law, and 
international law—that could have provided valuable precedents for the US military 
commissions, is curious to say the least. Robinson did, however, rely on the Hague 
Regulations.748 Here he cited a number of provisions that related to property and the rules 
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associated with the protection as well as the lawful destruction of property in the context of 
military necessity. Specifically, of the Hague Regulations he cited included, 
Article 23(g) 
It is especially forbidden … 
To destroy or seize the enemy’s property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively 
demanded by the necessities of war. 
Article 46 
Family honour and rights, the lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious 
convictions and practice, must be respected. Private property cannot be confiscated. 
Article 56 
The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, 
the arts and sciences, even when State property, shall be treated as private property. 
All seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions of this character, historic 
monuments, works of art and science, is forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal 
proceedings. 
III. Cases 
A. United States v Major Mikami Koe Imperial Japanese Army, 
Manila, 4–13 June 1946 
The case against Major Mikami Koe749 illustrates the dilemma that exists for military 
commanders in the field when faced with decisions that involve protecting the lives of 
fellow soldiers at the expense of civilians and other non-combatants. Mikami’s case 
touches on what, in contemporary parlance, is often referred to as collateral damage 
whereby the loss of civilian life, while unfortunate, is deemed necessary to ensure military 
objectives are achieved.750 The one difference in Mikami’s case, however, was that the 
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decision to take civilian lives was not carried out with the goal of achieving military 
objectives, but to avoid detection and likely annihilation by advancing US forces. 
The Charge 
Mikami was charged with violating the laws of war on the grounds that he committed the wilful 
and unlawful killing of six unarmed, non-combatant Filipino civilians.751 The killings, which 
were not disputed, occurred on 16 September 1943 near Langasian on the island of Mindanao 
and were carried out on the orders of Mikami by several members of his unit. The victims 
consisted of one adult male, two adult women, and three children aged twelve, ten and four. 
For his role in the killings, Mikami was sentenced to death by hanging by a military 
commission in Manila on 13 June 1946. 
Evidence for the Prosecution 
On the day of the killings, the victims, who were travelling together on a boat going upstream 
near Sagunto on Mindanao Island, were intercepted by 21 Japanese survivors of the 1st 
Battalion, 77th Regiment, 30th Division of the IJA.752 The soldiers were retreating from an area 
that had seen some of the bloodiest fighting in the Philippine theatre. They were coming in the 
opposite direction in an attempt to avoid detection from US forces engaged in mopping up 
operations in the mountains of Mindanao.753 
When the six civilians were spotted by the Japanese, they were forced ashore and interrogated 
by Mikami. He was unaware that Japan had already surrendered in August as all 
communications between Mikami’s group and other retreating Japanese units had been 
destroyed. 754  The civilians produced several leaflets written in Japanese that contained 
information regarding the surrender. Mikami concluded the leaflets were based on a lie and, 
shortly after, issued orders to execute the entire civilian group on the basis they were spies for 
US forces. There was no evidence that a trial was conducted.755 
The prosecution produced photographic evidence of the victims’ remains which, despite 
decomposition, bore marks of severe violence. The bodies showed signs that death may have 
been caused by sharp instrument trauma caused by a bayonet or knife. All of the victims 
showed signs of lacerations to the abdomen, chest and other parts of the body. The clothing of 
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the two women and female child had been removed. The evidence also suggested that the four-
year-old boy was shot in the head.756 
Defence’s Argument Based on Necessity to Preserve Lives of Japanese Soldiers 
The defence offered several arguments to defend the charge against Mikami. The primary 
argument focused on the fact that he made the decision to execute the civilians based on 
necessity. His primary objective was to ensure the survival of his unit. Due to the intensity of 
the fighting from which they were fleeing, Mikami’s unit had been reduced from a force of 700 
men to 21 survivors. Mikami knew that a warning had been issued to civilians to stay away 
from the area. It was apparently issued prior to the Japanese surrender so, that when Mikami 
and his group apprehended the civilians, he was under a mistaken belief that Japan was still at 
war with the Allies. 
He claimed that because he knew of other instances where children had been used as spies for 
the US and guerrillas, he could not risk allowing any of the group—including the children—to 
reveal their position to Filipino guerrillas or the US Army. For that reason, he ordered their 
execution. Mikami claimed the executions were made because of military necessity to maintain 
secrecy to avoid detection by the advancing US forces.757 The defence also claimed that when 
Mikami became aware, in the following days, that Japan had actually surrendered, no other 
civilians were harmed, and he too surrendered shortly after. 
Military Necessity Not Proven 
Unfortunately for Mikami, the original Commission—and later the reviewing authority—did 
not believe that the evidence supported the defence’s argument about the necessity to execute 
the six Filipino civilians. The reviewer, Colonel Shaw JA, stated that, 
Reasons assigned by the accused for the killings are so patently devoid of merit as to render any 
discussion of details unnecessary … Neither the members of the commission nor Major General 
J G Christiansen … recommend clemency. In a ‘petition for retrial’ filed by the accused, he again 
seeks to justify his act as a necessary and urgent battlefield measure. However, this cannot be 
considered a mitigating factor under the circumstances.758 
The decision of the original military commission, death by hanging, was upheld and the order 
to execute the sentence was affirmed. 
The evidence was clear that Mikami ordered the killings and that the killings were carried out 
under those orders. However, in some respects, the strength of the excuse of necessity in 
Mikami’s case is not without merit. When faced with the real possibility that he and his unit 
could be annihilated if information of their whereabouts was passed on to US forces, Mikami 
made a decision in the field to eliminate that possibility. The prosecution neither presented any 
 
 






evidence of, nor sought to argue for, the proposition that the victims were killed for blood lust, 
as had been the case in other trials. The decision Mikami took to kill the civilians was taken to 
ensure the survival of men who were fleeing for their lives. 
The fact that the accused raised military necessity as a possible excuse—or, at the very least, 
as a reason for the killings—should have enlivened a discussion of aspects associated with 
mens rea. That Mikami’s defence team did not advance this line of inquiry, or at the very least 
attempt to focus the Commission’s attention on an analysis of the law of military necessity, is 
curious. The concept of ‘necessity’ would require a subjective analysis of what the accused 
may or may not have believed at the time of the commission of the offence. A subjective 
assessment would have been beneficial to the accused given that it would have made it possible 
to raise many external aspects (such as the dire conditions in which Mikami and the group 
found themselves). 
Necessity, by its nature, would require an exploration of the subjective elements at play in the 
mind of the accused that were created by an objective analysis of the surrounding events at the 
time of the offence. In other words, given the dire circumstances in which the accused found 
himself, his plight and that of his men depended on him taking drastic action to alleviate the 
possible—and probable in Mikami’s mind, given that fellow soldiers had been killed in this 
way—disclosure of their position to US forces. 
In any event, the Commission chose not to entertain the idea that military necessity played any 
part in the killings and represented a missed opportunity to develop, or at the very least, gain 
further insight into what constitutes military necessity. 
B. Trial of Corporal Ogo Yokio, Imperial Japanese Army, 
Manila, 27 February 1947 
Military commissions appeared unlikely to award latitude to junior NCOs on a finding of 
military necessity, even in circumstances where the accused appeared to be acting in self-
defence, as the trial of Corporal Ogo in February 1947, clearly showed. Ogo’s case was a trial 
involving a junior NCO being sentenced to death for striking a Filipino guerrilla with a 
‘bolo’.759 
The Charge 
Corporal Ogo was charged, along with others under his supervision and control, for violating 
the laws of war on the basis that he and his subordinates committed rape, unlawfully killed 
several Filipino non-combatants and that Ogo ‘permitted the killing’ of a Filipino combatant.760 
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For his part in the atrocities, Corporal Ogo was sentenced to death. His co-accused each 
received sentences varying from 15 years to life imprisonment. 
The findings of the original Commission were later reviewed and, as part of that review, the 
reviewing authority looked at Ogo’s part in the killing. Ogo’s defence team claimed he was 
acting in self-defence on the basis that his life and the lives of his six subordinates depended 
upon him killing the victim. 
Self-defence or ‘military necessity’? 
It was alleged, and seemingly accepted by the Commission, that Corporal Ogo was indeed 
attacked by Elliser (a Filipino guerrilla). The skirmish occurred while Ogo and his men were 
on patrol. Elliser attempted to attack Ogo but was subdued. Ogo then disarmed Elliser of his 
‘bolo’ and stabbed the victim in the back. At that point Elliser took flight but later collapsed. 
He was then hit in the back of the head by Private Eto and this was said to be the blow that 
killed him. The question for the Commission was, who was ultimately responsible for the 
death? 
The Commission looked at the law surrounding self-defence and held that while Ogo did have 
a reasonable and valid excuse of self-defence at the time he was attacked, he could not rely on 
that defence after the victim was subdued with a stab wound. The Commission held that at the 
time Elliser was lying disarmed on the ground, he no longer posed a clear and present danger 
to Ogo or his men. On that basis, Ogo allowing Eto to land the fatal blow on the victim, went 
beyond the realms of legality. 
The killing of the victim was not out of necessity and allowing such conduct to take place was 
deemed by the Commission to be unlawful. The original death sentence against Ogo was 
upheld. 
IV. The Restriction of Military Necessity as a Defence at International Law – 
A Valid Approach? 
Several important points emerged from the Manila trials in relation to the defence of military 
necessity. As shown in this chapter and in Chapter 8, the US trials were consistent with extant 
jurisprudence at the time regarding the approach to restrict the application of military necessity. 
The Manila trials thereby restricted any possible expansion of the doctrine becoming further 
legitimised at international law during those trials. The approach the tribunals adopted was 
consistent with Lieutenant Robinson’s analysis of the underlying jurisprudence at the time 
regarding military necessity.761 
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The question is, however, whether such an approach was, and remains, a legitimate practice? 
In other words, should the doctrine of military necessity be expanded to act as a defence to war 
crimes by allowing a broad range of acts to constitute a legitimate excuse to criminal 
responsibility on the basis that those acts were done in the course of securing a military 
objective?  
If one is to use as the standard by which to assess this question, the jurisprudence coming from 
the cases and the lex scripta—such as Articles 22 and 23 of Hague Regulations of 1899 and 
1907,762 the Declaration of St Petersburg, 763 Article 14 of the Lieber Code,764 the US Army 
Filed manual 27-10,765 United States v Russell,766 Mitchell v Harmony,767 Hardman’s case,768 
and the Hostage case,769 and the cases of Mikami770 and Ogo771—there are strong grounds to 
argue that the military commissions in Manila were correct in their application to restrict the 
expansion of military necessity becoming further legitimised as a defence at international 
criminal law. There were clear signals in the early cases and the law that military necessity 
should be restricted in its application due to the dangers associated with legitimising, 
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potentially, unlimited killing and destruction to property so long as it occurred on the basis of 
securing military objectives.  
Other trials that were occurring in Europe at the same time as the Manila trials adopted a similar 
position by restricting the application and legitimacy of military necessity becoming a standard 
defence to allegations of war crimes—the Hostage case, as discussed above, was a good 
example of the Allied attempts to restrict the doctrine of military necessity becoming a 
legitimate doctrine by refusing to accept that the killing of Allied POWs constituted a valid 
practice under any circumstances.772  
The problem with expanding or further legitimising the doctrine of military necessity by 
allowing it to become a stronger defence for the accused, is the potentially unlimited scope that 
it would provide for those charged with war crimes seeking an excuse for actions that would 
otherwise constitute criminal behaviour. If the doctrine of military necessity was expanded 
further, any conduct that causes harm to humans or property damage, could potentially be 
justified as being necessary so long as the conduct occurred in the context of war.  
The fact that there is no evidence that military necessity was given any reasonable credence at 
Manila is perhaps one reason why the tribunals did not provide further clarity around 
Robinson’s analysis of the ‘general rule’ relating to the ‘three interdependent principles’ or 
define in greater detail the elements of what constitutes a valid assertion of military necessity—
for them the question of military necessity was settled and there appears very little difference 
with current laws. The approach to limit the use of the doctrine of military necessity at the 
Manila trials is, therefore, one of the enduring legacies of those trials. 
*** 
This chapter has outlined the historical and legal contexts of military necessity as it was applied 
at the Manila War Crimes Trials. 
The following chapter examines the Manila trials through the ‘just war’ theoretical framework. 
The purpose of this chapter will be to determine the extent and nature of ‘justice’ that was 
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AN ASSESSMENT OF ‘JUSTICE’ AT THE MANILA TRIALS 
THROUGH THE ‘JUST WAR’ LENS 
In accordance with the ‘just war’ tradition, this thesis asserts that there is sufficient evidence 
to conclude that the Manila trials were ‘just’ and provided Japanese defendants and—to the 
extent that is possible—the victims of the Japanese occupation, an appropriate level of justice 
in accordance with the ‘just war’ tradition. The reasons for this assertion is predicated on the 
fact that the US Army trials in Manila: were created under legitimate authority; applied and 
developed law according to stare decisis by relying on, and developing existing international 
criminal law doctrine; and applied the criminal standard that required the prosecution to prove 
the case against the defendants beyond reasonable doubt. Importantly, there is very little 
evidence that the Manila trials engaged in disproportionate sentencing or indiscriminate 
prosecution. 
The ‘just war’ tradition is a useful framework to assess the conduct of belligerents at all levels 
throughout each phase of war because it can assist with identifying acceptable conduct in 
relation to war—before, during and after hostilities.773 The ‘just war’ tradition can be used to 
assess several important questions in relation to war: whether a war is justified in its 
conception;774 whether it is ‘just’ in terms of how it is prosecuted once hostilities commence;775 
and whether the conduct post war is legitimate in terms of the conduct of the victors towards 
the vanquished.776  
As such, the ‘just war’ tradition comprises three limbs: 
(1) Jus ad bellum: legitimation of war based on initial justification for going to war 
(2) Jus in bello: legitimate and lawful conduct ‘in’ or during war 
(3) Jus post bellum: legitimate conduct after the cessation of war.  
 
The Tokyo trials found that Japan embarked on a war of aggression and convicted 27 senior 
Japanese military and civilian leaders for the planning and preparation of the War. In that 
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regard, the Tokyo trials primarily examined the jus ad bellum or the justification of the reasons 
for Japan embarking on war. In contrast, this thesis is primarily concerned with the second, and 
the third limbs of the ‘just war’ tradition. 
Opponents of the ‘just war’ doctrine can be cast into two camps: pacifists who strictly oppose 
war under any circumstances and ‘permissivists’ who believe that the state should have very 
few (if any) limits imposed upon it with regards to fulfilling its policy agenda, including the 
right to employ whatever force it deems necessary to promote its own interests.777 The pacifists 
fail to appreciate that war, unfortunate as it seems, is a reality and will occur irrespective of 
any ethical objections. Permissivists, on the other hand, while more reflective of the realities 
of the frailties of peace, fail to acknowledge the humanitarian consequences arising from 
unobstructed state action.778  
Jus in bello and Japanese conduct during the occupation of the Philippines 
In accordance with jus in bello, belligerents must at all times uphold certain standards of 
conduct whilst engaging in war and if conduct falls below an acceptable standard, then the 
party whose conduct is substandard, is said to have engaged in an ‘unjust’ war. Thomas Nagel 
suggests that political and military strategists view the death of innocent civilians, while 
regrettable, but a necessity to military strategy and long-term outcomes.779 In determining the 
requisite standard, in accordance with jus in bello there are several principles that need to be 
shown to determine whether a party is behaving or has behaved in a ‘just’ way. These are: 
‘proportionality’, ‘discrimination’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘necessity’.780  
Discrimination and proportionality operate to restrict the level of violence of war and the scope 
of those who are affected by its violence. These principles require the belligerent to direct only 
so much force against a legitimate target as is required to affect the legitimate military 
objective. The difficulty lies in determining what is a legitimate target and the extent of force 
required to suppress that target. The practicalities of warfare make this problematic at times, 
as the defendants claimed. The killing of non-combatants, for example, is permissible under 
certain circumstances where the killing was done to achieve a legitimate military objective. 
The Manila trials commonly convicted those defendants who it believed violated the principles 
of discrimination and proportion. For example, in Onishi’s case781 the defendant was convicted 
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for the murder of Filipino non-combatants after Japanese forces took revenge for guerrilla 
attacks. Other cases where defendants were convicted for the indiscriminate and 
disproportionate killing of Filipino non-combatants included Kono’s case, 782 Ko’s case,783 
Kato’s case,784 and Nagahama’s case.785  
The principle of ‘responsibility’ in just in bello operates to hold persons responsible for certain 
acts committed during war, whether or not those acts were committed by the defendant. The 
purpose of the responsibility principle upholds the moral requirement that someone should be 
held responsible for war crime under certain circumstances. The command responsibility and 
superior orders cases were an attempt by the tribunals to provide legal reasoning to pronounce 
guilt on the basis of responsibility.  
Many of the command responsibility cases were tried against defendants who did not 
personally participate in the crimes but were, according to the tribunals, morally and legally 
responsible for the wrongdoing. The Manila trials found criminal responsibility on the basis 
that the commander failed to prevent the crimes, failed to punish the perpetrators, where the 
defendant had knowledge or suspicion of the crimes, where the commander incited the 
subordinates into carrying out the crimes, or even where the commander failed to effectively 
control his subordinates. The cases mentioned above are also examples of the tribunals 
interpreting the law so as to attribute responsibility for wrongdoing, as was the case of Osugi,786  
Similarly the principle of responsibility was instrumental in attributing criminal wrongdoing 
to those defendants seeking to invoke the defence of superior orders. The Manila trials did not 
allow the defence of superior orders to prevent a conviction for war crimes on the basis that 
the criminal acts were committed due to the existence of criminal orders. In the event that clear 
evidence existed that the defendant acted out of superior orders, the tribunals enforced the 
responsibility principle and finding him guilty but allowed the sentence to be mitigated on the 
basis of superior orders. As such, the superior orders doctrine could only reduce the sentence 
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but not absolve the defendant from criminal responsibility. Cases that illustrate these points are 
Otsuka,787 Shin,788 Tanaka and Hayashi,789 and Toyota.790 
The necessity principle was strictly enforced is so far as the tribunals never acknowledged that 
conduct of the Japanese defendants constituted a valid defence to war crimes against people or 
property on the basis of military necessity. Cases such Mikami 791  and Ogo illustrate this 
point.792 
Jus Post Bellum 
The jus post bellum limb of the ‘just war’ tradition looks at the way justice operates after war. 
The jus post bellum is an examination of the way in which the victors enforce terms associated 
with surrender, the nature of war crimes trials and prosecutions, whether compensation and 
reparations are applied, whether the rights of the vanquished are recognised and any other 
aspects associated with discerning the ‘nature of the peace’ after cessation of hostilities.793 In 
relation to war crimes trials, Orend argues that ‘proportionality’ and ‘discrimination’ are 
crucial elements needed to satisfy just post bellum.794 In so far as proportionality relates to war 
crimes trials, according to Orend, in order for justice to occur the victors need to ensure that 
the number of defendants prosecuted and the nature of punishment is proportionate and 
reflective of the crimes committed during the conflict. 795  Orend also argues that those 
prosecuted should be held accountable only for the crimes for which they are responsible.796 
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An assessment of the number of trials carried out by the US at Manila indicates that there were 
similar conviction rates to other trials conducted by the US throughout the Asia-Pacific.797 For 
instance, the conviction rate at Manila was 90% of all defendants tried, while the conviction 
rates at Yokohama was 85%, China 89%, and the Pacific Island trials was 91%. The total 
average conviction rate for all US trials was 87% so there is not a strong indication that the 
Manila trails disproportionately convicted defendants.  
The Manila trials did, however, have a relatively low acquittal rate (9%) when compared to the 
total average (13%). However, the differences between the Manila trials and other US trials 
was striking when comparing the rate of death sentences and is a cause for some concern. At 
Manila 42% of those convicted received the death sentence. This was very high when 
compared to the Yokohama trials (5%), China trials (13%), and the Pacific trials (8%). One 
explanation for this high variance is that other trials, particularly Yokohama, were concerned 
with a range of offences, including relatively minor assaults and property offences and as such 
dealt with a high volume of cases.  
In contrast, the Manila trials dealt with what appear to be most severe cases involving murder 
and torture against US POWs and non-combatants, and to a lesser extent, sexual assault and 
rape committed against Filipino women. Arguably, a further reason why the US Army trials in 
Manila had a high rate of death sentences, may have had something to do with the ousting of 
US forces from the Philippines in the early stages of the War. The loss of the Philippines to the 
US may have been a humiliating loss and coupled with enormous US casualties during that 
campaign and the subsequent Japanese occupation, the trials were a way to exercise revenge 
against the Japanese. However, there is scant evidence of such a proposition in the trial 
documents and it would be pure conjecture to argue that the US tribunals sought widescale 
vicarious revenge against Japanese soldiers for military and foreign policy failings of their 
leaders.  
In relation to the ‘discrimination’ principle of jus post bellum, the Manila trials did not appear 
to engage in indiscriminate prosecution of Japanese soldiers for war crimes. The cases 
reviewed showed that at most times there was a clear connection between those charged and 
the crimes for which they were charged. It must be said, however, that in some cases the 
connections were not always strong. For example, there were several cases involving superiors 
charged and convicted for war crimes committed by subordinates where the superior alleged 
he had no knowledge of his subordinates actions. In these cases, the tribunals appeared to 
accept a lower standard of proof and raised the required standard of responsibility incumbent 
upon a superior to know and control what his troops are doing at all times.798 
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The following section (Conclusion) ties together all three issues that were frequently raised in 
Manila—command responsibility and the defences of superior orders and military necessity. 
In the Conclusion the thesis returns to the central question posed at the beginning which is in 
what ways does the Manila trials provide any guidance for future war crimes trials, the law 
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TOWARDS AN ENDURING LEGACY OF THE MANILA TRIALS 
I. Thesis Question 
The central question posed at the beginning of this thesis asked how the jurisprudential 
approach to criminal responsibility at Manila contributes to, or provides guidance for other war 
crimes trials. This question relates to the normative aspects associated with how the law ought 
to be in so far as command responsibility, superior orders and military necessity are concerned. 
The short answer to the question is that the Manila trials provide a great deal of guidance. In 
addressing this part of the question, throughout the thesis I have provided an ontological 
account of the law as it was applied at the US Army trials in Manila in respect to command 
responsibility, superior orders and military necessity. These observations were then compared 
with other historical trials where command responsibility, superior orders and military 
necessity were at issue. 
There were obvious deficiencies in the way that the law was interpreted at Manila and this is 
borne out in blunt application and the possible errors in the construction of fundamental legal 
principles of criminal responsibility. In answer to the thesis question as to what guidance the 
trials provide for other war crimes trials, the following section provides a summary of the 
normative assessment of the way that law perhaps ought to be applied in respect to future war 
crimes trials that this thesis has advanced. 
II. Normative Assessment of the Law 
A. Command Responsibility 
As it has been shown, the Manila trials, and other trials throughout history, devised ways to 
hold superiors criminally responsible for the acts of subordinates. In theory, such an approach 
is desirable on a range of levels, namely, to ensure that superiors at all levels ensure their 
subordinates abide by law and do not commit war crimes. Furthermore, holding superiors to 
account when war crimes are committed also satisfies an innate sense of justice. 
However, as the cases from the Manila trials make it clear, several problems associated with 
command responsibility appear, including the fact that liability is sometimes attributed to 
superiors merely because they occupy positions of authority (known as contingent liability). If 
liability is attributable merely on the position a superior occupies, quite often to make the crime 
fit the necessary criminal elements of the offence, tribunals will adopt a broad interpretation of 
the mental element mens rea. The problem with manipulating or adapting the mental element 
of offences (which has been an enduring plank of the common law legal system) is that it makes 
a mockery of the underlying requirement of having to prove this element at all. The requirement 




time of the Manila trials, well established, fundamental legal principles of the criminal law. By 
relaxing the requirement of the prosecution to prove this element, other problems emerged, and 
how they should be dealt with is summarised below. 
Application of ‘contingent liability’: Contingent liability should be viewed with great caution 
and applied sparingly. The consequences of tribunals and commissions applying contingent 
liability will produce a situation whereby a person will be convicted despite, on occasions, not 
having any direct involvement in the crimes or not having any knowledge of the crimes. 
Contingent liability provides legal uncertainty. Contingent liability is a form of strict liability 
whereby an accused was convicted of offences merely due to the position he occupied. In many 
cases, it is highly questionable whether the accused was actually able to exercise any, let alone 
effective control over his troops. The joint trial of Lieutenant-Colonel Onishi Seiichi (‘Onishi’s 
case’) squarely raised this principle. In Onishi’s case, the Tribunal favoured circumstantial 
evidence for which they convicted based on the accused’s position. In other words, the criminal 
responsibility of the accused was ‘contingent’ upon the position he occupied at the time of the 
alleged offences. His conviction was not, it seemed, based on specific orders he gave or 
knowledge he had in relation to the offences. The notion of ‘contingent liability’ in the Manila 
trials was used to convict the accused based on the contingency associated with a person’s 
superior rank to that of the perpetrators.  
It is a well-established principle under international criminal law that to be liable for war crimes 
under the doctrine of command responsibility, a superior must have known ‘or had reason to 
know that the subordinate will commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take 
the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators’.799 
Mitchell argues that one of the benefits of applying contingent liability in this way is that it 
forces those in positions of authority to ‘control their subordinates and to establish objective 
standards of diligence’.800 There is merit in this suggestion. However, as Damaska points out, 
criminality for war crimes should be assigned to those who have clear responsibility for 
criminal wrongdoing.801 A further problem identified by Colonel Clarke in the Yamashita trial 
is that attributing liability to superiors simply based on the superior’s rank relative to the 
subordinate produces an ambiguous and, potentially, unlimited scope of liability.802 
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Broad interpretation of mens rea (especially, ‘knowledge’): There is a real danger in expanding 
or otherwise utilising a broad interpretation of mens rea to convict those under the doctrine of 
command responsibility. The problem goes to the very essence of having to prove the ‘guilty 
mind’ as it becomes a construction of the subjective mind of the accused based on an 
indeterminate number of variables. The loosening of the requirement of proving the guilty mind 
is an erosion of one of the most fundamental concepts in criminal law. Military commissions 
adopted a broad interpretation of the fault element in regard to ‘knowledge’. Often they 
presumed the accused would or should have known of war crimes being committed by 
subordinates. Onishi’s case was also a prime example of this.803 The conflation of would and 
should is problematic since ‘would’ is a determination of fact and ‘should’ is a normative 
assessment in the absence of evidence. Boister and Cryer have stated that for the ‘guilty mind’ 
or mens rea to be sufficiently proven for criminal responsibility, it is sufficient to prove that 
there is a ‘spectrum’ of knowledge.804 Such a spectrum would range from complete knowledge 
of the actions of the perpetrators to ‘constructive knowledge’ so that the superior may still be 
held liable on the basis that they would or ought805 have formed a reasonable assumption that 
crimes were being committed by their subordinates.806 Constructive knowledge was used in 
the IMTFE to convict senior Japanese military and civilians,807 as was also the situation in 
Yamashita’s case.808  
Subjective bias with disputed fact evidence: Where disputes arose regarding witness testimony, 
even where the accused’s version of events was substantiated with witness testimony, the 
commissions tended to favour prosecution witnesses. There was insufficient information 
contained in the cases that shows clearly why the tribunal members accepted the prosecution’s 
version of events where instances of conflicting evidence were presented. Perhaps a common 
aspect of war crimes is the perception that the victors get to determine the outcome of trials. 
The real or perceived aspects of ‘Victor’s Justice’ in relation to Allied war crimes trials has 
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been a constant source of criticism from those who claim the trials were biased on a range of 
levels.809  
The fact that there were such high conviction rates and so few acquittals could feed into the 
notion that there was an underlying bias against the Japanese accused at Manila. One lesson 
learnt from the Manila trials that applies for all war crimes trials is that ‘Victor’s Justice’ and 
its associated perceptions is real and is something that needs to be kept in mind for future war 
crimes trials.  
Ambiguities regarding charges relating to ‘disregarding and failing to discharge’ their duties: 
An oft-utilised charge centred on the commander’s failure to properly discharge their duty. 
However, nowhere was it apparent that the commission sought a delineation of what 
constituted ‘disregard’ and ‘failure to discharge’ one’s duties, or whether such duties varied 
according to rank and circumstances. The term ‘disregard’ was raised in the Yamashita trial 
when he was charged with ‘willful [sic] disregard and failure to discharge his duty…’.810 
Although Yamashita was ultimately convicted of the offence, very little discussion was 
provided on the meaning of the term and what specific actions would constitute ‘disregard’. 
The meaning of the term was also raised repeatedly after the Yamashita case, such as in the 
case of Lt-General Kono.811  
Kono’s charge stated that he did ‘unlawfully disregard and fail to discharge his duties in 
controlling the operations of members of his command by permitting them to commit brutal 
atrocities and other high crimes against the people of the United States and the Philippines’.812 
The defence raised many arguments about the meaning of the term and put a series of questions 
to the prosecution about the meaning of ‘disregard’ and how such actions led to a failure to 
discharge his duties. These questions went largely unanswered. Similar concerns arose in the 
case of Lt-General Ko Shiyoku. As in other cases, Ko was successfully convicted without the 
prosecution having to fully explain the meaning of the term ‘disregard’ and how Ko 
disregarded his duties in relation to the atrocities.  
There was no clear discussion from either the prosecution or the tribunal that sufficiently 
defined the term.  
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Broadening of the meaning of the charge ‘permit’ atrocities to occur: Military commissions 
broadened the meaning of ‘permit’ to include a range of instances where the accused neither 
gave permission nor took any pro-active steps to inquire or punish perpetrators. The 
commissions interpreted ‘permit’ to mean ‘acquiescence’, although the term was never fully 
explained throughout the trials. Conviction patterns indicate that the meaning of ‘permit’ could 
apply in any situation where a person held a position of seniority, atrocities were committed 
and there was no clear indication that the person ordered cessation of the atrocities or where 
the person took steps to punish the perpetrators.  
General definitions of ‘permit’ were applied to show that it meant ‘tolerate’ or give consent to 
or to authorise, or ‘to grant …license or liberty’.813 The trials made it clear that the act of 
‘permitting’ something to happen was expanded to include instances where permission was 
tacit or assumed to have been given, even if the person giving permission had no knowledge 
of the acts and there was no evidence of specific orders to commit the atrocities. The expanded 
definition of ‘permission’ enabled the prosecution to successfully convict a greater number of 
people than might otherwise have been the case. Definition ‘creep’ in relation to the term 
‘permit’, was another example of how the Manila trials sought to widen the scope of criminal 
responsibility. 
Application of intermediary liability: The commissions had a habit of making an intermediary 
criminally responsible for the actions or failures of higher entities (civilian or military entities). 
The conviction of Lt-General Ko Shiyoku was largely predicated on the wrongdoing of the 
Japanese Government and senior military for their part in failing to enforce the Geneva 
Convention in relation to US and Allied POWs. Ko was effectively made liable for the actions, 
or inactions, of others more senior to him, despite the apparent fact that he was unable to 
exercise effective control over those who committed the atrocities.  
Intermediary liability is problematic in law since its application lacks clarity as to who will be 
held liable and is therefore indiscriminate in nature. This is particularly apparent during war 
when the lines of command are varied and complex. The conviction of Ko in March 1946 gave 
the appearance that the tribunal punished Ko for wrongdoings in which he had no involvement. 
Cases such as Ko’s gave the appearance that the tribunal transcended doctrinal legal discourse 
and moved into a broader political discussion on the conduct of the War by his superiors. 
Broad interpretation of ‘effective control’: Similar to other terms that proved problematic in a 
definitional sense, so too was the meaning of ‘effective control’. The commissions applied a 
broad definition of ‘control’, whereby the accused could be held liable even when physically 
removed or otherwise somehow separated from atrocities committed. The broad definition of 
‘effective control’ was a further example of the tribunal applying the law to suit the 
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circumstances of the crime. Even if the accused was not present at the time atrocities were 
committed, under the broad definition of the term, they could be held criminally liable for the 
actions of others unless there was clear intervention or orders that were contrary to the actions 
of subordinates who committed the crimes. These convictions tended to be in the context of 
atrocities committed against US POWs so it was likely that the tribunals decision was based 
on crimes that had quite a considerable degree of emotive influence.  
Inconsistent sentencing due to ‘temporal disconnection’: Sentences varied substantially at 
times as military commissions applied inconsistent sentencing based on, for instance, the 
temporal disconnection between the date of the commission of the offence and the date of the 
trial. Where the trial was held in the latter part of the trial program, the accused had a greater 
chance of receiving a more lenient sentence. 
The primary concern with applying different sentences is that it leads to inconsistency for those 
convicted of similar offences. It also indicates that different standards were applied during the 
early stages of the trials as opposed to the latter stages and that those unfortunate enough to be 
tried earlier were at a distinct disadvantage compared to others who were tried later. Sentencing 
should be applied consistently over any trial process. One can only speculate why sentences 
varied according to time and there may have been a variety of reasons why the tribunals 
appeared to show greater leniency in relation to the sentence in the later trials, such as the 
political exigencies to finalise the trials.  
The application of the ‘temporal’ and ‘proximal’ principle: Where a superior personally 
engaged in one (or more) instance of war crimes it is sufficient to show that the same 
commander ordered other killings and is likewise guilty by the doctrine of command 
responsibility for other war crimes committed by subordinates within a reasonable ‘temporal’ 
and ‘proximal’ space. 
In the trial of 2nd Lieutenant Kato, he was found to have participated in some, but not all, of 
the killings. However, given the tribunal’s findings regarding his participation in some of the 
acts, he was also found guilty for other similar acts, even though there was insufficient evidence 
to place him at the scene at the time the acts took place. He was found guilty of all acts and 
was sentenced to death by hanging.  
The fact that the tribunal attributed liability to him in this way shows that they believed there 
was a ‘temporal’ and ‘proximal’ relationship between the acts he initially committed and other 
similar acts. Such a finding lacks basis in fact and leads to convictions purely on similar fact 
evidence.  
The inability to prevent, punish or deter atrocities is not a valid factor to mitigate the sentence: 
Failure to prevent and punish subordinates for war crimes is sufficient to constitute 
acquiescence of a mid-ranked officer. This would be the case even though no evidence existed 
that the accused had actual knowledge of the scale and nature of atrocities committed by 
subordinates. It was held that the inability to prevent atrocities was not a valid excuse and not 




The apparent refusal to mitigate the sentence for superiors who were, purportedly, unable to 
prevent their subordinates from committing atrocities was a constant sentencing pattern 
throughout the trials. The refusal of the tribunals to mitigate the sentence appears to fly in the 
face of facts presented by the defence, particularly in the latter stages of the Philippines 
campaign when Japan suffered huge losses in personnel and equipment. Such a situation would 
indicate that Japanese commanders were unable to control their forces unless they were in close 
proximity to the atrocities.  
There are little clues available to suggest why the tribunal did not accept factual evidence that 
would indicate the accused did, in fact, have little to no ability to prevent subordinates from 
committing atrocities in the field of battle. In any event, the arbitrary application of such a 
refusal indicates a flaw in sentencing at the trials.  
B. Superior Orders 
The main points in relation to the defence of superior orders coming from the Manila trials are 
as follows: 
Repeated disregard of evidence for, and a denial of, the validity of the defence of superior 
orders: Despite the existence of sound arguments for a defendant’s reliance on superior orders 
as either a defence or in mitigation of sentence, military commissions were reluctant to accept 
a plea of superior orders or to extend the doctrine further. 
Subjective bias due to the status/ role of the accused: Consideration to superior orders was 
often contingent upon the nature/ status of the accused as to whether military commissions 
would or would not accept superior orders to mitigate the sentence; Kentpeitai or others 
accused of committing offences against US military personnel were less likely to be successful 
in having their sentence mitigated on the basis of superior orders. 
Reliance on the defence of superior orders is akin to an admission of guilt: An accused who 
seeks to rely on the defence of superior orders ipso facto makes admissions to part or all of the 
acts for which they are charged. Defendants who raised superior orders fared no better than if 
they had denied the acts for which they were charged and not raised superior orders. 
Superior orders at times were accepted as a point of mitigation where evidence was clear that 
orders were promulgated from higher command: Some military commissions in Manila 
accepted that superior orders were relevant in so far as the sentence was concerned. Where 
evidence clearly showed the defendant was following orders from higher command, even 
where those orders were manifestly unlawful in the commission’s view, the commissions were 
prepared to reduce the sentence (particularly for sentences involving the death penalty) but not 
relieve the accused of complete criminal responsibility. 
The defence of superior orders can be considered as a means to mitigate the sentence (but not 
to absolve the accused from criminal responsibility) where certain criteria are established by 
the defendant: (1) where ambiguity exists regarding the lawfulness or unlawfulness of orders; 




to follow those orders, but did so out of legal compulsion; (4) where the accused derived no 
pleasure from and had no desire to and did not intend to commit such acts; and (4) where 
disobedience to those orders would result in severe punishment to the accused. 
C. Military Necessity 
The important points coming from the Manila trials in relation to the excuse of military 
necessity are as follows: 
1. A self-serving and malleable definition of military necessity: the legal definition of 
military necessity put forward by the US Army was self-serving in the sense that 
the definition did not extend to exclude the acts committed by US forces and Allies 
such as the bombing of Japanese cities. 
2. General Rule: Three Interdependent Principles: 
(a) The principle of military necessity [is] subject to the principles of humanity and 
chivalry; (b) The principle of humanity, prohibiting employment of any such kind or degree 
of violence as is not actually necessary for the purpose of the war; and (c) The principle of 
chivalry, which denounces and forbids resort to dishonorable means, expedients, or 
conduct. 
3. Ambiguous test in determining the elements of military necessity, particularly in 
relation to whether the fault element (mens rea) is subjective or objective: An aspect 
of military necessity requires that there be no ‘cruelty’ – to determine whether 
cruelty was present, there was no clear application in regard to whether the test was 
subjective (i.e. what was in the mind of the accused at the time of the offence), or 
objective (i.e. whether a reasonable person would consider the acts of the accused 
to be cruel given the circumstances). 
III. What is the Legacy of the US Army’s Manila Trials? 
The Manila trials with their immense corpus of case law and jurisprudence provide an 
intriguing archive of a series of trials conducted in the aftermath of a major conflict. This thesis 
has examined cases from those trials involving questions regarding command responsibility 
(both de jure and de facto command), and the defences of superior orders and military 
necessity. The large body of case law, lex scripta and jurisprudential commentary that came 
out of the Manila trials, in conjunction with other previous cases, provides an important 
indication of the normative basis of what the law is and what it ought to be regarding a person’s 
criminal responsibility. What is obtained from such an analysis is an intricate and complex 
view of the machinations of the law and how the law was and should be applied when 
determining a person’s criminal responsibility for war crimes. 
This research will, hopefully, allow researchers to understand and articulate the nature of law 




deteriorate on archival shelves. By understanding the nature of law we are better able to achieve 
just outcomes for the victims of war crimes by holding those responsible (both civilian and 
military) to account. 
As to whether the US Army trials in Manila were ‘just’, the answer to that question is that there 
is strong evidence that the trials did provide an appropriate level of justice to the defendants. 
Assessed insofar as the jus post bellum limb of the ‘just war’ theory, the US Manila trials 
exercised proportionality in terms of the number of Japanese defendants tried in relation to the 
number of atrocities committed. Although death sentences were not uncommon, the severity 
of punishment was not disproportionate to the nature of the crimes and was not unlike 
punishment meted out at other Allied war crimes trials. There remains some doubt, however, 
in relation to several cases where the tribunals applied what appeared to be indiscriminate 
responsibility so as to make someone accountable for war crimes. 
This problem notwithstanding, the US Manila war crimes trials did represent justice for the 
defendants and went some way towards addressing the crimes committed against the victims 
of Japanese atrocities. The fact that the US Army conducted trials in the first place, and the 
lengths taken to ensure justice was seen to be done, provides further insight into the importance 
placed on the desire of the US to ensure justice was done.  
Under international law it is clear that those in positions of command will have certain 
responsibilities and will be held accountable for failing to uphold those responsibilities. 
Likewise, subordinates will be held to account and will not be able to rely on such excuses as 
merely ‘obeying superior orders’ or because they believed they needed to satisfy a military 
objective. 
The problem becomes more complex, however, when the circumstances surrounding the 
accused’s conduct do not allow a straightforward application of facts to the law. There are a 
myriad of reasons that needs to be considered when determining criminal responsibility, and 
in the aftermath of major conflict this task is made even more difficult. In particular, every 
person is potentially susceptible to committing war crimes—not just those Japanese 
commanders and military personnel who committed crimes against humanity nearly 80 years 
ago. The clear and present threat of war crimes is an enduring phenomenon of the human 
project and decisions that bring nations to war and the conduct of that war once it commences, 
must be held under tight scrutiny. 
There is hardly a desire by our leaders to linger over past wars such as the Vietnam War and 
the more recent invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan. However, serious questions remain over the 
conduct of not only those involved in direct conflict, but the commanders (military and civilian) 
who were responsible for creating the conditions in which potential crimes were committed in 
the first place. If we are not prepared to examine the responsibility of our civilian leaders and 
military commanders for the possible commission of war crimes—just as the Allies exposed 
the Japanese and Axis leaders—then the complex array of war crimes jurisprudence that came 




The enduring question is whether we are now prepared to apply the law to past incidents of 
possible war crimes and dubious questions of criminal responsibility, in the same way as it was 
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